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1. SUMMARY: In these two cross-appeals, both sides attack

different portions of the three-judge d.ct's decision
regulating the relationship between the State of Washington and
four Indian tribes located within the State.

The Tribes

challenge the State's assertion of jurisdiction over them and
WC)v\d a\~(~ c_,I.M'\IMM\~ :tt T8 -la0. _r- wtru\c\_ ~VA\JL -~II)!:-" ho--o.. oF , .
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the State challenges the Tribes' refusal to comply with some of

c.

its taxing provisions.

2. FACTS: Appts in 78-60 are the Colville, Lummi and Makah
Indian Tribes.

All three are sovereign tribes recognized by

the United States that are governed ·-by a tribal council under a
constitution and by-laws approved by the Secy of the Interior.
All three tribes live on reservations located within the
geographic area of the State of Washington.
The source of the controversy in 78-60 is the State's
assertion of varying degrees of jurisdiction over the three
Tribes.

Based on the authority provided by Congress in Public

Law 83-280, the Wash. legislature in 1957 enacted Chapter 240,
which authorized the governor to issue a proclamation assuming

c.

total jurisdiction over any Indian reservation if the Tribe on
that reservation requested it.

In 1963, the legislature

enacted Chapter 36 which obligated the State to assume partial
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations with
regard to eight subject-matter categories,

~'

compulsory

school attendance.
In 1965 the Colville Business Council enacted a resolution
requesting the State to assume total jurisdiction over the
Indian reservation.

The governor of the State issued a

proclamation to that effect on January 29, 1965.

Neither the

Makah nor the Lummi Tribe has made a similar request and thus
they are subject only to the State's partial jurisdiction.
All three Tribes filed suit for a declaratory judgment that
the State's assumption of jurisdiction was illegal.

All three

Tribes argued that the State could not assume any jurisdiction

- 3

over them without first amending its constitution.

They argued

that this requirement arose either from Public Law 83-280 or
Washington's Enabling Act.

Alternatively, the Tribes argued

that, even if the State could exercise jurisdiction by passing
a mere statute, the Act passed by the Wash. legis. violated
equal protection.
The d.ct. held that there was no need to have a
constitutional amendment in order for the State to assume
jurisdiction over the Indians.

It felt bound by this Ct's

dismissal of an appeal, 397 u.s. 316, from a Wash. s.ct
judgment that a statute sufficed to comply with Pub. Law
83-280. Makah Indian Tribe v. Washington, 76 Wash.2d 485, 457
P.2d 590.
The d.ct did accept a previous CA9 decision that the
State's assumption of partial jurisdiction violated the Makah
and Lummi tribes' rights to equal· protection. See Confederated
Barids & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 552
F.2d 1332 (CA9 1977), revd, No. 77-388 (Jan. 16, 1979).

The

d.ct, however, rejected the Colville Tribe's claim that the
State's assumption of total jurisdiction ·over it also violated
equal protection.
The State of Washington is the

appt Ct~

At issue 1n

---~that are
that appeal are several general taxing statUtes

applied to enterprises conducted on the Tribes' reservations.
First, the State has a cigarette excise tax of approximately
$1.60 per carton that is imposed upon the sale, use,

c
'

consumption, handling, possession or distribution of
cigarettes.

It is enforced· by means of stamps which every

- 4 )
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retailer is required to purchase.

Sales of cigarettes to

reservation Indians are not subject to the tax.

The tax is

applied, however, to the resale of cigarettes by the
reservation Indians to non-members

~f

the Tribe.

The incidents

of the tax thus fall on the purchaser of the cigarettes.

To

assist in enforcing these taxes the State requires all sellers
to provide it with complete information on all cigarette
sales.

As applied to the Tribes, this requirement is imposed

both for sales to members of the Tribes and to non-members.
The State also imposes a sales tax on resale of
cigarettes.

The tax amounts to 5 per cent of the sale price of

the item.
The Colville, Lummi and Makah Tribes all have a scheme for
taxing the sale of cigarettes on their reservations.

The

Tribes themselves are engaged in the retailing of cigarettes.
They purchase them

wholes~le

from out of state and distribute

them to their tribally licensed dealers on the reservation.
The cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sold.
All three tribes levy a tax upon the distribution of cigarettes
to the distributor.
carton.

These taxes range from 40 to 50 cents per

Approximately 90% of the Tribes' sales of cigarettes

are to non-members of the Tribes.

~

The Yakima Indian Tribe is an appellee i

78-630 \and it too

has an ordinance for regulating and taxing the sale of
cigarettes.

The Tribe purchases cigarettes wholesale from out

of state and then sells them to members who have been licensed
to run •smoke shops" on the reservation.
profit of 1 cent per carton on this sale.

The Tribe derives a
The Tribe also

- 5 imposes a 22.5 cent per carton tax.

(
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The

S~te's

second tax at issue in No. 78-630 is a motor

~

vehicle, camper and travel trailer excise tax that is imposed
on the privlege of using these various motor vehicles in the
state.

The tax is measured by 2 per- cent of the fair market

value of the vehicle.

The State only taxes those vehicles that

are used in whole or in part outside of the reservation.
The Tribes refused to comply with the State's taxing
requirements.

To enforce its cigarette tax, the State seized

unstamped cigarettes shipped in interstate commerce that it
believed were going to be used for resale outside of the
reservation.
The Tribes then filed suit in federal d.ct to enjoin the
State's enforcement efforts.
applied to them were unlawful.

They claimed that the taxes as
A three-judge d.ct was convened

because the Tribes were seeking to have the state's statute
declared unconstitutional and its enforcement against them
enjoined.
The d.ct held that the cigarette taxes had been preempted
by Tribal ordinances regulating and taxing the sale of
cigarettes.

In addition, it held that the tax, by increasing
I

the price of cigarettes and reducing the Tribes' revenues from
their sales, interfered with the Tribes' right of self-govt as
provided in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217.

The ct reasoned

that if the Tribes did not have the tax revenues from sales to
non-tribe members, they could not afford to provide basic
govtal services.

For the same reasons, the ct struck down the

state's sales tax as applied to resale of cigarettes to

- 6 non-members of the Tribes.

(

With regarq to the vehicle tax, the

ct held that the tax had the same practical effect as the
personal property tax struck down in Moe v. Confederated Salish

& Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425

u.s.

463, and

thus was equally unconstitutional.
Judge Kilkenny dissented from the holding that the
cigarette tax was impermissible.

He felt that the mere fact

that both sovereigns chose to tax the same product did not
create a preemption problem.

He also declined to join the

majority's holding with regard to the vehicle excise tax.

He

felt that the record was inadequate to determine whether the
tax was unconstitutional under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commn, 411

u.s.

164, as being a tax on activity on the

reservation or constitutional under Mescalero Apache Tribe v.

L

Jones, 411 U.S. 145, as a tax on activity outside of the
reservation.
3. CONTENTIONS & DISCUSSION FOR 78-60: The Tribes in 78-60
basically raise the same issues decided by the Ct in Yakima II,
on Jan. 16.

In fact, they request consolidation of ~argument

with that appeal.

They argue that the State cannot assume

jurisdiction over their reservations without amending its
constitution.

The Colville Tribe also claims that even if the

state's law complies with the federal statutes, its application
to it still violates equal protection.
The Ct in Yakima decided that the State's assumption of

.

''

j

jurisdiction not only complies with the federal statutes relied
upon by the Tribes, but also that the state law permitting
partial assumption of jurisdiction satisfies equal protection.

- 7
The Ct held that the propex standard of review of the State's
statute was whether it bore a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest.

Yakima thus decided most of the

issues in 78-60.
The only issue left is whether tne assumption of total
jurisdiction against the Colville Tribe violates equal
protection.

Given that the Tribe, itself, requested the State

to assume total jurisdiction, it is difficult to perceive how
the State's action can be said to be unreasonable.
For the appeal in No. 78-60, I would affirm summarily on
the authority of Yakima.

~

4. CONTENTIONS IN 78-630:

The State first argues that the

d.ct erred in holding that it could not tax cigarettes sold to
non-members of the Tribes.

The State first notes that this Ct

decided in Moe, supra that taxing such sales by individual
Indians was permissible. 425

u.s .. at

481.

The State next cites

Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside,

u.s.

442 F.2d 1184 (CA9 1971), cert denied, 405

933 (1972)

(state possessory interest tax on lessees'of Indian-owned land
held constitutional) and Fort Mojave v. San Bernardino County,
543 F.2d 933 (CA9 1976), cert denied, 430

u.s.

1253 (1977)

(same), to support its view that there is no Williams v. Lee
problem created by the fact that the Tribes are the actual
retailers in this case.
The Tribes argue that the d.ct's decision is a proper
application of this Ct's previous holdings.

r
0

They contend that

the d.ct correctly found that the Tribes' ability to govern was
dependent on the revenues and thus the State's efforts were

- 8 contrary to the principles supporting tribal self-government
announced in Williams v. Lee, 358

u.s.

217.

The Tribes also

rely upon this fact to distinguish the Ct's holding in Moe,
supra.
The State next argues that its tax reporting statute is a
reasonable accounting requirement that is very similar to the
state law requiring the Indians to collect the taxes for the
State that was approved in Moe, supra, 425

u.s.

at 482-83.

It

asserts that its ability to guarantee collection of the proper
amount of tax is dependent on being permitted to require
record-keeping on all sales and not merely those sales to
non-members of the Tribes.
The Tribes do not specifically address this issue.

The

d.ct held that the State could require collection of only that
information reasonably necessary to guarantee collection of the
tax and that the State had failed to demonstrate why it needed
records on all sales to satisfy its enforcement interest.
Third, the State contests the d.ct's independent holding
that its cigarette and sales taxes could not be applied to
reservation Indians who are not members of the Tribe.

It

argues that the issue was not decided in Moe, supra, 425
at 480 n.l6, and that it is substantial.

u.s.

The State asserts

that there is no federal basis for restricting the State's
right to regulate non-tribal members merely because they live
on a reservation.

t

c

The Tribes first question whether this is an appealable
issue since nothing in the . d.ct's injunctive order deals with
this issue.

Second, they note that all of the lower ct cases

- 9 -

dealing with the issue have agreed with the d.ct.

Finally,

they contend that the definition of "Indian" in 25

u.s.c.

§479,

includes non-tribe members on a reservation, and thus federal
law precludes the distinction among Indians that the State
seeks to draw.
Fourth, the

St~te

argues that its vehicle excise tax is

constitutional under Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra.

It argues

that it merely taxes uses .of vehicles off the reservation and
thus there is no basis for applying McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commn, supra.

It asserts that at a minimum the issue is

substantial since it falls between two decisions of this Ct.
The Tribes respond by adopting the analysis of the d.ct.
They note that the statute here has the same practical effect
as the statute invalidated in Moe.

Citing the d.ct's opn, they

assert that the statute in Moe also applied to vehicle use
partly on and partly off the Flathead reservation.

They thus

argue that the issue has been resolved by this Ct.
Finally, the State seeks reversal of the d.ct's decision
agreeing with the CA9's Yakima holding that the State's
assumption of partial jurisdiction violates equal protection.
The Tribes do not directly respond to this argument.
5. DISCUSSION FOR 78-630: There is an initial question of

..

the three-judge ct's jurisdiction to decide

'-~

th~

~~

case.

The ct

acknowledged that this Ct in Moe made clear that a three-judge
d.ct could not obtain jurisdiction if the only basis for
attacking enforcement of the state's statute was under the
/

c
.

.-

Supremacy Clause.

The d.ct avoided that problem by noting that

the State's method of enforcement of its taxing

- 10 -

c

statutes--seizure of goods in interstate commerce--raised a
substantial question under the Commerce Clause and thus the Ct
did have jurisdiction over the Tribes' claims.
There are several problems with
this question.

~he

d.ct's resolution 0f

First, the constitutionality of the enforcement

procedure really is independent of the underlying statutes
being challenged by the Tribes.

Thus, there is a serious

bootstraping problem in its analysis.

Second, the enforcement

efforts only applied to the cigarette tax issue and yet the ct
considered and decided several additional issues that did not
implicate the enforcement procedure.

I am not sure whether

these issues were properly decided by the d.ct.

The ct did

invoke the doctrine of "judicial economy, convenience and

(.

fairness to the litigants" to justify retaining jurisdiction
over the whole case.
jurisdiction on the

I would tentatively note probable
subst~ntial

questions discussed below and

postpone consideration of the jurisdictional issues until
argument.
On the merits, I think the cigarette tax issue is a
substantial one.

The d.ct took a very expansive view of

~

Williams v. Lee.

There the effect of the state's law was to

undermine directly the authority of the tribal ct.

Here, the

effect on the Tribes' ability to govern is much less direct.
Moreover, the two CA9 cases cited by the State do seem to
reject a broad application of Williams to state taxing cases.
I would note probable jurisdiction on this issue.

L

The question of whether the State may require records of
Indian sales to Indians on the reservation by itself is

- 11 probably not substantial, but if the Ct noted probable

(

~

jurisdiction on the first issue it would be reasonable to note
it on this one too.

It does seem reasonable to permit the

•

State to require records on all sales to guarantee against tax
fraud.

The requirement would not

b~

onerous if the tax is

declared constitutional since the Tribes could be required
under Moe, supra, co provide records on the sales to
non-members, which comprise 90 per cent of the sales.
The question of whether the State for taxation purposes can
distinguish between tribal Indians and non-tribal Indians
living on the reservation is also not independently noteworthy,
but probably should be noted if the first issue is.
The constitutionality of a state's "use" tax on vehicles
driven both on and off the reservation has never been decided
by this Ct.

The Ct in Moe, however, did strike down a

property tax applied to a vehicle on a reservation.

persona~

Both that

tax and the one involved here were

bas~d

on a percentage of the

fair market value of the vehicle.

Since the State's tax does

not purport to make allowance for the amount of use off the
reservation, it seems to me indistinguishable from Moe.

I thus

would affirm this part of the d.ct's decision.
Finally, our decision in Yakima requires reversal of the
d.ct's holding that the State's assumption of partial

J(

jurisdiction over the Lummi and Makah Tribes violates equal
protection.
There is a motion from the State of Wash. to affirm in
78-60.

There are motions to affirm or dismiss from both the

Yakima Tribe and the Colville, Lummi and Makah Tribes in 78-630.
1/23/79

Phillips

D.Ct opn in JS app.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

13 September 1979

From: Gregory May

"1.. ~~.

No. 78-630: Washington v. Confederated Tribes

cr~~~ ·-~·1~t~
Questions Presented

s.AvuU. L,..-.& .. ,;-r ~vi" j/cfi "-~~0 ~

Jurisdictional Questions ~ ~ J.4A- v€~-R~ H ~ ~~ Y..
~~-~~

1. Was a three-judge district court properly convened
in

these

cases?

The

United

States

moving to dismiss the Yakima appeal.
in

the

Colville

appeal,

although

has

raised

this

issue

by

The same issue is present
no

party

has

moved

for

excise

tax

dismissal.
2.

Was

the

appeal

issues in Colville timely?

of

the

motor

vehicle

Substantive Questions
1. State Cigarette
Tax:
..________(a)

May

the

state

tax

cigarettes

sold

on

the

reservation to non-Indians by tribal retailers even though the
tribes also tax cigarettes?
(b) Are Indians living on a reservation set aside
for a tribe other than their own subject to the state cigarette
tax?
(c)
putb igarette
Indians?

May

tax

the

stamps

state
on

require

cigarette

tribal

retailers

packages

sold

to

to

non-

The district court did not expressly reach this issue

because it invalidated the tax.
(d)
seizing

May

cigare~tes

~"""'

the

although

enforce

its

c iq a ret te

tax

by

being shipped through interstate commerce to
~-------------...._____~

non-complying retailers?
issue,

state

it

used

The district court did not reach this
the

question

as

a

basis

for

its

jurisdiction.
(e)
seizing

May

cigarettes

retailers?

the

held

state
on

the

enforce

its

reservation

cigarette
by

tax

by

non-complying

The district court also did not reach this issue.
2. State __.....
Sales Tax:
(a)

May

the

state

impose

a

sales

tax

on

the

cigarette sales made on the reservation to non-Indians by tribal
retailers even though the tribes tax cigarettes?

,,,

"·
.,
'

'l~.·

·..

I-•'

(b)
occupying

the

Are

Indians

who

do

not

belong

to

the

tribe

reservation on which they reside subject to the

state sales tax?
(c)

May

the

state

require

tribal

retailers

to

report all exempt sales to Indians?
(d) May the state enforce its sales tax by assessing
retailers

who

fail

to

collect

it

from

The

buyers?

district

court did not reach this issue.
3. State Motor Vehicle Tax:
May

the

state

impose

an

excise

tax

on

motor

vehicles owned by reservation Indians and used both on and off
the reservation?
4.

Is

the

state's

partial

assumption

of

partial

territorial jurisdiction over Indian reservations invalid under
the

equal

protection

clause?

This

issue,

appearing

Colville, was resolved last Term in Washington v.
Bands

&

(1979).

· Tribes

of

the

Yakima

Indian

Nation,

99

only

in

Confederated

s.

Ct.

740

consolidated

for

.•

The parties have not briefed it here .

~

;~

~-\A~

,,

~ · \rhis appeal

decision by a

Facts

arises

from

two

cases

three-judge district court.

" In

the

first

suit,

Colville tribes sought declarat~ and i nj uncti ve relief
----(j\
:z:.
against Washington's~ igarette tax,
otor vehicles tax, and
the

assumption of

jurisdiction over their reservation.

The tribes

also challenged the state's seizure of untaxed cigarettes moving
in interstate commerce.
In the second suit, the United States on behalf of the
Yakima tribes sought declaratory and

injunctive relief against

~

Washington's cigarette tax and the seizure of untaxed cigarettes
moving

in

government
its

interstate
intervened,

cigarette

commerce.
claiming

business.

The

damages

Those

confederated
for

claims,

tribal

interference with

however,

have

been

remanded to a single district judge.

~~

~y

~·

·~~C

Although the parties agreed that the three-judge court
had jurisdiction, the court felt cbnstrained to note why.

Moe

. t.,

v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 n.17
(1976),

said

reservation

that

challenges

Indians

raise

to

only

state

taxes

supremacy

as

clause

applied

to

issues

not

~~-- ~~

within the jurisdiction of a three-judge court.
In this case,
~c..
~~ however, the court based jurisdiction on the commerce clause

~-_,p-1-

~

challenges to seizures of cigarettes moving interstate.

~ found

lo ~ the
..-(M~

the

jurisdiction,

Having

the court concluded that i t could address

validity of the tax statutes which gave the state cause for
seizures.

The

court

did

not

explain

how

it

had

jurisdiction over the sales and motor vehicle tax questions.

:?
~

~

1

The
invalid

~~ tribal

~~-

as

three-judge

applied

to

court

held

cigarettes

sold on

retailers to non-Indian buyers.

~~~~

the

state

cigarette

tax

the

reservation

by

It reached the result on

.

two

alternative

cigarette

taxes

authori ti~ ;

( 1)

grounds:

the

enacted by the

(2)

the

state

government because it

state

tribes

tax

impaired the

. to

h U

1distinguished these cases from Moe.

4::J:

~

~~ ~eempted

~~

t;!~
']-'·

needed

The

court also held

the

state

sales

was

preempted

approved by
with

court

thought

both

by

federal

tribal

tribal governments'

The

revenue.

and

interfered

~

collect

tax

self-

ability
grounds

that the tribal cigarette taxes

tax

on cigarette

transactions.

As

applied to Indian sales of other goods to non-Indians, however,
the court declared the sales tax valid.
that all

Indians residing on

the

Next,

the court found

reservation were exempt

from

sales tax even if they were not members of the tribe for whom

..

the reservation had been set aside.
Moe

permitted

collect
Indian

the

the

sales

sellers

state
tax.

to

to
It

record

Finally, the court thought

require

concluded,

and

report

that

the

however,

Indian
that

information

seller

requiring

about

exempt

sales to other Indians was beyond the state's power.
The

state

excise

tax

on

motor

vehicles,

the

court

concluded, really operated on i~dian-owned vehicles in the same
~

IV

way

as

~~noted

~

~
·~

~

the
that

personal
the

property tax at

district

in

Moe

The court
that

vehicles there were used both on and off the reservation,

just

tax under Moe.

opinion

in Moe.

showed

as they were in this case.

col}'rt

issue

The court therefore invalidated the

Discussion

Jurisdictional Questions

I. Three-Judge Court
Although

the United States called

for

a

three-judge

court in the Yakima case, it now argues that this Court has no
jurisdiction over
unnecessary.

the

appeal

because

The Yakima tribe has

a

three-judge

court

was

joined in this contention.

Although the Colville case presents the same issue, the Colville
tribe

agrees

with

the

state

that

the

three-judge

court.

was

properly convened.

~~d- ~-

~~ hear
~

~
~

It

is well-settled

supremacy clause challenges to state statutes.

~ &Co. v. Wickham, 382
481

that a single district judge can

n.l?,

challenging

this
state

u.s.

Court

111, 129 (1965).

expressly

taxes

as

noted

applied

to

E.g.,

In Moe, 425
that
the

the

~wift

u.s.

basis

Indians

was

at
for
the

supremacy clause "and not any automatic exemptions 'as a matter
of constitutional law'

either under the Commerce Clause or the

inter-governmental immunities doctrine
McClanahan,

the Court said,

had

.

established

"

Mescalero and

that proposition.

The Court allowed the appeal from the commerce clause challenge
in Moe because the three-judge court had been convened before
those two opinions were announced.

Sine= the three-judge court

in the present case was convened after those announcements, the
United States argues, appeal lies in CA9.

I'·

•

First,

The state makes several rejoinders.
that

the

it notes

three-judge court convened in these cases before the

decision

in

Moe.

At

that

time,

the

state

continues,

the

implications of Mescalero and McClanahan were not as clear as
they

became

after Moe.

Second,

the

state contends

that

this

case did present a substantial commerce clause question even in
light of Moe.

The tribes challenged the state's right to seize

as

untaxed

contraband

through
under

interstate
spec i f i c

82.32.210,
issue,

cigarettes

commerce.

moving

Those

82.24.230.

the

seizures

state statutes , Wash •

82.32.235,

to

Rev .

reservations

were

Code

§§

conducted
8 2 . 2 4 . 13 0 ,

Given jurisdiction over this

the three-judge court could address the other questions

raised in the cases.
The
problem,

even

authority.

three-judge
though

the

court

recognized

parties

had

the

not

jurisdiction

challenged

its

It abjured reliance on the first argument advanced

by the state,

proceeding on the basis of the second argument.

The court also noted that it had expended substantial judicial
resources on the cases,

so that retention of jurisdiction over

all claims served the interest of judicial economy.
The
into taking
the

lower

court

rather

clearl

jurisdiction over these cases.

commerce

clause

challenge

to

boot-strapped

itself

Even assuming that

seizures

gave

the

court

jurisdiction over all challenges to the state cigarette tax, the
court still should have remanded attacks on the other statutes

to

a

single

judge.

By

taking

a

charitable

view,

one

could

conclude that the attack on the sales tax as applied to tribal
cigarette
because

sales was within

the

business.
tax

and

tax arguably

the

court's

ancillary

interfered with

the

jurisdiction

tribal

cigarette

The Colville tribe's challenges to the motor vehicle
the

state's

assumption

of

partial

jurisdiction

over

their reservation, however, are totally unrelated to the court's
basis for jurisdiction.

f~v

:;:

~~~

Since the parties have focused their efforts in this
Court

on

the

jurisdiction

cigarette
over

all

tax

issues,

other

claims

the

Court

without

could

doing

decline

much

harm.

Indeed, because the lower court did not deal very fully with the

~·

remaining

~

c~ e~n of the issues by the court of appeals.

'A_rN ~II.

claims,

this

Timeliness of Appeal

~-

Court

{

ff

Vv

could

benefit

from

further

~)

The Colville tribes have moved to dismiss as untimely
the state's appeal on the motor vehicle tax and assumption of
jurisdiction claims.

The appeal on these two claims was taken

by amended notice of appeal within sixty days after the lower
court denied a motion for partial new trial on the cigarette and
sales

tax

issues,

but

more

than

sixty

days

entered its original judgment in the case.

after

the

court

The Colville tribe

cites no authority for the proposition that a partial new trial
motion does not terminate the time for appeal.

I

"1;
r:·

'

The

single question

is whether a motion for partial

new trial undermines the finality of those parts of a
not

challenged by

appeal

runs

anew

the motion.
from

If

it does,

the denial of

judgment

then the time for
The

the motion.

state's

amended notice of appeal, therefore, would be timely.
The
timely.

state

First,

argues

the

convincingly

state

notes

that

that

a

new

qenerally defeats the finality of a judgment.
taken

before

the

trial

court

disposes

its

of

appeal
is
.....___-

trial

motion

Indeed, an appeal
the

motion

may

be

premature (although appellate courts often forgive this defect).
v~

See United -states
Wright

(1944):

Jurisdiction§

&

u.s.

Crescent -Amusement Co., 323
Miller,

3915 at 593,

Federal

· Practice

599-601

(1976).

argues that according finality to

and

173,

177

· Procedure:

Second, the state

the parts of a

judgment not

implicated in a motion for partial new trial conflicts with the
policy

against

piecemeal

merge

unchallenged

trial

court's

Federal
Thus,

any

portions of

judgment

Practice
motion

appeals.

after

The

usual

the original
retrial.

See

and

Procedure:

Civil

for

new

suspends

trial

§

practice

is

to

judgment into the
'i1r i g h t

2814

the

at

&

Mi 11 e r ,

99

(1976).

finality

entire judgment until the trial court takes final action.

of

an

Substantive -Questions

The centerpiece of this appeal

is the cigarette tax,

and the most obvious question is whether this case differs from
Moe.

Moe also bears heavily on the sales tax and motor vehicle

tax issues.
I. State Cigarette Tax
(;,~~~~)
A. State Tax Statutes
( 1)

"the

sale,

Washington imposes a
use,

tax of $1. oO per carton on

consumption,

distribution of all . cigare'ttes."

handling,
Wash.

Rev.

or

possession,
Code §

82.24.020;

-:;;;:::l

see

id.

§§

28A.47:440,

73.32.130.

The

tax

is

collected

by

I

requiring

retailers

( 1)

to buy

cigarette

packages bearing

the

state tax stamp or ' ( 2) to buy tax · stamps and 'lffix them to each
package before sale.

II~

~

Indian tribes and their licensed retailers may possess

unstamped cigarettes for .sale to enrolled members of the tribe.

At\~V Id.
~

l,A>,

~~

G~

/

82.24.260.

When

selling

cigarettes

to

anyone

else,

however, the Indian retailer must affix the tax atamp and remit

the

excise

tax

to

the

state.

The retailer receives nominal

l.~ompensation for affixing the stamps.

"'V

~r

§

If the Indian seller does

not collect the tax, the state may collect it directly from the
buyer.

Id. §§ 82.24.020 & -.080.
Unstamped

cigarettes

are

subject

contraband unless they are in transit to

to

authori~ed

seizure

as

retailers.

'·'

Id.

82.24.260.

§

Indian

tribes

and

their

traders

are

not

authorized retailers if they sell unstamped cigarettes to nonIndians.

Id.

§

82.24.040.

( 2)

The cigarette tax

is due upon occurrence of the

first taxable event within the state.
case,

therefore,

retailer.
however,

the

In most

incidence is upon the distributor or the

the state claims that the
"possession

744, 754 (Wash.

1974).

taxes on

to

the

first

taxable event is the

non-Indian

[buyer]."

E.T.B.

v. State (Tonasket II), 525 P.2d

Thus, the state avoids the federal bar

Indian traders.

Arizona Tax Comm'n,
sells

by

~Tonasket

504.08.192 (1976):

who

82.24.080.

§

When cigarettes are consigned to an Indian retailer,

subsequent

against

Id.

380

u.s.

non-Indians,

685

Warren Trading
(1965).

however,

Post Co. · v.

The Indian retailer

does

bear

the

burden

of

affixing the tax stamps that he must purchase from the state.
B. Tribal Tax Ordinances
Cigarette distribution schemes and taxes differ
tribe

to

tribe,

but

all tribal taxes are authorized
-----------~-------tribal constitutions and approved

________________________________.

federally-approved
-------------~-----._

by

the

by. the

Secretary of the Interior.
( 1)
trust

lands

purchased
with

The

Colville

within

tribes

their

reservation.

from out-of-state,

federally-restricted

operate

All

federally-1 icensed

tribal

tribal regulatory ordinances.

tobacco

funds

and

outlets on

cigarettes

are

Indian traders

distributed

under

Tribal retailers, who manage the

tobacco side of their business as employees of the tribe, obtain
custody of the tribally-owned cigarettes by paying the wholesale
price.
which

The purchaser pays a
has

been

added

to

tax of $. 40 or $.50 per carton,

the

retail

The

price.

retailer's

compensation is the amount by which the sale price exceeds the
wholesale price plus the tribal tax.
( 2)

The Yakima

tribe,

on

the other hand, acts as a
------tribal members who own and operate

-....___,

cigarette wholesaler to the

tobacco outlets on allotted lands within the reservation.

The

tribe buys cigarettes from out-of-state wholesalers, marks them
up

$. 01

per

carton,

and

sells

them

to

retailers

who

pay

a

"permit fee" of $.225 per carton for the privilege of retailing
the

goods.

Retailers

need

not

add

the

tax

to

their

selling

price.
C. Incidence of the State Tax
( 1)

Since federal courts are not bound by a state's

characterization of its tax when

tax immunities are at issue,

First Agricultural Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 347 (1968),
the first question is whether the Washington tav on cigarettes
sold by Indians to non-Indians is a tax on the non-Indian.

~he
ty{ ~

#1.~

,

tax

1965).

~
tff'pv--

really on

the

Indian

Warren Trading · Post Co. · v.

;z;_ (

.1.~

is

fully

seller,

it

is

Arizona Tax Comm'n,

invalid
380

If

under

U.S.

685 w~

Warren found Congress had regulated Indian traders so
that

no

state

tax

on

Congressional authorization.

H.J-~~~

them

was

valid

absent

explicit

( 2)

The

appellees

have

which the lower court relied,

taken

the

higher

ground

on

and they do not strongly pursue

the claim that the incidence of the state tax is on the Indian
retailer.

In light of the

Indian and

non-Indian retailers in Tonasket a.nd the state tax

bulletin,

however,

"precollected"
wholesaler,

the

through

strained distinction drawn between

Th~

claim has merit.
the

price paid by
Here,

as it was in Moe.

the

Although

he

can pass

here

retailer

is not
to

the

the Indian retailer pays

the tax when he buys tax stamps for use on
Indians.

tax

the

tax

pac~ages

along

in

sold to nonthe

selling

price, like the retailers in Moe, it is he who must pay the tax
directly to the state.
more

like

the

th~

Thus, the impact on

burden

disapproved

in

Indian trader is

Warren

than

wash-out

transaction approved in Moe.

(3) A decision on this ground may be unsatisfactory,
however,

~

between

~. . ~ r~ler

because it would ignore the most critical differences
this

appeal

whose

~~ government.

and

business

Here

Moe.
had

Moe

governments

~

cigarettes to non-Indians.

tax

and

involved

almost

(particularly

~~ ~

both

v

engage

in
in

no

simply

impact

on

Colville),
the

business

a

private

the

tribal

the

tribal

of

selling

If Washington were to adopt a tax

~~ scheme like that approved in Moe, the scheme still might be
..

~
yV~

invalid as applied to a business taxed by the tribes themselves.

~ In

~

-~~

such a case, even the argument that tribal involvement is a

strategy

for

immunizing

private

business

from

state

taxes

appears

unsatisfactory.

private

sellers

A

state

still destroys

tax

the

on

cigarette

possibility of

sales

by

substantial

7

revenue from a tribal tax on the same transactions.
D.
( 1)
invalidated
right

of

of State Tax

Pre~emption

The

the

two

state

Indian

grounds

on which

cigarette

tribes

to

the

tax have

exercise

a

three-judge
common

court

theme,

quasi-sovereignty

the

within

----------~~--------~----------~------------------~--------

their reservations.

Since that theme is less important to the

...

--------~--~--

pre-emption ground,
for decision.

is a safer and narrower basis'~~

pre-emption

See McClanahan v. ·Arizona · Tax Comm'n,

411

164, 172 & n.8 (1973).

Some amici are particularly fearful

a decision recognizing

the tribe's

Indians

within

development

on

the

U.S.

r

that ~

inherent power to tax non-;:::t:;._

reservations

Indian

~
~

would

impede

industrial

See Amicus Brief of Salt River

lands.

Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District et al.
The

state

troublesome ground

argues

because

that
it

pre-emption

allows

Indian

is

tribes

the

more

to divest

states of their tax powers by a "mere stroke of a pen."

This

argument,

that

however,

ignores

the

constitutional

principles

give the federal government plenary power to regulate relations
between

Indians

and

non-Indians.

County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 (1976).

See,

e.g.,

Bryan

v.

Itasca

Under the pre-emption theory,

not a stroke of the tribal pen, but the federal power behind the
/

stroke ousts the state tax.

Since the state can exert its power

within the federal government,

it more easily can place limits

~·

•' .

on

the

possibility

of

pre-emption

that

on

the

exercise

of

pre-empt ion

argument

inherent Indian sovereignty.
( 2)

The

first

step

in

the

-

is

finding a delegation of federal power to the Indian tribes.
(a) The three-judge court found delegation in

§

16

of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, as amended, 25 U.S.C.
§

4 76.

Only one of

the

tribes

involved

in

this

apoE"al

(the

~he

Act,

Makah of the Colville confederation) reorganized under
but

all

of

Secretary

the

of

reorganized

tribes

the

have

Interior

tribes.

constitutions

under

Section

16

regulations

confirmed

powers vested in any Indian tribe

approved

.

to

by

the

applicable
the

to

tribP.s

"all

• by existing law."

The

power to tax non-Indians within the reservation apparently was
one of those powers, although it was based more on the tribe's
right

to exclude whites rather

sovereignty.

See

Morris

than on some notion of tribal

v. · Hitchcock,

194

u.s.

384

(1904);

Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed,
203 U.S.
89

599

(8th Cir.

(1942).

The

(1906);
1956);

Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d
Cohen,

Handbook of Federal Indian Law 142

federally-approved

constitutions

of

involved in this appeal permit taxes on non-Indians.
Constitution

and

By-Laws

of

Colville Reservation, art. V,

~~A~~
approval of
Ltf"'l"~

!~---=7

the
§

Confederated

1 (e)

( 1938)

the

tribes

See, e.g.,

Tribes

of

the

[A. 66].

(b) A cleaner analysis relies squarely on 1 ederal
-._______

the

tribal

cigarette

""'--""

taxes

and

the

t

constitutions

authorizing them, rather than referring to traditional sovereign
powers.

It

then

decisions.

United

recognized
Indians

builds

that

broad

States

the

on

three

v;

Mazurie,

federal

authority

of

can

non-Indians

Court's

u.s.

419

government

over

this

recent

544

(1975),

delegate

because

to

the

the

tribes

already have substantial independent authority over non-Indians
within their territory.
(1976)

Fisher · v. · District Court, 424 U.S. 382

(per curiam), held that a federally-approved tribal court

pre-empted
power.
declared

state

And

court

Bryan

jurisdiction

v. · Itasca

that plenary

federal

over

County,

426

matters

within

u.s.

authority over the

373

its

(1976),

Indians pre-

empted taxation of property within the reservation even though
the state had assumed complete civil and criminal jurisdiction
under ·public
complete
this

Law

280,

Stat.

67

(Washington has

588.

jurisdiction over only one of the tribes

case:

the Colville

assumed

involved

in

tribe of the Colville confederation.)

Thus, the argument goes, even a state with the broadest possible
power over the Indians cannot levy taxes on non-Indians within
the

reservation

if

the

state

exaction

undercuts

a

federally-

approved tribal tax.
(3)

The

second

step

in

pre-emption

analysis

~ determining whether the state law undercuts federal policy.

~

purpose

of

the

federally-approved

tribal

~enue. The tribes accomplish this
J~ ~ fference between their taxes and the
~~

taxes

is

to

is
The

raise

objective by keeping

the

state tax large enough to

~1::;:~~~·
..

make their cigarettes significantly cheaper than those sold off
the reservation.

The resulting savings for non-Indian consumers
Large

numbers of non-Indians 1 ive on all
numbers come

from outside

cheaper cigarettes.

the reservation,

and

large

the reservation in order to buy the

The state wants to stop this drain on its

own tax revenues by imposing its tax on cigarettes sold to nonIndians.

If

however,

the

the

state

tribal

virtually disappear.

tax

were

business

added
and

to

its

the
tax

selling

price,

revenues

would

No party to the appeal really disputes the

incompatibility of the tribal and the state tax objectives.
E. Interference with Tribal Self-Government
Where
in a
matter,

the

infringe [s]

both

a

state

transaction
critical

and

and Congress

question

(1959);

179

(1973).

is

Indian
has

tribe

not

"whether

have

spoken on

the

state

an
the

action

on the right of reservation Indians to make their

own laws and be ruled by them."
220

an

Williams v. Lee,

35~

U.S. 217,

u.s.

see McClanahan v. · Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411

164,

The appellees say that Washington's cigarette tax

interferes with tribal self-government in two respects.
(1)

The

state

tax

most

obviously

interferes

with

tribal government by cutting off a substantial source of the tax

---

revenue

needed

to

support governmental

functions.

The

tribes

argue that the power to tax is a necessary and inherent part of
their

sovereignty,

Congressional approval.

which

cannot

be

infringed

without

v~

United ' States

Wheeler,

u.s.

435

313,

323

(1978),

which held that a tribal prosecution did not bar a subsequent
federal

prosecution grounded

recognized

that

sovereignty

the

not

withdrawn

implication as a
The

tribes

tribes

in the dual sovereignty doctrine,
"still
by

treaty

necessary result of

argue

that

the

possess

power

~spects

those

or

their dependent
to

tax

or

statute,

those

of
by

status."

within

the

Ta"(ation is

reservation is an aspect of original sovereignty.

critical to the support of governmental functions for which the
tribe
See,

has

primary--and
Fisher v.

e~g~,

curiam)

District Court,

over suit

400 U.S.

for debt

to

423

424 U.S.

382

transact

cited at p. 15

(1971)

(per curiam)

business

sup~;

within

tribal

(1976)

(per

KP.nnerly v.
(jurisdiction

Non- I'1d ians who

incurred on reservation).

legitimate objects of the

( 1975)

exclusive--responsibility.

(jurisdiction over dispute among Indians);

District Court,

choose

sometimes

the

reserv.::ttion

are

See authorities

tax powers.

cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544

(owner of bar comes under Indian regulation bv choosing

to transact business in Indian country).
( 2)
government
exclusively

The state tax also

by

extending

for

the

state

Indians.

interferes with

authority
The

into

Indian

tr i ba 1

lands

tribes

self-

reserved
say

that

theirterritorial sovereignty over the reservations prevents the
states from entering unless Congress has consented or the matter
at

issue "does not directly affect the Indians."

New York ex

..
..

... .
~

rel; · Ray · v; · Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 501 (1946)
Indian
U.S.

by

another) ;

145,

tribal

148-51

see Mescalero Apache Tribe v.

(1973)

enterprise,

reservation).

(state

but

The

(murder of one non-

sales

tax

has

less

power

taxable

event

under

it

first

can

Jones,

411

off-reservation
within

the

Washington's

cigarette tax--the possession by a non-Indian--occurs within the
reservation.
the tax.

More importantly, Indians are directly affected by

They must buy tax stamps and affix them to cigarette

packages held on the reservation.

Indeed,

the

state contends

that even Indians who live on the reservation must pay the tax
unless they are members of the governing tribe.

Thus, the state

rather clearly is reaching into territory over which the tribes
are sovereign in some sense.
(3)

I

Indians'

(a)

The

territorial

sovereignty

argument is largely unpersuasive.

strain

of

the

In Moe itself,

the

state taxed events that occurred on Indian land.
intrusion

into

Indian

territory

cases 1 ike Fort Mojave Tribe v.
F.2d

1253

(9th Cir.

is not

unlike

Washington's

that

upheld

County of San Bernardino,

in
543

1976), which found that Moe permitted the

state to levy a possessory interest tax on non-Indian lessees of
reservation

trust

lands.

The

Indian retailer's duty to affix

the stamp tax is slightly more burdensome than the precollection
scheme in Moe, but the retailer is compensated for the task.

(b) The argument that state cigarette taxes destroy

~

~
~

V

a source of needed revenue for the tribes goes to the real heart
of

this case:
_________...,.

revenue.

~~

between

two

governments

for

the

same

that they must rely on trade with non-Indians in order

support

says

battle

The tribes point to the poverty of their own people

~a~aim
to

a

tribal

that

the

exemption
revenue.

to

government.

tribes

The

cannot

non-Indians

live

and

state,

on

the

by marketing

robbing

the

other

an

state

hand,

Indian
of

its

tax
own

This Court has never squarely confronted this problem,

but the cases suggest a resolution in favor of the state.
Mescalero Apache
(1973),

dealt

reservation,
otherwise
because

with

but

welfare.

to

tribe

state

needs

Likewise,

Bernardino,

tribal

v.

Jones,

enterprise

411

U.S.

145,

151

operating

off

the

the Court did declare that Indian businesses

subject

the

an

Tribe

in

taxation

the

income

Fort

543 F.2d 1253

for

Mojave

(9th Cir.

are

not

exempt

simply

Indian government and

Tribe

v.

County

of

San

1976), the court sustained

the state tax even though its economic impact on the tribe was
uncertain.
inability
indirect

The possible reduction in rentals due to the tribe's
to market
economic

government.

a

tax

exemption,

burden

that

did

the

not

court

held,

threaten

was

tribal

an

self-

Throughout its opinion, CA9 seemed to suggest that

the economic consequences for the tribe had no real bearing on
the legal question.
F. Other Issues
(1)

The

state

claims

that

Indians

living

on

the

reservation who are not members of the tribe for which it has

been s e t aside are non-Indians for purposes of the state
.. - e
• ' .-

,_ - .-

.~

T

.,

'

..

,... tt

cigarette

tax.

claim as

it

The

relates

before this Court.
a

similar

three-judge
to

the

court

cigarette

did

not

tax,

so

consider
it may

this

not

be

The district court decision in Moe rejected

argument,

Confederated

Salish

& ·

Kootenai

Tribes · v.

Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (D. Mont. 1975), but the parties to
that case did not raise the issue in this Court, 425 U.S. ar 480
n.16.

Although the question remains open, the state's argument

has no merit.
(2) If this Court holds that Indian cigarette sales to
non-Indians are subject to the state tax, the Court then r e aches
a number of enforcement issues.

Since the three-judge court did

not decide these issues, the case should return to the district
court

for

resolution of enforcement problems

in light of

the

Court's opinion.

--

II. State Sales Tax
~

A. State Tax · statute
(1) Washington has a 4.5% sales tax on retail sales.
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.08.020.

The tax is on the buyer, but the

seller collects the tax at the time of the sale and remits to
the state.

82.08.050.

The three-judge court noted that

the present tax rate is 5.1%

[Juris. Statmt. A. 55 n. 7], owing

perhaps

Id.

to

a

§

local

option

provision

not

included

in

the

tax must

file

appendices.
( 2)

All

retailers

who

collect

the

a

monthly return with the state.
E.T.B.

504.08.192

detailed
reports

reports
must

(1976)
on

requires

all

disclose

Id.

§

Indian

tax-exempt

the

82.08.070.

name

retailers

sales

of

In addition,

the

to

to

make

Indians.

The

buyer,

his

tribal

affiliation, the reservation on which the transaction occurred,
the amount of the sale, and the date of the sale.
If the seller fails to collect the tax, the state may
recover

its revenue

the buyer.

Id.

from either the defaulting seller or from

82.08.050.

§

B. Pre-emption by Tribal Cigarette Tax
(1)

The three-judge court found that addition of the

s ~x

to the price of cigarettes sold to non-Indians
·~

would have an effec t

n the tribal cigarette business.

Although

the Indians would retain an $.80 per carton price advantage over
off-reservation
decrease
demand

"substantially"
for

decrease

retailers,

in

cheap

their

due

to

cigarettes.

sales

would

sales
the

The

not

to

high

elasticity

court

diminish

non-Indians

of

the

that

the

enough

to

concluded
revenues

would

interfere with tribal self-government, but that the impediment
to

maximum

sales

frustrated

cigarette ordinances.

the

policy

behind

the

tribal

The court therefore held the sales tax on

cigarettes pre-empted by the tribal laws.
(2) The conflict between the state sales tax and the
tribal

cigarette

tax

is much

less

apparent

than

between the state and the tribal cigarette taxes.

the

conflict

The last two

taxes

aim

to

raise

revenue

from

the

same

object--cigarettes.

Although the state purports to tax possession of the goods by
non-Indians while the tribes
tax cigarette
purchases (Colville
. .
. .
tribes)

or

sales

(Yakima

tribes),

the

state

and

tribal

both go to the subject matter of the transaction.
subject

to

both

exactions

are
.

double

taxed •

taxes

Cigarettes

The

resulting

interference with the tribes' ability to collect their tax from
buyers who can avoid the double exaction is rather clear.
r-~

5~ales
~

~

()4·~

Th ~x,

on the other hand,

falls on all

whether or not the subject matter of the transaction is

o ~ le.

The tax assesses the buyer not for w~at he

acquires, but for the privilege of making the purchase.

Since

the sales tax does not subject non-Indians who buy cigarettes on

•

the reservation to a double exaction, the tribes do not lose the
revenues

attributable

cigarettes.

Thus,

without directly

to

the

their

state

more

can

sales

favorable
tax

tax

rate

non-Indian

on

buyers

interfering with tribal cigarette taxes.

The

incidental burden on the Indian retailer who must collect the
tax probably is permissible under Moe, 425 U.S. at 463.
C. Interference with Tribal Self-Government
The appellees claim that the sales tax interferes with
tribal self-government not so much by reducing cigarette sales
to

non-Indians

as

by

unacceptably

territory and Indian affairs.
this

claim are

the

intruding

into

Indian

The arguments advanced to Rupport

same arguments

advanced

against

the

state

cigarette tax.

They are equally unpersuasive here, and they do

not distinguish the sales tax on cigarettes from the tax on any
other retail sale to a non-Indian.
D. State Reporting Requirements
(1)

There are,

however,

limits on the administrative

requirements that the state can impose on Indian retailers.
lower court held

u.s.

Comm'n, 380
the

state

that Warren Trading Post Co.

from

685, 691

court

requiring

noted,

transactions with

was

Arizona Tax

(1965), a pre-emption case, prevented
tribal

retailers

records on all tax-exempt sales to Indians.
the

v.

a

direct

Indians;

indeed,

to

keep

d e tailed

This requirement,

burden

on

the

trc>ders'

the trader could not Avoid

the burden even if he traded exclusively with Indians.
although

the

court

found

The

that

sales

other than cigarettes are taxable,

to

Thus,

non-Indians of goods

it concluded that the state

must monitor collection through some less burdensome procedure.
(2)

The

state

responds

that

requiring

retailers

to

record only taxable transactions with non-Indians would he more
burdensome,
primarily

since

the

tribal

to non-Indians.

smoke

shops

at

issue

here

sell

Warren does not necessarily apply,

the state says, because it directly addressed only the question
of state tax burdens on trading with the Indians.
commends
correct.

the

state's

Since

requirement,

the

argument,
lower

it made no

court

if

its

factual

invalidated

findings on the

Common sense
premise

the

relevant

is

reporting

point.

The

state

also

suggests

that

a

report

covering

only

taxable

transactions would not assure compliance with the law, although
that problem alone might not justify an otherwise impermissible
burden on Indian traders.

Thus, whether or not this Court holds

the sales tax applicable to cigarette sales, the lower court's
decision on this point bears reconsideration in light of further
fact-finding.
E. Other Issues
( 1)

The state claims the right to enforce its sales

tax by assessing Indian retailers who fail
from

non-Indian buyers.

The

not pass on this question,
Furthermore,

the

answer

to collect tho tax

three-judge court apparently did

so it may not be before the Court.

probably

depends

upon

the

which the state has jurisdiction over a particular

ext r~nd

to

reserv~tion.

Although it may seem unsatisfactory to confirm the state's power
to

tax

without

considering

how

the

tax

can be

enforced,

the

question probably ought to be remanded.
( 2) The state also contends that reservation Indians
who do not belong

to the tribe for which the reservation has

been set aside are subject to state sales tax as if they were
not Indians.

The three-judge court rejected this claim, relying

on the district court opinion in Moe.
21 supra.

See
___._

The decision appears correct.

discussion at pp. 20-

III. State Motor Vehicle Tax
A. State · Motor Vehicle · Tax
Washington imposes an excise tax on "the privilege of
using

in

the

82.33.020.
annual

state

The

tax

any
rate

registration

appropriate

county

state

imposes

also

motor

Wash.

Rev.

Code

§

is 2% of the vehicle's value at the

date,

and

auditor.
a

vehicle."

like

the

Id.
tax

§§

on

tax

is

payable

82.33.020
the

use

the

-.060.

The

trailer~

and

&

of

to

campers, rated at 1% of their value on January 1 of each year.
Id. §§ 82.50.400 & -.410.

This tax apparently applies to mobile

homes.
B. Validity of the Tax
( 1)

The parties have devoted scant attention to the

motor vehicle tax.

The state simply argues that Indian

come

tax

within

-----

reservation.
(1973)

-

its

power

whenever

they

drive

Mescalero · Apache · Tribe v. Jones, 411

u.s.

v~hicles

off

the

145, 1 51

(state can sales tax Indian business off the reservation

even if it could not tax the same business on the reservation).
The

tribes

simply

argue

essentially a property··

~x

that

the

motor

vehicle

tax

is

and that the property is exemp t since

it is held on ' the reservation.
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).

See McClanahan v. · Arizona Tax

They note that the Indian vehicles

exempted from property taxes in Moe were used both on and off
the reservation.

See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v.

Montana, 392 F. Supp. 1325, 1328-29 (D. Mont.

1975)

(Smith, J.,

.

''

concurring and dissenting), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
( 2)

l

personal
excise

There

property
tax

vehicle • s

at

use,

is

tax

no

on vehicles

issue
the

meaningful

here.

tax

distinction

invalidated

Although

between

in Moe

Washington

and

taxes

the
the
the

is computed--1 ike any property tax--on

the basis of value at a fixed date.

The tax is paid--like any

property tax--to the county tax official.
this Court validated this tax,

Use is presumed.

If

Montana could change the result

in Moe simply by redenominating its tax.

Summary

Jurisdictional Questions

1.

The

three-judge

court

arguably

had

jurisdiction

over all challenges to the state cigarette tax because they were
ancillary to its jurisdiction over the commerce clause attack on
state seizures of contraband cigarettes.
that

jurisdiction

over

cigarette

tax

One might even argue
claims

gave

the

court

jurisdiction over challenges to the state sales tax as applied
to

cigarette

sales.

The

court,

however,

had

no

basis

for

jurisdiction over the claims against other applications of the
sales tax, the motor vehicles tax, and the state's assumption of
jurisdiction over the Colville reservations.

(The last claim,

of course, is controlled by the decision last term in Washington

v. Confederated · Bands · and · Tribes of the ·Yakima Indian Nation, 99
S. Ct. 740 ( 1979).)

Since the _?iqarette tax is the c:nterpiece(j

of this appeal in any event, the Court should decline appellate\
jurisdiction over all other issues.
2.

The state appeal on the motor vehicle tax claims

was timely because the state's motion for a new trial on other
issues stopped the running of the time for appeal on all parts
of the judgment.

stantive Questions

~ 1.

~~~
~·

State Cigarette Tax:
(a )

Th e

.4~~~ftt_

.
c1garette

state

tax

.

as

ap~l1ed

f.c;.,{
to ~.

cigarettes sold by tribal retailers probably has been pre-empted
by

the

tribal

taxes.

One

could

also

argue

that

the

tax

is

invalid because it falls on the Indian retailer rather than on
the

non-Indian

differences

buyer,

between

but

this

that
case

argument
and

Moe.

ignores
The

the

tribal

real
self-

government arguments against the tax have dangerous implications
and limited merit.
(b)

Since

the

three-judge

court

invalidated

state tax as applied to cigarettes sold by the Indians,

the

it did

not reach the enforcement issues upon which it had grounded its
jurisdiction.

These

questions

are

not

insubstantial.

Court reverses, they should be resolved on remand.

If

the

2. State Sales Tax:
Tribal

(a)

sales

c1garette

~~

taxes

do

------------------------------~

-------------

state

It .

tax

on

cigarettes

sold

to

not

the

pre-empt

non-Indian

buyers

by

~

tribal retailers.

The sales tax also does not interfere with
--~----~-------------tribal self-government.

_______

....__..........

~

(b)
tribe occupying

Reservation Indians who do not belong to the
the

reservation are

exempt

from

sales

tax on

purchases made within the reservation.
(c)

If other aspects of the sales tax are properly

before this Court, it should remand
the lower court's decision
'
J
I

that Indian retailers need not keep records of their tax-exempt
sales.

Further

fact-finding

might

reveal

that

the

record

keeping requirement is essential to enforcement of the tax and
that

keeping

records on exempt

sales

is

less

burdensome

than

recording taxable sales.
(d)
whether

the

Since

state

the

can

three-judge court did not consider

enforce

the

tax

by

assessing

retailers who fail to collect it, the Court need not

Indian

re~ch

this

question.
3. State Motor Vehicle Tax
If
this

ta~,

it

the Court has
should
./

Moe.
-,:--'

conclude

jurisdiction over challenges
that

the

tax

is

to

substantially

7
/

lfp/ss
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MEMO TO FILE

78-630 -washington v. Confederated Tribes (Colville
and Yakima Tribes
This is a brief and incomplete summary of key
issues address by Greg in his bench memo of September 13.
This is a consolidation of two suits:

One by the

Colville tribes against Washington's cigarette tax, motor
vehicle tax, and assumption of jurisdiction over its
reservation.

The state's seizure of untaxed cigarettes

moving in interstate commerce also is challenged.

In the

second suit, the Yakima tribes also attacked the cigarette
tax and - seizure of untaxed cigarettes.

The validity of the

state sales tax (different from the cigarette tax) was also
challenged when imposed on cigarettes.
The tax issues in these cases apply only to
cigarettes sold on the reservation by tribal retailers to
non-Indian buyers.

Substantial numbers of non-Indians live

on the reservations, and since the tribal cigarette tax is
lower than the state tax, substantial business - i.e. tax
revenue -

is at issue.

Indeed, access to this revenue is

central to the controversy.
The three-judge court invalidated both the

2.

cigarette and sales taxes, holding (i) that they were
preempted by the cigarette tax enacted by the tribes and

-------,

approved by federal authorities; and (ii) also, that the
state taxes interferred with tribal self government.

The

three-judge court, on both of these grounds, distinguished
Moe (that involved only sales by a private retailer on tribal
land but who operated independently of tribal oversight or

taxatio~ Y
Jurisdiction
Although doubtful, the three-judge court probably
had jurisdiction over challenges to the state cigarette and
sales taxes.

The Supremacy Clause alone would not suffice

for jurisdiction, but perhaps there was ancillary
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause in view of the attack
on the state's seizure of contraband cigarettes.
There probably was no three-judge court
jurisdiction over other issues in the case.
Timeliness of Appeal
It was timely.
Merits
Affirm as to state cigarette tax.
is tax revenue.

The basic issue

The tribes• cigarette tax is lower than the

state tax, deliberately so for the purpose of attracting
business and bolstering the economy of the tribes.

The state

3.

correspondingly loses tax revenues from non-Indians who trade
with Indian retailers.

As Greg put it, under the preemption

theory, federal power - not tribal authority - lies behind

-

'---

-

the action of the tribe in imposing a cigarette tax.

The

remedy of the state is to seek relief within the federal
government.
Moe is distinguishable, as it involved a private
retailer whose business had no substantial impact on tribal
government.

In these cases, the tribal governments both tax

and engage in the business of selling cigarettes to non-

---

Indians.

Probably reverse as to the state sales tax.
sales tax is not levied on ciqarettes.

The

Rather, it is levied

on persons who purchase a wide variety of goods and services.
A tribal cigarette tax does not preempt the state sales tax
when imposed on cigarettes.

Nor does the sales tax interfere

with tribal self government.
Greg, in affirming with respect to the cigarette
tax, would rely solely on the preemption doctrine.

He

argues, with reason, that "interference with tribal self
qovernment" is too broad a ground, and one that could set a
troublesome precedent.
Other Issues
Probably we need not reach other issues in the
case.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

~
~

SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

4 October 1979

From: Gregory May

No. 78-630: Washington v. Confederated Tribes (~~

:f
Appls

have

just

filed

a

reply

brief

f(Lf)

which

is

considerably clearer and more helpful than their opening brief.
Although the new brief does not change my view of the case, it
does make several

interesting arguments on the basic cigarette

tax issue.

I. Interference with Tribal Self-Government
A. Appls' Arguments
First, in a reformulation of an old argument, the appls
say

that

the

Indians

need

to market

a

tax

exemption

to

non-

Indian customers in order to compensate for the poor location of
their smoke shops.

In other words, appls argue, recognition of

the

just

tax

payment

exemption
that

forces

compensates

the

the

state

Indians

to

for

make
their

a

transfer

commercial

disadvantage.

....

·

Second,
businesses

are

the

state

purely

argues

that

proprietary

the

tribal

rather

than

-·---

--·

~ -·--.,

cigarette

- -governmental
---~

activities.

The tribes are not taxing cigarettes, they are just ~3

marking

cigarette

up

continue,

this

Court

In

prices.

tax

consistently

immunity

has

drawn

cases,
a

appls

distinction

between a government's governmental and proprietary activities.
See Alfred Dunhill,

Inc.

v.

Cuba,

425 U.S.

682,

695-96

(1976)

(summarizing cases).
B. Comments
The first argument states the obvious, and the second
just expresses

~

in a different way my earlier observation that

.

the courts have refused to immunize tribal businesses from state
taxation on tribal self-government grounds.

See

.~

II. Federal Pre-emption
A. Appls' Arguments
First, appls argue that the Indian commerce clause does
not prevent the states from taxing non-Indians who buy goods on
the reservations, whether or not the tribes tax the non-Indian
buyers.

Moe,

425 U.S.

463,

481

n.17

(1976),

clearly declares

that the Indian commerce clause itself provides no "automatic"
exemptj.on .from state taxes.
"multiple '
commerce

burd~ns"

clause

And the tribes'

argument

fails

because

by

analogy

multiple

attempt to make a

to

burdens

the

interstate

analysis

only

applies in situations where two jurisdictions--in a territorial

sense--seeks to tax the same commercial activity.
Second,

appls note

that none of

the

federal

statutes

that explicitly preserve tax exemptions for the Indians refer to
tax
also

exemptions
note

that

for

the

the

(they don't say what

non-Indians who buy

American
that

Indian

is)

from

Policy

recommended

Appls

them.

Review
federal

Commission
legislation

exempting persons and activities taxed by the tribes from state
taxation.

Final Report of the American Indian Policy Review

Commission 182 (1977), quoted at Appls' Reply Brief 30 n.22.
Third,

appls say that the treaties between the United

States and these tribes do not pre-empt state taxation of nonIndians on the reservation.

Such state taxation, appls contend,

is consistent with the treaty language that sets aside the lands
for the Indians' "exclusive use."
B. Comments

5~~~
!)~ advance
~~.At eff,ect

Appls' arguments against the pre-emption theory do not
their case because they do not come to grips with the

o :__f~.::_ approval

for

the

tribal

cigarette

taxthees

~~-

involved

~

federaly-approved tribal constitutions that confer tax powers on

~
T'o

•V

_ ~

/

·~

the
the

in

this

tribeGsl~ven

pre-emption

case.

Indeed,

the plenary federal
analysis

in

this

appls

do

not

power over Indian affairs,
case

seems

to

easily on an "occupation of the field" argument.
question

here

is

whether

the

mention

Executive--acting

rest

rather

The difficult
through

the

.
,

Bureau · of
state

Indian

taxes.

Congress

has

The

Affairs--should
answer

delegated

to

should
the

have
depend

executive

the

power

upon

how

agerycy.

to

pre-empt

much

power
None of the

parties have given this issue enough attention, and it could be
the most profitable focus for oral argument.

I

78-630 Washington v. Confedera ted Tribes
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October 15, 1979

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation

··.

Dear Bill:
Except for the jurisdictional aspect on Yakima, my
vote was the same as yours in the above.
jurisdiction, I'm

prepar~d

had assigned this to you.

to go along.

On the Yakima
By coincidence I

You haven't had your share of

Indian cases!
Regards,

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

•.

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Greg
Re: No. 78-630--Washington v. Confed. Tribes

Attached is Mr. Justice Brennan's redraft of n.40 in the

other Justice.

-

The sentence in the old footnote about upholding

the sales tax as to sales of other goods has been--his clerk tells
me--shifted to another footnote.
As far as I can see, the redraft does not meet your

-

objection.

In fact, it does not rest the sales tax decision on

the strongest possible ground: viz. that the state sales tax
"would inject state law into an on-reservation transaction which
the Indians have chosen to subj8ct to their own laws."

Op. at 20.

I think that Mr. Justice Brennan would agree to pitch the result
on that ground if you suggested it.

But that ground is really

broader than the one he has chosen, so I would not make the
suggestion.
I have two observations on the continuing disagreement.
First, the basic sticking point is Mr. Justice Brennan's
insistence on lumping together all taxes that affect the same
transaction.

He thinks that it makes no difference what the taxes

are called; the critical question for him is whether they raise
the ultimately price of cigarettes to the non-Indian customers of
the tribal retailers.
dif:t;erence .

-----------

.

There apparently is no way to resolve this

Second, the next case to come before this Court is
likely to be one in which the state allows the Indian retailers to

!

credit tribal taxes against the state's tax claims.

See Op. at 20

n.37 (leaving open the question of the validity of a credit
scheme).

In that case, the practical effect of Mr. Justice

Brennan's QOSition will be to allow a credit of all tribal taxes
affecting the same transaction against all state taxes affecting
it.

Thus, a tribe that chases to impose a cigarette tax greater

than the state cigarette tax would still be able to sell
cigarettes at the off-reservation price as long as the tribal
cigarette tax did not exceed the sum of the state's cigarette and
sales taxes.

In other words, a tribe can draw revenue from one

sort of tax away from the state by enacting a different sort of
tax on the same transaction.

I am not sure how well that result

squares with this Court's sales tax vs. use tax cases.

But

assuming that the states go to a tax credit system, the practical
effect of Indian taxes on state revenues will not be very severe
in any case.

The credit system will equalize the consumer price

for goods on and off the reservation.
If you dissent and garner some votes, your opinion might
lead the Court to reconsider the proper pairing of taxes in a
credit scheme case.

I suspect, however, that the Court would

adhere to the decision in this case--perhaps invoking the
rationale that I mention above.
a dissent would be useless.

broader ~

Thus, I am inclined to think that

NEW FOOTNOTE 40

!QI As applied to cigarettes, it seems to us that the state

sales and cigarette taxes present essentially the same
question.

Each imposes an economic burden on the distribution

of cigarettes. Each falls on the non-Indian purchaser, and the
amount of each is directly proportional to the amount of
cigarettes purchased.

Nomenclature aside, they are, in short,

indistinguishable from either an economic or a formal
perspective.

And in consequence, they are properly analyzed as

dual components of a single state imposed burden on tribal
cigarette sales, a burden that must to some extent yield when
the tribe chooses to impose its own analagous burden on those
sales.
The District Court did note one distinction between the two
taxes: the sales tax was smaller.

Thus, while under that

court's view the cigarette tax was invalid for two reasons
it (1) would interfere with tribal self government by
drastically reducing the volume of cigarette sales and the
tribal revenues produced by such sales and (2) had in any event
been preempted by the tribes' exercise of their federally
delegated powers, 446 F.Supp. at 1360-1366, -- the sales tax
was invalid only for the second reason.

It had been preempted

-2-

by the tribes taxing scheme, but it was simply not large enough
to have an impact upon tribal self-government, id. at
1370-1371.

Even if our own analysis dovetailed in other

respects more closely with that of the District Court, we would
be unwilling to accept the proposition that the permissibility
of a tax must turn upon a highly fact-specific inquiry into
demand elasticities and actual impacts.

Thus, in the present

case we hold the presence of some competitive disadvantage to
be enough without attempting to quantify that disadvantage.

.----

Justice
Justice
Tusttce
Justice
Justice

e
Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
R0hnquist
Stevens

State of Washington et at 1
Appellants1

~~

v.

Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United
States District Court for the
q~ille Indian ReserEastern District of Wash~
vation et aL
ington.
State of W ashington 1

~ U

'i}),

United States et al.
[ . ovember - , 1979]

MR.

BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463 (1976), held that the State of Montana could require
Indian operators of on-reservation "smoke shops" to collect
cigarette taxes from the non-Indian purchasers on whom those
taxes fell. 425 U. S., at 481-483. Today we consider a challenge to similar cigarette taxes imposed by the State of Washington on similar transactions. But while in Moe the cigarette retailing business was largely a private operation, the
Tribes involved in these coJtsolidated cases have adopted
comprehensive ordinances regulating aud taxing the distribution of cigarettes by on-reservation smokt> shops. The principal question for decision, therefore. is whether the tribal
regulatory and taxing in vol vemen t present here and absent in
Moe mandates a different conclusiOn as to the validity of the
Washington taxes. The three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington concluded that it does, and
we affirm When th e tribal governments chose to tax the
JusTIC]<]
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distribution of cigarettes, the Washington taxing scheme was
brought into conflict with the Tribes' federally sanctioned
functions and activities. The effect was Impermissibly to
jeopardize tribal authority and place thr Indian smoke shops
at a competitive disadvantage.

'These cases are here 011 the State of WashmgtOJlS appeal
from declaratory JUdgments and permanent injunctions entered by the District Court at the close of consolidated proceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978). The first case. Cot/federated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservatwn v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Colville, Makah, and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States
of America and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
i ndian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909,
was commenced on July 18, 1913, by the United States on
behalf of the Yakima Indian N atio11. 1 In each action, the
complainants contended that the State 's cigarette and tobacco
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by onreservatiOn tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judgments to that effect, as well as in.lunctions barring the State
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enJoill the State from se1z1 On April 24, 1!:174, the Yakima Indian Nahou mtervened as a plmnt111
in the FnitPd Stat<•,;' casr. h::; rom plaint ap]>('ar::; at Ap]wnchx (App.) 149.
2 The State tobaeco product ~ tax, winch Is nnposed on cigar,: and pipe
tobacco )l\ll':"tUtllt to R.. C. W Ch. R2 .26, 1" not beforr u:s. The D1stnct
Conrt ronrluclrd' that tl~at. tax fdl upon the Indwn sell e r~ and not upon
the non-Indian p11rcha ~<:> r~ . -1-46 F Supp ., at la55, n. 15 . The State did
not appeal from tin,.; holding, appellant;; ' bnrf at 55 , n. 40, and allpart1e~
ap;r<:>e that. m consequence tlw tobac('o product:; tax may not. be impo~ed
on sale:; by tribal dealrr::. McClanahan \ Anzona Stat e Tax Comnussion,
411 l' S 164 (l!.l7:l) See al:;o Brww1 Y ltai$Cn County, 42() U S. 37J.

'( 1976) .

;

'J
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ing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to
their reservations. 8 Iu the Colville case, the Tribes also challenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked
the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to Indianowned vehicles. 'The Yakima case did not present these latter
issues, but it did make a broad attack on the application of
the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation transactions. Both complaints alleged that the challenged state
practices were contrary to the Indian Commerce Clause (U. S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), and various federal treaties and
enactments.
}""rom the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely parallel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining
order against the State's enforcement of the taxing statutes
was issued in each. Appendix (App.), at 13, 147. Thereafter,
because the complaints sought i1ijunctive relief against the
enforcement of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was
convened pursuant to tl1e then applicable requirement of 28
U. S. C. § 2281 (1970). 4 On September 6, 1974, the threejudge court issued preliminary injunctions restraining the
State from enforcing the challenged taxes against the Tribes.
App. 15, 156. There followed extensive discovery,& after
which the parties to each case reached agreemeut in pretrial
orders, setting forth facts and clarifying the issues.
The Tribes abo sought damages for interference with their cigarette
The damage is~ues m both cases were remanded by the threejudge Court to a single di~triet judge. 446 F. Supp., at 1367, 1373.
'1 Although § 2281 was :;ub~equently repealed, Act of AuguHt 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, it WW:i expre:;~ly left in place for
eases which, like t.ho:;e before u~, wen• pcndiug on the da.te of repeal.
Pub . L. No. 94-381, § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. W(' consider i:;~ues concernmg the
applicability of the former § 2281 to the~<> caSt>i:l 111 Part III, ·i nfra.
5 ProceedingH iu both ea."ieR were ~t ayed for !'iPvernl month,;, however,
pending thii:l Court's deciH:on in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U. S. 46a ( 1970) , and .Bryan v Itasca Couuty, supra.
3
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Trial was held in both cases on March 28, 1977, and the
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on May 10,
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a
three-judge court to consider the issues presented; (2) that
the state cigarette tax could not be applied to on-reservation transactions because it was pre-empted by the tribal taxing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales, but could be
applied to sales of other goods to. non-Indians; (4) that the
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements
in connection ·with various tax exempt sales; ( 5) that the
State could not impose its vehicle excise taxes upon vehicles
owned by the 'Tribes and their members, and (6) that the
State's assumptio11 of civil and criminal J-urisdiction over the
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutional. The court
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new trial. This appeal
followed. We ·postponed consideration of certain jurisdictional questions to the merits. U. S. (1979). We
now conclude that we have jurisdiction of the appeal and
affirm the judgment of the District Court with one
modification.
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background,
which · is not seriously in dispute. 6 · Thereafter, we explore
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then
turn to the merits.
II

~·

'

"·

...

..
'

..•

...

(a) The State Taxiny Schemes

The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of'
$1.60 per carton/ ou the "sale, use, consumption, handling,
<J Our ~1 at.enwnt of Uw factual backgrotmd i~ drawn ill large mea~ure
from the OlJlllion of the District Court, 446 F . Supp., at. 1345-1349, 1367-

1370.
7

The cigarette

exci~e

tax is imposed

pur~uant

to R C. W. 82.24.020 •.

•·'
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rossession or distribution " of cigarettes Within the State.
RCW 82.24.020. The tax is enforced with tax stamps; and
dealers are required to sell only cigarettes to which such stamps
have been affixed. R. C. W. 82.24.030. Indian tribes are
permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes for purposes of
resale to members of the tribe, but are required by regulation
to collect t.h e tax with respect to sales to nonmembers.
R. C. W. 82.24.260, WAC 458-20-192.ti The District Court
found, ou t~1e basis of its examination of state authorities,
that the legal incidence of the tax is on the purchaser in
transactions between an Indian seller and a non-Indian buyer. 0
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seizures whenever the cigarettes are destiued to be sold to nonIndians with.put affixation of stamps or collection of the tax.
R. C. \V. 82.24.040.
.That proviHion authorizeil a levy of 6.5 null:, per cigarette. The tax JS
brought. up to 11~ full amount by R. C. W. 28A.47.440, and 73.32.130,
which add 0.5 m11l~ and 1 mill r(·~pechvel).
8 Imtwlly tlw State al:'serted that 11 eould tax all tnbal cigarette !iales,
,regardle:;::; of whether thr buyer wa~ lndiau or non-Indian. Its throry was
that Pub. L. No. s:~-2~0, 67 Stat. 51\8, rh . 505 (HJ5:3), granted it general
authonty to tax reservation Indwns. Aft£•r thi::. theor·~r was rrJected in
B1'yan v. Itasca County, supra, thr State abandoned any claim of authority
to tax ::>ales to tnbal mt•mbrr><. See 446 F Supp., at 1346, 11. 4
u 446 F. Supp., at 1:352-1355. Es,.;entially the Court aerepted the
State's contention that the tax fall::> upon the fir,;t event. which may constitutionally be ~ubjected to 11 . In the ca::;e of ::;ales by non-Indians to nonIndians, this mean" thr mcidence of the tax IS on the seller, or perhap::; on
emeone evrn further up the cham of di::;tnbution, b('£•au~e that per::;on 11;
tlw one who fir::;t ~ell~;, use,;, cou~ume,;, handlt's, po~~es::;cs or ch::>tributes the
products. But where the wholesaler or retailer i~ an Indian on whom
the tax cannot be nnposrd uudrr M cClwwltan ". AI''!Zona State 1'ax Corn. rn~sswn, supra. thr fir:'lt t.axable t•vent LS thr u::>e, consumptiOn or po::>ce::>swn
by the non-Indian pttr<'haser. Henee, tlw Distnct Court concluded, the
tax falls on that JHtrcha~er While the que~twn 1::; not free from doubt, weaccept th1:, eonclu,.;wn .

'.

''
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Washington also imposes a sales tax on sales of personal
property, including cigarettes. R. C. W. 82.08.020. This tax,
which was 5% during the relevant period, is collected from
the purchaser by the retailer. R. C. Vl. 82.08.050. It does
not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation Indians,
WAC 458-20-192.
The State Motor Vehicle Excise Tax is imposed on "the
privilege of using in the state any motor vehicle." R. C. W.
82.44.020. The tax is assessed annually, and during the rele~
vant period the amount was two percent of the fair market
value of the vehicle in question. 1bid. In additon, the State
imposes an annual tax in the amount of one percent of fair
market value on the privilege of using campers and trailers
in the State. R. C. W. 82.50.10

I

I

'

I

-

'f<
~.

.,

...
>.~

.,

I

l

~.
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(b) The Tribes

Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized
by the United States as a sovereign Indian Tribe. Each is
governed by a business or tribal council approved by the Secretary of Interior. 11 ·The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 members, of whom about 3;200 ·uve on the Colville Indian Reservation.12 Enrolled members of the ·Tribe constitute just.
under half of the reservation's population. ·The Lummi Tribe
has approximately 2,000 members. Roughly 1,250 of them

•.,

··'

,,

".....,

•c
10

The same chapter provided for an · excise tax on mobile homes. Initially, the State smtght to apply this tax to Indians as well; but after
Bryan v. lta~ca County, supra, and Moe v. Coufederated Salish and
Kouteuai 'l'ribes, supra, it no longer attempts to do ~o . 446 F . Supp., at

1365.
The Mn.kah Tribe j,.; organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of
~Seq. Wh1le the Lumrm aud Colville Tribes do·
have federally approved constitutions, they voted in 1935 not to com~
under that Act. 446 F. Supp., at 1:345, n. 2
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 Jmlhon acreH in the northeastern section of Wn.~hmgton . It was eHtablished by Exeeutive Order on
· July 2, 1872. 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Tl'eatiet> 916 (1903).
11

1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et

I.
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live on the reservation. 13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000
members. Some 900 live on the reservation. 11 The Colville,
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated a.ncl underdeveloped. Many members reside in mobile homes. Most own
at least one automobile which is used both on and off the reservation. Unemployment is a serious problem on the Colville
and Makah reservations.
The Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation have more than 6,000 members, of whom about 5,000
live on the rservation. 1 '' Enrolled members, however, constitute less than one fifth of the reservation's population. The
balance is made up of approximately 1,500 Indians who are
not members of the Tribes and more than 20,000 non-Indians.
(c) '!'he Tnbal Ctyarette Buswess
The Colville, Lumuu, and Makah Tribes have uearly identical cigarette 5ales and taxing schemes. Each Tribe has
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has established one
or morP on-reservation tobacco outlets. 16 These ordinances
have been approved by the Secretary of Interior; and the
dealer at each tobacco outlet 1s a federally licensed Indian
tradet'. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds 17
13 The Lummi R<'~ervatwn encompa~,;e:-- 7,319 acre:;, mo:;t of them on •t
1Jeninsula nrar Bellingham, Wa.~h It. was establislwd by lhe treaty of
Point Elliot. in 1855. 12 Stat . 927
u The Makah He:sPrvatJOn rneompas,;e~ 28,000 acre~ at the northwe::;t tip
of the Olympic P('nm,;ula. It too wn~:; ~tabh,;hed by treaty m 1855. 12
Stnt. 039. Roughly 63% of Its mhabitants a.re PllT'olled membrr8 of the
Tribe.
lG The Yakima Indmn ReservatiOn was ~ct a,~Ide for thP Tnbe by treaty
ra.tifiPd .Marrh 8, 18511, 12 Stat 951 lt rneompasses about 1.4 million
acrrs in south rrntral WaKhington
10 The trihal ordm:mres r('gttlating the ::~ale, distnbution ami taxing of
cigar('tte:; arP ~C't. forth at App. 104, 115, and 111
17 The fund:< arP mam1amed m mdividual aceount;~ in tlw Bureau of
Indian Affa.irs agency servmg the reHervatwn pm::matlL to 25 CFR Part 104
(1U78). App. 32- 34.
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to purchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers. 1 " The Tnbes
distribute the cigarettes to their tobacco outlets and collect
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale distribution price and a tax of 40-to-50 cents per carton. The
cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sale. The
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to
the ultimate consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through
1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from
its cigarette tax; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and the
Makah Tribe realized $13,000
While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as
retailers, retaining possession of the cigarettes until their sale
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It purchases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them
to its licensed retailers. The Tribe receives a markup over the
wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of 22.5
cent per carton. There is no requirement that this tax be
added to the selling price. In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived
$278,000 from its cigarette business.
Indian tobacco dealers make a large maJority of their sales
to non-Indians-residents of nearby communities who journey
to the reservation especially to take advantage of the tribal tax
exemption. The purchaser saves more than a dollar ou each
carton, and that makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree
that if the State were able to tax sales by Indian smoke shops
and eliminate that one-dollar saving the stream of nou-Indian
bargain hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's
business is to a substantial degree dependent upon his tax
exempt status, and if he loses that status his sales will fall off
sharply.

ITI
We first address our jurisdictiOn to hear the State's appeal.
Two attacks are made upon that jurisdiction. one grounded in
The,;e
trader.;.
18

out-of-~;tate

whole:saleriS are al,;o ft•d(•rall ' hcrnsed lndunr

'

;

..•
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· the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing threejudge district courts and the other having to do with the timing
of the State's appeal. Both are lacking in merit.
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit
"required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined
by a district court of t4ree judges." At the time the Yakima
·and Colville cases were filed, 28 U.S. C. ~ 2281 provided that:
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officers of such State
in the enforcement or execution of such statute .. .
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by
a district court of three judges . . .. " 10
After the State filed its JUrisdictional statement in this appeal,
'the United States moved to dismiss the Yakirna case on the
'ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by
'a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to
the Y akirna case because that is the only one to which the
'government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane
to the Colville case as well.
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only m
the Supremacy Clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S.
ll1, 128-129 (1965) . In addition, § 2281 is not brought into
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973). The United States argues
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into
one or the other category. and thus failed to trigger § 2281. 2 (}
10 The repeal of thi~ provi~ion m 197f:i doeR not. affect its application t~
these cases. Sec n. 4, supra.
~As the government rt>eogni:M's, its po:,ition in tin:, regard J:; somt'what·

•
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Further, the government continues, the attacks on the State;s
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine Commerce
Clause issues, are not properly characterized as challenges to
the constitutionality of a state statute. Rather, the government asserts, they go to the constitutionality of the result obtained by the 1fSe of the statute. We find neither contention
persuasive.
The original complaints in these actions ·contended that
the state taxes were unconstitutional under the Indian Commerce Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause. Relying
primarily upon language in footnote 17 in Moe, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tn:bes, supra, at 481, n. 17, the
United States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce Clause claims
were insubstantiaJ.2 1 Footnote 17 does suggest that challenges to taxing statutes like the ones before us are to be
analyzed under the Supremacy Clause. But Moe was decided
in 1976-long after a three-judge court was convened to hear'
these cases-and it is thus apparent that footnote 17 alone·
cannot be dispositive, whatever its precise thrust. There is·
language in that footnote, however, which suggests that the·
insubstantiality of Commerce Clause 'Claims such as those·
before us flows from Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U. S. 145 (1973), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)-both of which were decided
anomalous since it was the Umted States which initially reque:;ted a tJueejudge court in the Yakima carse. App. 145. At that t1me the government
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a,
state statute on grounds of it::; unconstitutwnality withm the meaning of
§ 2281.
21 The Di:;trict Court sef'ms to have found this contention persuasive,
446 F . Supp., a.t 1350, i1lthough it addreso;ed it only briefly. Presumably
it saw no need lo explore the matter more fully since It was confident
that the three-judge reqnil'ement of § 2281 had m any event been satisfied
by the Tribers' challenge,; to the State's enforcement measures, 446 ·:F ..
. Supp., at 1350-1351.
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before the present suits were filed. 22 We think the United
States reads too much into this language. Goosby v. Osser,
supra, made it clear that constitutional claims will not lightly
be found insubstantial for purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby
explicitly states that prior decisions are not sufficient to support a conclusion that certain claims are insubstantial unless
those prior decisions "inescapably render the claims frivolous."
409 U. S., at 518. We cannot say here that the Goosby test
has been met. Neither Mescalero nor McClanahan "inescapably render[s] the fTribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivolous" because neither holds that that clause is wholly without
force in situations like the present. And even footnote 17
merely rejects the stark and rather unhelpful notion that the
Commerce Clause provides an "automatic exemption[] 'as a
matter of constitutional law [emphasis added j' " in such cases.
It does not take that clause entirely out of play in the field of
state regulation of Indian affairs.
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack
on the official sehmre of cigarettes bound for the reserva22

Footnote 17 in Jt8 en tJrety reads a:> follow:>.
JS thus clear that the basb for thP mvalidity of the:se taxmg measures, whicii we have found to be inron~i;;tent with PXJ:stlug federal statutes,
is the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CmJ.St.. Art . VI, cl. :l, and not any automatiC
exemption:; 'a,; a mattc•r of con:,titutwnal law' Pither under til(' Commerce Clause or the mtprgovcrmnental-immumty doctnne as lrud down
originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). If so, thPn the
basi~ for convening a thn·e-Judge eourt m tins type of caRe has pffectively
disappeared, for thi8 CourL ha;,: exprr:;~ly held that attacks on state statutes
rai:,;ing only Supremacy Clause mvalidity do not fall witluu the scope of
28 :U. S. C.§ 2281. Swtft & Co. v. Wickham. ;{82 ll. S. 111 (1965). Here,
however, the D1strwt Court properly convened a § 221\1 court, becau;;e
at the out:;Pt the Tribp';; attack as~crtl'd uncon,.;tJtutJOnality of the"e ~;tatutP::l
under the Commerce Clau;;c, a not m"ub,.;tantml clann ~:>incc Mescalero
[Apache Tribe Y. Jolle8, 411 U. S. 145 (197:-l),j all(! McClanahan
Arizona State 'l'ax Comm'n, 411 U S. 164 (1!)73) ,] had not yet been
decided SPe Goo8by v Osser, 409 lr. S. 512 (Hl7;{) " 425 U S, at 481,

"lt

rv

n. 17.
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tions also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281.
The United States concedes that that attack raised Commerce Clause issues, but maintains that the Tribes' target
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves,
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pursuant to those statutes. We have no quarrel with the proposition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit to
restrain their lawless behavior into a § 2281 case, Phillips v.
Un·ited States, 312 U.S. '246, 248_:252 (1941). But this is not
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires actions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes granting them broad executive discretion. Phillips, 312 U. S., at
252. Here the state officials involved were attempting to
enforce the state tax laws ·by using the tools authorized for
such enforcement by the state legislature. They manifested
an intention to continue to use those tools for that purpose.
And it is those tools, as applied to cigarettes in Indian commerce, which the Tribes challenged.n We hold that this
suffices to bring these cases within ~ 2281.
The other jurisdictioual question postponed last February 1s
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness
under 28 U. S. C. ~ 2101 (b) of the State's appeal from the
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and assumption of j urisdictiou issues. Basically, the problem is
this: the Notice of Appeal on these two issues was filed more
than 60 days after the District Court's decision. but withiu 60
days of the deni~1l of a state motion for partial new trial-a
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and assumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District
2
~ ScP Turne1· v. Ji'ouche, 396 U.S. :346, ;{54, n. 10 (1970). S('e alooDepartment of Employment v. United State8, 3H5 U. S 355 (1966) ;
·• Query v United States, :n6 U.S 486, 490 (1942) .
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Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely
renders nonfinal the disposition of those issues actually raised
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice
of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction
issues was timely. If the latter, that notice was filed out of
time and to that extent the appeal is JUrisdictionally time
barred.2-1
We think that the filing of a motion for partial new trial
in these circumstauces must have rendered nonfinal the disposition of all issues betweeu the parties. A contrary conclusion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make
little difference save to force future appellants to include in
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues.
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any
sound supporting rationale but capablP of occasionally tripping
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redundant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of
The ad ual chronology wa:; <U:i follow~: On May 10, 1978, the D1,;tnct
Court entered 1ts final order. On -:\fay 22, the State fiiPd a motion for
partial nPw trial on th<;> eigarf'tte and l-':tles tax i~:;urs. On .July 1:2, wlule
that motion was !WIH.iing, the Statr filed a Notier of Appeal rai:;ing the
motor veh1cle excise tnx and as15umption of juri:;dictwn IH::;ue,;. On July 17,
the motion for partial nPw trial wa:; clemed; and on August H, the State
filed a Notice of Appe<d ou tlw sale,; and cigarette tax is:sueH. On September R, the State filPd an Amend<>d Notice of Appeal nu,mg all n·lcvant i:;sues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal wm; filed more than 60 days
after the ol'lginal Di:stnct Court. order. Accordmgly, under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2).01 (b), it w:ts out of tunc. The 'N otJce of August 14 and the Amended
Notice of September 8, however, were filed with111 60 day:; of the District
Court'll denial of the motwn for partml new trwl. It ~eems clear that
the filing of that mot ion reudPrecl nonfinal tlw di~po~ltiOn of all covered'
bsue~;-if not, one :-;eckmg a partial new tnal would have to jeopardize
his right to appeal. Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 41-! U. S. 441, 445446 (1974), Department of Banhng v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 266 (1942) .
Thus, the only remaining question 18 wlwther the motion for partwl new
trial also Hllspended thl' finality of thr Di:-;tnci Court'~ cliHposition ol'
issues not; covered by that mohon ..
21
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the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction
holding is properly before us.

IV
We turn now to the merits. The primary questions con~
cern the validit:YOnfie Wasf1ington cigarette and sales taxes.
In our view, these questions are considerably more narrow
than some of the briefs suggest. We are not required to reconstruct the foundations of Indian sovereignty, locate the
precise source of Indian power to assess taxes on non-Indians 25
or fiually define the relationship between state and Indian
revenue-raising authority. All that is before us is a challenge
to the application of a particular state taxiu schemeto'j)articu ar ransactwns t
are a so su ject to particular tribal
taxing an<l regulatory ordinances. And all we decide is fuat
that state scheme may not ~ applied to those transac~ions.
We begin w'"'itfl"'a Drief overview. ""It 1s no longer the law
that Indian reservations partake of the full territorial sovereignty of states or foreign countries. although they do retain
important attributes of such sovereignty. 26 As a result, the

;

25 Ser Morris v. I·btchcocl•. 194 U.S. 384 (1904), Iron Crow v. Oglala
Siou.c 'l'ribe, 231 F. 2d R9 (CA8 1956), rf. 55 L D. 14 (19:34)

The starkrxt tPI'ntoriril eoncl'ptwn of Indian sovereignty was sketched
by Chi<·f Justiee ~Tar::<ha11 in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515,
557-561 (18:32) . An Inaian reservation , he ;;tated, was "a diE'tinct community, occup~· ing iti:i own tNritor~' .. . in winch the law;; of Georgia
can have no forcr . . . . " See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 122 (1942). Williams v. Lei', 358 U . S. 217, 219 (1959), nott>d that.
t. hi~:~ vit•w 1mcl l)et•n "modified .. . 111 ca~-;e;; whpre t"Ssential tribal relatiotL~ wt•rr not mvolved." Organized Village of Kake Y. Egan, :369 U. S. 60,
71-75 ( 1962) , noted a sluft a~ well. And M rClanahan v. Anzona State
Tax Commisswn , I!U])ra. at 172, ob~erved that " the trend ha:s bren away
from the idea of inherPnt Inclimt sovereignty as a, bar to state jurisdic·
tion." Rather, M cCianana.n concluded, ~overr1gnty is bett.rr ;;een as a
" backdrop against wluch the apphcable treaties and federal statntrs must
be read." Ibid. Iu a ~imilar vein, Ohphant \'. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U. S. 191, :208 (1978), recogmzed that Indian tribes are "prohibtted
from exerci~ing both tho:;e powers of autonDmou» :;;t<ltes that art' expre;;;;ly
26

~·
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boundary between state and tribal authority has become in~
creasingly difficult to define. Still, there are some guideposts.
First, it seems clear that in the absence of tribal consent state
law generally does not reach on-reservation conduct involving
only Indians. Thus we have held that tribal courts have ex~
clusi ve jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving the
on-reservation conduct of tribal members. Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976); that States cannot apply their
income taxes to the receipts derived by reservation 1ndians
from reservation sources. McClanahan v. Arizoua State Tax
Commission, 411 U. S. 164 (H)73); and that States may not
levy cigarette taxes on on-reservation sales to reservation
Indians or impose personal property taxes 011 property owned
by such Indians, Moe, supra, at 480-481.
Second, thf're is a significant territorial component to tribal
power. Thus state taxes on the off-reservation activities of
Indians are permissible. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145 (1973), and tribaJ laws will often govern the onreservation conduct of non-Indians. Williams v. Lee, 358
U. S. 217 (1959). See also United States v. Mazurie, 419
u.s. 544, 558 (1975) .27
terminated by Congress and tho~e powers 'incon~1stent with the1r status.' "
(Emphasi~:~ aud citation:; omitted.)
Still, Un£ted i:itate~ v. Wheeze,·, 435
U.S. 313, 322-326 (1978), empha;o;Jzed the sovere1gn nature of tribal authority over Indians. See abo Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S.
145, 148 (1973); Antoine v. Washingtou, -!20 U.S. 19-!, 201-203 (1975) .
27 Thil'l territorial component 1s also suggested b~· recent ~tatutes like the
Clean Air Aet AmPndment,; of 1977, 91 Stat. 685, 7a5, wluch provide thnt
· " lands w1thin tlw E'X(Prior boundane:; of re:>ervatwn:s of federally recognized Indim1 tribPs" may hE' red€'~1gnated for mr quality purpo,:E':; "only by
the appropriat(• Indian governing body." A :::nnilar note 1:; :sounded m the
Surface !\lining and ReclamatiOn Art of 1977, 41 Stat. 445, 523. In addition, a geographieal or territorial ,.;ourc€' for Indian authonty may be
found in the. Wa;-;hington Enabling Act, 25 SwL. 676, ch. 180, 4 (1889), by
whieh the State wa.~ required to dt~clann ''all nght and title" to lands
"owned or held by any Indian or lndim1 tnbe" and to agree that such
lands ":;hall remain nuder the absolute Jnn,.;dJrtwn and control of the
'Congress .. . !'
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Third, where it is necessary to resolve a conflict between
state and tribal authority over on-reservatiou conduct involv·
ing Indians aud non-Indians, a relatively particularistic look at
the interests of state and tribe and the federal policies that
govern relations with Indian tribes is appropriate. We have
concluded, for example, that a tribe lacks jurisdiction to try
a non-Indian for a crime, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 208 (1978), but that a State may not resolve a dispute arising out of on-reservation transactions between an
Indian purchaser and a liOn-Indian seller. Williams v. Lee,
supra, or tax the gross receipts of a federally licensed retail
trading post that deals ou the reservation with reservation
Indians, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) .
And fourth, the preceding results flow from an mtricate
web of sources including federal treaties and statutes, the
broad policies and notions that uuderhe those federal enactments, and a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that
has roots deep in aboriginal independence. The prevalent
mode of analysis is one of pre-emption. It takes as its starting point the exclusive ·power of the Federal Government to
regulate Indian Tribes and proceeds to bound state power
where necessary to give vitality to the federal concerns at
stake. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376, n. 2 (1976).
Only rarely does the talismanic invocation of constitutional
language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal sovereignty
shed light on difficult problems. Moe, supm, at 481, n. 17,
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, supra, at 172.
For present )Urposes, two federal conc~.ws seem especially
important. 01 e IS the Strong and oft-cited poliCYOT encouraging tn al self -government. United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 322-326 (1978); Fisher v. District Court, supra,
at 386-388; · McClanahan v. A.rizona State Tax Commission,
~at 179; wmiarns V. Lee, supra, at 219-220. And the
~is a complementary wterest in stimulating Indian economic and commercial development. Both found expression

l

'
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in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461
et seq./ 8 Mescalero Apache 'l'ribe v. Jones, supra, at 151-152/g
and are manifest in more recent statutes as welP 0 They are,
we believe, of central importance in analyzing any conflict of
state and tribal law.
28 As we have already noted, of the Tribe::~ before u:s only one--the
Mnkah Tribe-iR organized under the Indian Hrorganization Act. The
others, although governed by federally approved constitutions, have voted
not to eome under that Aet. ThiH is not particularly relevant to the preHent eases beenn~e that Act is important, here primarily as an indic1a of
congrrs:;ional policy regardmg uU Indians. Moreover, the concenm underlying that Act have been reatfimwcl in more reernt legislation a~ wc•ll. See
n. 30, infra. A year after the Reorg;:mization Art was enac·ted, Congre~s
provided that "All law::;, general and RpPcial, and all treaty provisions
affecting any Indian re~ervahon whiCh ha~ votrd or may vote to exclude
it~;elf from [thii'i Act] . . . :::hall be deemed to have been continuou~ly
effective as to ~uch re~ervatwn, notwith::;tnnchng the pat-~~age of Lthis Act] ."
25 U. S. C. 478b (1976), 49 Stat . :378 (1935) .
20 We notrcl there that thr ''intent and purp~e of the Heorgamznt10n
Act was 'to rehab1litate the Indian's economic life and to g1ve hnn a chance
to develop tht> initiative de:;troyed by a eent ury of oppre:;sion and paternalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, ai 152, quoting H . R.
Rep. No. 1804, nd Conf., 2d Sf'SS., (j (19:34) . The Act Itself contains a
number of provi~1ons that demon:;trate Congres:;' concern with t>ncouraging
Indian economic development. S<'e 25 U. S. C. §§ 469, 470, and 477. Sec
also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 43G U. S. 49 , 59-60 ( 1978) .
30 See the Indian Self-Detrrmination and Education A~:;i~timre Act, 25
U. S. C. § 450 et seq. and the Indian Financing Art of 1974, 25 U. S.C.
§ 1451 et seq. The fir:>t :;ertion of tlw latter ,;ta1ute .-<tateR as follow:; ~
"H is hereb) cleelared to be· the policy of C'ongre~~ to provide capital . .. to help develop and utilize> Indian re:>Otli'C't'l:l, both phy:;ical am!
human, to a point where the Indian,; will fully exerci~c rp:;pon~iuility for
the utilization and management of their own re:;ourcf':; and whrrr thry will
enjoy a ::;tandnrd of living from their own produetivr effort"' comparable to
that enjoyed by non-India.m; in neighuormg communities."
AdhPrrner to tlw polirie~ unclerlyin~~; the Reorganization Act ha~ not lw('JJ
without ,;ome interrnption. The TerminatiOn Act.. of the 1950's, ~ee, e. g.,
25 U. S. C. §§ 564, 721-728, 741- 760, and ~91-901 , ~eem to have , ignallecf
a congrr~:-<ional urge to pur~ue an a:;:similatiOnJ;;t. policy ,.:omf'what akin to
the approach that wa:s dominant pnor to the Heorgunizatiou Aet . See
generally M enominee T ribe v. Umted States, :3H1 U S. 404 (1968) . Btd,
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With this as background, "•'C turn to the particular problem
before us. Our starting point is Moe, supra. There we considered a state cigarette tax similar-to the one at issue here." 1
Noting that the District Court had concluded that the tax fell
not on the Indian seller, but on the non-Indian buyer,a 2 wo
observed that our decisions dealing with Indian tax exemptions
were not directly applicable. Id., at 483. Indeed, we viewed
the tax itself as "concededly lawful"-it neither fell upon
tribal members nor impinged on tribal functions. The key
problem, as we saw it, was one of enforcement--could the
State of Montana require the Indian seller to collect a tax
validly imposed on the non-Indian purchaser. We determined
that the burden of collectiou was minimal and noted that it
would in no sense "frustrate[] tribal self-government." :w
Accordingly, we concluded that it could be imposed to prevent
wholesale tax avoidance by non-Indian purchasers.
Moe necessarily suggests a number of limits upon Indian
sovereignty in general and the federal interests in tribal selfgovernment and economic growth in particular: It permits
state law to come onto the reservation in the form of a tax
aud collection requirement a11d it upholds the imposition of a.
tax that will undoubtedly hurt Indian retailing activities by
depriving tribal smoke shops of a competitive edge.H
presPnt. pohcr "appear::: to lw returuing to a fo('tt,.; upon ~lrengtheuing
tribnl ::;elf-govemmrnt." Bryan v. itasca Cow1t,11. supra. at :~89, 11. 14.
:n The tax in Moe wm; 1:! C'eut~ a pack or 1);1.20 a. carton. Confederatec!
Salish and Kootenai 'J'ribex \', Moe , :~02 F. Supp. 12\17, 1:3:33 (~Iont. 1975}
( thrrr-j udgf• t'ourt.) .
~ ·Moe. supra, at 4~1-!R2. Set> Cunfederatfd :iuLish am! Kootenai 'J'ribelf
v. Moe, supra, at 1297, 100S for the Di~trid Court'~ ('Onclu:;ion in Llu:s-

rcgard.
~a

Mot>,

~upra ,

aL 48a,

cttin~

Wtllwm~

\,

Le ~: ,

:35H U

~

217,

~Hl-220

(1950) .
~ ~The Di~trict Comt found lt-foe to U!' disJlo~itiv(• of th!' Trio!·~ ' cla1nr
that impo:;itiOn of the tax ('Oilrrtwn hurdl'll drpm·Pd Ilwm of duP procr~~ and thrir a,;:-;l'rtion that. tlw tax wa~ pn•-pmpl<>d by thr Indian·
'l'radcrH Act, 25 U. S C .. § 261 et ~eq., and frderal poliey underlying 11Hs

'.
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The major factual difference between the present cases and
Moe is that here the Tr.ibesj).ave elected to tax a11d regulate
on-reservation ci arette sales ~ while in Moe they had not.ao
Phrase differently, th~ ribes before us are acting in federally
sanctioned and encouraged ways--they are raising governmental revenues, establishing commercial enterprises and
struggling to escape from " 'a century of oppression and paternalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152,
quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).
That difference has a number of consequences. First, it
means that in this case the sharp drop in cigarette sales that
would result from imposition of the state tax will reduce
revenues not only of individual Indian retailers. but of the
Tribes themselves as governmental units. Second, it means
that a decision permitting application of the state tax would
place Indian goods at an actual competitive disadvantage as
5

Indian Reorgamzation Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C § 461 et seq., the Indian
Self-Det!:'rmination and Education ARsiFitance Act, 25 U. S. C. § 450
et seq. and the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1-151 et seq.
See 446 F. Supp., at 1:356-1360.
au The Unitrd States argu!:'H that. therr exist;; a Rerond important difference ns well-the pre::;cnce here of evidrJH·e that pNm1tting impoMition
of the state tax would sharply reduce sale,; by tribal tobarco outlets. In
Moe, the government as~erts, there wa::; no ~bowing that. the rconomic
impact would br thii'i grave. Brief for the United States, at 14-15. We
think the United States rrads Moe too parsimoniously. That deci,·ion
does make clear that Indian tribe::; have no right to 11 rrrtain volume of
saleH. And the presrnt one doe:,: not turn upon thr mere drop in sales
which impo:;ition of the tax would produce.
so The State suggest~ that tribal involvmwnt in Moe wa;; in many respect.,; comparable to that in tlwse cm;es, and tllll~ that Moe is directly
controlling. But whilr the District Court opinion iu that rase does refer
to an admini:;trative fee imposrd by thr Tribr on tohaeco rrtailrrs, unci to
some regulatory involvement a.~ wrll, ;~92 F. Supp., at l!Ha, 11rither eomt
in Moe srrms to have focussecl upon thrHr fact~. Indred, the District
Court specifically notrd that the Tribe~ h:td not impo:<ed any ta.'\ on
cigarette::;, ibid., aJ1d wr obscrYrd that. the ca:-;e pre~PJJtrd 110 conflict with
tribal self-government, 4~5 U S., at 483.
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compared to 11on-Indian ones because the former would have
to bear two tax burdens while the latter bore but one. And
third, it leads to au actual conflict of jurisdiction and soverciguty because impositon of the Washington tax would inject
state law into an on-reservation transaction which the Indians
have chosen to subject to their own laws.
In our view, these three consequences, and particularly the
latter two, bring tfie Washington taxes into sharp collfii with
important fe<. era po ICies.
er aps mos stn ing is the fact
that a rule pennittingrii1positon of the state taxes would have
the curious effect of making the federal concerns with tribal
self-government and commercial development inconsistent
with one-another. In essence, Tribes are put to an uusatisfactory choice. They are free to tax sales to non-Indians, but
doing so will place a burden upon such sales which may well
make it profitable for non-1ndian buyers who are located on
the reservation to journey to surrounding communities to purchase cigarettes. 37 Or they can decide to remain competitive
by not taxing such sales, and in the process forego revenues
urgently needed to fill governmental coffers. Commercial
growth, in short, can be had only at the expense of tax dollars.
And having to make that choice seriously intrudes on the
Indiaus' right "to make their own laws and be ruled by them,"
Williams v. Lee, supra, at 219-220. 38
a7 ThiH problem ww; entirely ab:-;ent in Moe. Nothing in the result
there di~favored the purcha:;p of Indian good::;. Hather, impo::;ition of the
state tax on non-lnchans ,;imp]~· <:rra.ted a :>ituation in which prr:-:ons were
encouraged to buy cigarl'ttes on the basis of factor~ other than tax benefitl:i tU1d a voidall<:<'--fact or:-; likl' geograpl1ical location and (·onven1rncc.
In the ]Jrrsent ~ituation, the balanrr adually tip~ again;;t the Indians.
This mi~ht be uvoifl<•d via a ~httP t;tX that allowrcl sonw form of cr('dit for
the amount of any tribal (ax. Wl' an· not now fael'd with a ~tatP l'Cheme
that provHles for sueh a credit, and we exprc::;:; 110 vit•w as lo the validity
of such a. scheme.
u& It might be nrgll(•d that the ehoiee we describe is entire]~· commonplace-that in making its taxing d<'ei;;Jon::; every govrrnmental unit is
required to balance its revenue need8 again:st thr economic impact of the·

J
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'l'he State urgPs that an affirmance in these cases would
eviscerate jlf oe by making it turn soldy on the presence or
abseuce of eveu a token tribal tax. The result. the State
continues, would be to accord to l])(Jian tribes the right to
"market" to Ilon-India.ns the tax-exempt status recognized in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm·iss-iott, supra, and
related cases. In the State's vie\v, that iu turn would give
the Tribes carte blanche to establish vast tax-exempt shopping
centers dealing in every imaginable good.
We disagree. By permittiug imposition of a state tax that
would doubtless hurt sales by Indian smoke shops. Moe made
clear that Indians do not have a right to market their taxexempt status. Nothin we do today is in an wa to the
contrary. We have simply struck own one of many conAnd , our holding is not that
ceiVafife state taxing schemes.
taxe:'i it cou~ider~ . Iu one srm;e, thi~ is quite lrne : If one State has 1t
wry low ,;nle:s tax, a neighboring State';; ability to impo~t· a higher one may
as a ]Jracticnl matter be impaired. In ~Some rircum:stanc<'s, 1t rau cope
with this ~ituation b~· imposiug a romplementary tax on the in-state U!SC of
good" purchased clsewlwre. National Geogmphic Soczety v. California
Bd. of Equalization. -!ilO 1.'. S. 551, 555 (1977). And in other:; there will
exist 110 efficaciouH wa~· of collecting :such a tax. Whatever the ca:se, howevl•r, the two StnteH will fare each other acro~:s their common border with
equal ar~rnal~.
The pre~t·nt :situation is qu1t l' different for the simple rea~on that [nclian
reservations nrc not State~ . Thi~ hnR two sort~ of con;;equmce~. Fir~t,
it menns the equality notrd in the precPcliug paragraph i;; ab~ent. Moe
holds that :sellers on an Indian reservation may bP requin·d to collect ~tate
taxes 011 :sale~ to non-Indian~ that occur entirely on thr reservation. Yet
it i:s high]~· unlikely that thr Tribr~ in these CHH('~ could requirP ~ellers in
wa~hington to eollf'rt tribal taxe~. And R('('Oild, [ndian Tribes, while le8:s
autonomous than State~ in important re~pect,;, arf' the ~pPcwl beneficiaries
of tlw fedeml roJH't' l'll~ and poliei~ we di:;cu:s~ m text . A;; a re:snlt, while
wr are rontf'nt to recognize eert a in t radcoffs ami frictwn:s in th<· stnte-:state
context a~ inevitabl<>, ,;imilar problem~ in tlw ~tate-rP~ervation ('ontext
demand ,.:prcial ,;crutin~·· Tribe~ may lack tlw toob ll(:.'f:'drd to protect
them!Selve~, and protecting tlwm i:< l\11 llllportant federal concern . cr.
Morton v. Mancari , 417 l'. S. 535, 551-555 (1974) .
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Inuians have an absolue right to enter markets with the competitive boost that comes from tax-exempt status, 30 but merely
that the State is not free to eliminate that competitive boost
in ways that force tribes to choose between federally sanctioned goals, place tribal goods at an actual disadvantage and
compel tribal members to collect a tax that subjects their
goods to a double burden. Accordingly, the specter of enormous tribal tax havens recedes considerably,
The State co1icedes that the Washington cigarette and
sales 40 taxes may not be imposed on sales to Indians. We
no;; hoiCl that the application of those taxes to cigarette sales
to non-Indians is also impcrrnissible.

v
Several questions remam before us, but none reqUires extensive discussion.
80 Indeed, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, ~uggests that
the federal interest in tribal economic development adde:;:oe,; it~elf primarily
to the need to en::;ure that Indian::; can compete with non-Indians on an
equal footing .
40 The District Court anal~·zpd the cigarette nut! Hales t axp,.; se Jarately.
It concluded that th<' former (1) wou c mterfere with tribal :srlf govrrnment by drastically reducing the volume of cigarette "ale,: aucl the tribaf
revenues produced by :such sale:- and (2) had in any event bl'f.'n pre-empted
by the tribe.-' exercise• of their fedrrally delegated powers to regulate and
tax cigarette sales. 446 F. Supp., at 1360-1366. Turning to the ~:>ale~:~
tax, the Court found the second argument equally applicabiP, but concluded
that the first was not becau::;e that tax was so ~mall it would have little
effect on cigarette sales and tribal revenues. Beyond that, the Court
approvrd the application of the ~ales tax to :sale;; to non-Indians of goods
other than cigarette~~good which W<'re not ~ubject to tribal taxation.
!d., at 1370-1371 . ThP latter ronclu~ion is, of cour~;e, entirely unexceptional under Moe . We nl~o agree thai the sales tax may not be applied'
to cigarette sales. But \ve ar<' not per:suaded then' is any reason to·
analyze the ~ an<l'r1garettejaxes ~mtcly. BoT!i will have the effect
of subjecting Indian goods to a competitive di:-;advantagt• when tho~c
goods are also the target of tribal taxes, and we do not think it would be
wi:se to make the permissibility of such a di::;advantage depend in every-
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The first concerns the challenge in the Colville case to
the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper and
travel trailer taxes. R. C. W. chs. 82.44 and 82.50. Although
not identical, these taxes are quite similar. Each is denominated an excise tax for "the privilege of using in the State"
the covered vehicle, each is assessed annually at a certain percentage of fair market value, and each is sought to be imposed
upon vehicles owned by the Tribe or its members and used
both on and off the reservation. 41
Once again, our departure point is Moe. There we held
that Montana's personal property tax could not validly be
applied to motor vehicles owned by tribal members who resided on the reservation. 425 U. S., at 480-481. The vehicles
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and
off the reservation/ 2 and the tax was assessed annually at a
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus,
the only difference between the taxes now before us and the one
struck down in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State,
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax.
The State asserts that this difference mandates a different
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle on
case upon a highly fact-:;pecific inquiry into demand elasticitie:; and actual
impacts.
41 In the wake of McClanahan v. A1'izona State Tax Cornmis11ion, supra,
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon
vehicles used wholly within the re~ervation . Appellants' brief, at 111, anq
n. 77.
42
Moe did not focu:; upon vehicle u:;e at all . The Di:;trict Court opmion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which
Montana sought to apply its tax were used both on and off the reservation. Confederated: Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Montana. 3~2 F. Supp.
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court) (Smith, J ., concurring
~nd; di~:renting) .
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January 1 of each year," 43 and that even took place on the
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizo·na
State Ta.T Commission, supr·a, Montana was without authority
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continue~,
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is
inapplicable and the tax should be upheld under M esoalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily
circumvented. It is the substance of what was done, not its
form only, wl1ich Moe found invalid. Cf. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 285-286 (1977). While·
Washington may well be free to levy a tax on the use outside
the reservation of Indian-owned vehicles. it may not under
that rubric accomplish what Moe held was prohibited. Had
Washington tailored its tax to the amount of actual off-reservation use, or otherwise varied something more than mere
nomenclature, this might be a different case. But it has not
done so, and we dec1ine to treat the case as if it had.
The second question still before us concerns the tax status·
under Moe and McClanahan of Indians who are present on
the reservation but do not belong to the goveruing Tribe.
This issue arose in the Y aki·ma case in the wake of the District
Court's determination that the state retail sales tax could be·
applied to the purchase by non-Indians of goods other than·
cigarettes. 14 It was. of course, quite clear that under Moe
and McClanahan the sales tax could 11ot be applied to similar ·
purchases by tribal members. but the State argued that this
exemptiou should not extend to Indians who reside on the ·
reservation but are not enrolled m the governing ·Tribe.
Relying in part on the lower court opiniou in Moe, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297,.
13 /d., al 1327, citing the :\Iontana statute, R C. M. 1947, § 84-406 (2)•
(1074 Suw.))
14 See ll . 40, supra ..

....
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1312 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court), the District Court
rejected this contention, 446 F. Supp. 1371. Moe did not
reach this question because Montana failed to raise it on
appeal. We do reach it now, and we affirm. The State has
failed to suggest a persuasive reason for treating Indians resident on the reservation differently depending upon whether
they are formally enrolled in the governing tribe:1 •
The third issue that requires attention is the State's mecha~
nism for enforcement of its cigarette and sales taxes. Most
questions concerning enforcement are simply not before us
because the underlying taxes have in large measure been held
invalid. The District Court did, however, conclude that the
State could uot require the Tribes to keep records of certain
cigarette and other sales to Indians-sales coucededly exempt
even under Moe. 446 F. Supp. 1358- 1359, 1373. Thesa
recordkeeping requirements were apparently tailored to enforcement of taxes on nonexempt sales. Having concluded
that there are uo nonexempt cigarette sales in this case, it
is difficult to see why a recordkeeping requirement geared to
collection of a tax on such sales presents a live controversy.
Accordingly, we express uo opinion as to the District Court's
holding that the State could not require Indian retailers to
keep records of cigarette sales to Indians. As for the Court's
seemingly parallel holding that the State could not require the
Tribes to keep records of exempt sales of goods other than
cigarettes-a requirement apparently intended to facilitate
the collection of valid taxes on the sales of such goods to nonIndians--there does seem to be an actual controversy. The
District Court based its holding entirely on its conclusion
that the record was inadequate to show any need for the re45 Thi~ couclu:oiou i:; ron:-;i~ted with that reached by a munbcr of lower
courts. In addition to Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe,
392 F . Supp., at 1:312, ~<'(',e. g., Pox v. Bureau of Revenue. 87 N. M. 261,
531 P. 2d 1234 (1975), rert. dt'uied, 42-! U.S. (1976); Dillon v. State of
Montana. 451 F . Supp. 168 (1\Iont. 197g) . Cf. tlw dPfinition of "lncliuu'1
in the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 479.
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quirement. Accepting that finding. we affirm that Coures
result. Nothing in Moe permits the State to impose unneces~
sary burden upon tribal retailers, and we save an exploration
of what burdens are and are not truly necessary for a case in
which this issue is actually presented.
The final question that must be considered concerns the
challenge by the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes to the
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over them.
The District Court found that assumption unlawful as regards
the Makah and Lummi reservations and lawful as regards the
Colville reservation. 446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. The State
challenges the former findings.
All parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington
v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979). 'There a pattern of jurisdiction
identical to those created on the Makah and Lummi reservations was upheld, and the holding of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit on which the District Court in the present
case relied for its conclusion that such patterns are unconstitutional was reversed. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court in this respect is reversed and in all other re~pects ·l 6 is
Affirmed.
46

We note probable jurisdiction in No. 78-60, Confederated 1'1ibes of
the Colville Indian Reservation; Lummi Indian Tribe; and Makah Indian
Tribe v. Washington, e,t al., which i~:; pending on appeal. There the Colville Tribe appeal::; from ~o much of the District. Court's judgment ar~
reflects the holding that Wai:lhington 's assumption of total juri,;diction
over that Tribe'~ re,:ervation wa~ lawful. See 446 F. Supp., at 1366.
Tlw Colville Tribe chnlle11ge::; that holding on ground,: (1) that Washington could not a~:~Sumf:' juri::;diction without amending its constitution and
(2) that the assumption of tot:tl jurisdiction over only selectf:'d reserva.tions violatC's the Equal Protection Clause. lVashington v. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima hulian Nation, 4a9 U. S. -!6:3 (1979),
disposes of the first contention, id., at 493, and make" elear tha.t the
second must fail if the assumption of jurisdiction i:; rationally related t<>;

,
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some valid state purpose, id., at 500-502. We find thr pattR.rn of jmisdirtion in the present case mtional: The Colville Tribe consrnted in 1965
to the State's as~umption of jurisdiction over it, and the State has ru:;sumecl
total jurisdiction only over Tribes that have so consented. The presence
or absence of tribal consent is a rational basi!l for ctistinguishing among
reservations, und there is thus no com;titutional infirmity.
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST
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Re:

No. 78-630 - Washington v, Confederated Tribes

Dear Bill:

.~

In due course, I will circulate a dissent in t h is
case.

,.,

Sincerely,

)·

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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Novemher 27, 1q79
No. 78-630 Washington v. Confed. Tribes

.'
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Dear Bill:
You were generous to assign this difficult Indian
case to yourself, and you have written a fine oPinion.
I aqree with most of it. ~v vote at the
Conference, however, was that the state sales tax on Indian
cigarette sales to non-Indians orobablv was valid.
Because the tribes do not levv a sales tax,
imposition of the state's sales tax on Indian cigarette sales
would not put Indian goods at a "competitive disadvantage.•
Non-Indian consumers simply would pay the same surcharge no
matter where they made their purchases. Thus, the state
sales tax--unlike the state cigarette tax--does not subiect
Indian transactions to a double exaction or impose state
regulation over a sale that the tribes have chosen to
regulate. Indeed, absolving In~ian retailers of the
obligation to collect the state sales tax would all ow them to
gain a "competitive edge" by marketing their tax exemPtion.
But Moe, as you have pointed out, held that Indian businesses
are not entitled to such an edqe. Oo.at 18, 21-22.
If after further consideration, I adhere to my
Conference view, I will join most of your opinion but dissent
briefly as to the sales tax issue.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rrennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

'\.
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.·
·,

.iupt-tntt Ofttnrt ttf tlft ~b .italt$ ,
Jla$Jri:ngtlttt. ~. Of. 2!1,?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR .

RE:

November 28, 1979

No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation

Dear Lewis:
Thanks very much for your comments on the circulated
opinion in the above. Perhaps before you undertake to
write something I might try to expand upon why I think the
sales tax and cigarette tax should not be treated differently. I'll let you have a revision of footnote 40 within a
day or two.
Sincerely,

Mr.Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

December

fi,

1979

·'

78-630 Washinqton v. Confederated Tribes

'•

•
•,I

Dear Bill:
I so much appreciate your sendina me a draft of a
proposed new footnote 40, in re~ponse to ~v letter of
November 27. The redraft of the note does not meet the view
I expressed as to the nifference between the ciqarette and
sales tax, and I suppose we simply have different perceptions
of this issue. Yet, I oo think the most imPortant qoal is to
resolve doubt and provide quidance in this area.
Accordinqly, it is possible that I will ioin your entire
opinion. For the time beinq, however, I think I will await
writinas by other Justices and see what is said about the
sales tax.

•

'•

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STA~

No. 78-630
State of Washington et al.,
Appellants,

v.
Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United
Colville Indian ReserStates District Court for the
vation et al.
Eastern District of Washington.
State of Washington,

v.
United States et al.
[January -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting in part.
In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 'l'ribes, 425
U. S. 463, 481-483, the Court held that a State that imposes a
cigarette tax on non-Indian purchasers may require Indian
merchants to collect and remit that tax. The State's requirement was objectionable to the Indians for two r(;)asons: it destroyed their competitive advantage over non-Ind\an sellers
and it imposed an administrative burden on the llidian merchants. Because the competitive advantage was derived
solely from the willingness of a significant number of nonIndian purchasers to flout their obligations under state law
to pay sales and excise taxes, the Court found it unworthy of
federal protection. And the Court squarely held that the
"minimal" administrative burden of collecting the tax was
not a "burden which frustrates tribal self-government." Id.,
at 483.
The Washington cigarette tax discussed in Part IV of the
opinion the Court announces today is indistinguishable from
the state tax at issue in Moe . It is perfectly clear that Washington's taxation of the tribal sales of cigarettes to non-
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Indians would be vahd if the Tribes did not also tax those
sales. I am unable to accept the Court's conclusion that the
Tribes have the power, by their own action, to render an
otherwise valid state tax invalid. Cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair, 437 U . S. 267, 280, n. 16.
The Court's conclusion IS particularly anomalous because
the action of the Tribes has not strengthened either of the
objections to the state tax that were rejected in Moe. The
administrative burden of collecting the state tax remains essentially the same whether or not a tribal tax is also involved.
Moreover, the economic interest at stake in this litigation is
precisely the same as that involved in Moe, namely a competitive advantage accruing to the Indian Tribe that " ... is
dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser
is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax." 425
U. S., at 482.
Because I believe the Court's refusal in Moe to a1Iow the
Indian Tribes to gain a significant advantage over their nonIndian competitors by mat·keting their tax-exempt status
requires a like result here. I respectfully dissent from the
Court's principal holding. l do, however, join Parts I , II 1
III, and V of the Court's opinio.n.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 11, 1979

Re:

No. 78-630, Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Bi 11,
'

You were a good soldier to assign this one
to yourself, and I am sure we are all grateful. You
may remember that at the Conference I was alone in
believing that the Washington sales and cigarette
taxes were valid if they credited the taxes imposed
by the Tribes. At present I am simply not at rest and
shall
-" await the dissenting
..._,opinion. --------------Sincerely yours,

_________

---

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

...
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CHAMeE:RS 01'"

.JUSTICE WN • .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

/

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes

In response to John's dissent I propose to add the language
marked in the margin to my footnote 37 so that that note would
read as follows:
This problem was entirely absent in Moe. Nothing in the
result there disfavored the purchase of Indian goods. Rather,
imposition of the state tax on non-Indians simply created a
situation in which persons were encouraged to buy cigarettes
on the basis of factors other than tax benefits and avoidance In the
factors like geographical location and convenience.
present situation, the balance actually tips agains the Indians.
Accordingly, our brother Stevens' statement that the "economic
interest at stake in this litigation is precisely the same as
that involved in Moe", dissent infra at p. 2, overlooks a
crucial distinction-- that between the preservation of a tax
advantage, which was at stake in Moe, and the elimination of
a tax disadvantage, which is at the core of this case. This
distinction might not be present if the state tax allowed some
form of credit for the amount of any tribal tax. We are not
now faced with a state scheme that provides for such a credit,
and we express no view as to the validity of such a scheme.

~

W.J.B.Jr.
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CHAMBERS Of"

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re;

December 13, 1979

No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Deal;' Bill:

r join your opinion but strongly suggest that
you delete the words ''and particularly the second"
in the first full paragraph on page 20.
I consider all three of them to be equally
important and especially the third one so it seems
it would be easier to leave out the whole phrase.
Sincerely,

~·

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc'

The Conference

\
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CHAMSERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

December 14, 1979

No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Bill:
This, indeed, is a complicated and "messy" case. I am
prepared to join Parts I, II, and III of your opinion.
Part v affords me difficulty, particularly with respect
to the motor vehicle tax.
I shall await the dissent from
Bill Rehnquist as to this Part.
I have ~om
~servations about Part IV along the lines
suggested b Le s. The state sales tax and the state cigarette tax, 1 seems to me, are separate and distinct. One
certainly can argue that they should be treated separately
and that, if the facts warrant, one of them should be salvaged. On this approach, the "credit" issue sought to be.
avoided in note 37, lurks in the background. This means ·that
I am not entirely persuaded by the suggestion in note 40 that
the two ~es must be lumped together.
It may ·be that I shall not dissent from Part IV {or most
of it} even if it remains in its present form. For now, however, I shall await any other writing that may be forthcoming.
Could it be said that the last paragraph of Part IV {on
page 22} is literally too broad? Could not the final sentence be read to apply to a sale of cigarettes to any casual
purchaser in a Seattle smoke shop? Would this be cured by
the insertion of an appropriate reference to "on~reservation"
sales by Indians?

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.:§u:prtutt <!fuurluf flrt ~b ;§taft~ ,
Jlrutfri:ttgLm. ~. <!f. 2ll&f~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WH . J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

December 17, 1979

No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Harry:
Thanks for your memorandum of December 14. Your
comment about the last paragraph of Part IV is of
course well taken. It will be corrected by an appropriate reference to 0n-reservation sales by Indians
to non-Indians.
11

11

As to the treatment of the motor vehicle tax in
Part V,I prefer to leave it as it is though of course
I 1 d also consider any dissent.
As to the treatment of the state sales tax in
Part IV, I can only await further developments. I
still think the treatment of it in the opinion is
correct.

ll

Sincerely,

M
Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE
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RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes
Dear Thurgood:
Thank you for your note in the above.

I shall,

of course, make the change you suggested.

'·

Sincerely,

..'
Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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No. 78-630 Washington v. Confed. Tribes
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Dear Bill:
You were generous to assign this difficult Indian
case to yourself, and you have written a fine oPinion.
I aqree with most of it. ~v vote at the
Conference, however, was that the state sales tax on Indian
cigarette sales to non-Indians orobablv was valid.
Because the tribes do not levv a sales tax,
imposition of the state's sales tax on Indian cigarette sales
would not put Indian goods at a "competitive disadvantage.•
Non-Indian consumers simply would pay the same surcharge no
matter where they made their purchases. Thus, the state
sales tax--unlike the state cigarette tax--does not subiect
Indian transactions to a double exaction or impose state
regulation over a sale that the tribes have chosen to
regulate. Indeed, absolving In~ian retailers of the
obligation to collect the state sales tax would all ow them to
gain a "competitive edge" by marketing their tax exemPtion.
But Moe, as you have pointed out, held that Indian businesses
are not entitled to such an edqe. Oo.at 18, 21-22.
If after further consideration, I adhere to my
Conference view, I will join most of your opinion but dissent
briefly as to the sales tax issue.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rrennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR .

RE:

November 28, 1979

No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation

Dear Lewis:
Thanks very much for your comments on the circulated
opinion in the above. Perhaps before you undertake to
write something I might try to expand upon why I think the
sales tax and cigarette tax should not be treated differently. I'll let you have a revision of footnote 40 within a
day or two.
Sincerely,

Mr.Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

December

fi,

1979

·'
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Dear Bill:
I so much appreciate your sendina me a draft of a
proposed new footnote 40, in re~ponse to ~v letter of
November 27. The redraft of the note does not meet the view
I expressed as to the nifference between the ciqarette and
sales tax, and I suppose we simply have different perceptions
of this issue. Yet, I oo think the most imPortant qoal is to
resolve doubt and provide quidance in this area.
Accordinqly, it is possible that I will ioin your entire
opinion. For the time beinq, however, I think I will await
writinas by other Justices and see what is said about the
sales tax.
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Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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State of Washington et al.,
Appellants,
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Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United
Colville Indian ReserStates District Court for the
vation et al.
Eastern District of Washington.
State of Washington,
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United States et al.
[January -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting in part.
In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 'l'ribes, 425
U. S. 463, 481-483, the Court held that a State that imposes a
cigarette tax on non-Indian purchasers may require Indian
merchants to collect and remit that tax. The State's requirement was objectionable to the Indians for two r(;)asons: it destroyed their competitive advantage over non-Ind\an sellers
and it imposed an administrative burden on the llidian merchants. Because the competitive advantage was derived
solely from the willingness of a significant number of nonIndian purchasers to flout their obligations under state law
to pay sales and excise taxes, the Court found it unworthy of
federal protection. And the Court squarely held that the
"minimal" administrative burden of collecting the tax was
not a "burden which frustrates tribal self-government." Id.,
at 483.
The Washington cigarette tax discussed in Part IV of the
opinion the Court announces today is indistinguishable from
the state tax at issue in Moe . It is perfectly clear that Washington's taxation of the tribal sales of cigarettes to non-
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Indians would be vahd if the Tribes did not also tax those
sales. I am unable to accept the Court's conclusion that the
Tribes have the power, by their own action, to render an
otherwise valid state tax invalid. Cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair, 437 U . S. 267, 280, n. 16.
The Court's conclusion IS particularly anomalous because
the action of the Tribes has not strengthened either of the
objections to the state tax that were rejected in Moe. The
administrative burden of collecting the state tax remains essentially the same whether or not a tribal tax is also involved.
Moreover, the economic interest at stake in this litigation is
precisely the same as that involved in Moe, namely a competitive advantage accruing to the Indian Tribe that " ... is
dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser
is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax." 425
U. S., at 482.
Because I believe the Court's refusal in Moe to a1Iow the
Indian Tribes to gain a significant advantage over their nonIndian competitors by mat·keting their tax-exempt status
requires a like result here. I respectfully dissent from the
Court's principal holding. l do, however, join Parts I , II 1
III, and V of the Court's opinio.n.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 11, 1979

Re:

No. 78-630, Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Bi 11,
'

You were a good soldier to assign this one
to yourself, and I am sure we are all grateful. You
may remember that at the Conference I was alone in
believing that the Washington sales and cigarette
taxes were valid if they credited the taxes imposed
by the Tribes. At present I am simply not at rest and
shall
-" await the dissenting
..._,opinion. --------------Sincerely yours,

_________

---

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMeE:RS 01'"

.JUSTICE WN • .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

/

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes

In response to John's dissent I propose to add the language
marked in the margin to my footnote 37 so that that note would
read as follows:
This problem was entirely absent in Moe. Nothing in the
result there disfavored the purchase of Indian goods. Rather,
imposition of the state tax on non-Indians simply created a
situation in which persons were encouraged to buy cigarettes
on the basis of factors other than tax benefits and avoidance In the
factors like geographical location and convenience.
present situation, the balance actually tips agains the Indians.
Accordingly, our brother Stevens' statement that the "economic
interest at stake in this litigation is precisely the same as
that involved in Moe", dissent infra at p. 2, overlooks a
crucial distinction-- that between the preservation of a tax
advantage, which was at stake in Moe, and the elimination of
a tax disadvantage, which is at the core of this case. This
distinction might not be present if the state tax allowed some
form of credit for the amount of any tribal tax. We are not
now faced with a state scheme that provides for such a credit,
and we express no view as to the validity of such a scheme.
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CHAMBERS Of"

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re;

December 13, 1979

No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Deal;' Bill:

r join your opinion but strongly suggest that
you delete the words ''and particularly the second"
in the first full paragraph on page 20.
I consider all three of them to be equally
important and especially the third one so it seems
it would be easier to leave out the whole phrase.
Sincerely,

~·

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc'

The Conference

\
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CHAMSERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

December 14, 1979

No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Bill:
This, indeed, is a complicated and "messy" case. I am
prepared to join Parts I, II, and III of your opinion.
Part v affords me difficulty, particularly with respect
to the motor vehicle tax.
I shall await the dissent from
Bill Rehnquist as to this Part.
I have ~om
~servations about Part IV along the lines
suggested b Le s. The state sales tax and the state cigarette tax, 1 seems to me, are separate and distinct. One
certainly can argue that they should be treated separately
and that, if the facts warrant, one of them should be salvaged. On this approach, the "credit" issue sought to be.
avoided in note 37, lurks in the background. This means ·that
I am not entirely persuaded by the suggestion in note 40 that
the two ~es must be lumped together.
It may ·be that I shall not dissent from Part IV {or most
of it} even if it remains in its present form. For now, however, I shall await any other writing that may be forthcoming.
Could it be said that the last paragraph of Part IV {on
page 22} is literally too broad? Could not the final sentence be read to apply to a sale of cigarettes to any casual
purchaser in a Seattle smoke shop? Would this be cured by
the insertion of an appropriate reference to "on~reservation"
sales by Indians?

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.:§u:prtutt <!fuurluf flrt ~b ;§taft~ ,
Jlrutfri:ttgLm. ~. <!f. 2ll&f~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WH . J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

December 17, 1979

No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Harry:
Thanks for your memorandum of December 14. Your
comment about the last paragraph of Part IV is of
course well taken. It will be corrected by an appropriate reference to 0n-reservation sales by Indians
to non-Indians.
11

11

As to the treatment of the motor vehicle tax in
Part V,I prefer to leave it as it is though of course
I 1 d also consider any dissent.
As to the treatment of the state sales tax in
Part IV, I can only await further developments. I
still think the treatment of it in the opinion is
correct.

ll

Sincerely,

M
Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

j

December 17, 1979

J. BRENNAN, JR.

..
}

1.·

RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes
Dear Thurgood:
Thank you for your note in the above.

I shall,

of course, make the change you suggested.

'·

Sincerely,

..'
Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

1'o: The Chlet'

J utH 1.; ;

Mr. Justioe Stewart
.

Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Just1c e BJ 8. "11'm ''1
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Eastern District of Washington.
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[November -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Moe v. 'Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S.
463 (1976), held that the State of Montana could require
Indian operators of on-reservation "smoke shops" to collect
cigarette taxes from the non-Indian purchasers on whom those
taxes fell. 425 U. S., at :t.Sl-483. Today we consider a challenge ·to similar cigarette taxes imposed ·by the State of Washington on similar transactions. But while in Moe the cigarette retailing pusiness was largely a private operation, the
Tribes mvolved in these consolidated cases have adopted
comprehensive ordinances regulating and taxing the distribution of cigarettes by on-reservation smoke shops. The principal question for decision, therefore, is whether the tribal
regulatory and taxing involvement present here and absent in
Moe mandates a different conclusion as to the validity of the
'1 Washington taxes.
The three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington concluded that it does, and
we affirm. When the tribal governments chose to tax the

t
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distribution of cigarettes, the Washington taxing scheme was
brought into conflict with the Tribes' federally sanctioned
functions and activities. The effect was impermissibly to
jeopardize tribal authority and place the Indian smoke shops
at a competitive disadvantage.

I
These cases are here on the State of Washington's appeal
from declaratory judgments and permanent injunctions entered by the District Court at the close of consolidated proceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978). The first case, Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Col...
yille, Makah, and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States
of America and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909,
was commenced on July 18, 1973, by the United States on
behalf of the Yakima Indian Nation. 1 In each action, the
complainants contended that the State1 s cigarette and tobacco
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by onreservation tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judgments to that effect, as well as injunctions barring the State
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from seiz1 On April 24, 1974, the Yakima Indian Nation intervened as a plaintiff
m the United States' case. Its complaint appears at Appendix (App.) 149.
2 The State tobacco products tax, which is imposed on cigars and pipe
tobacco pursuant to R. C. W. Ch. 82.26, is not before us. The District
Court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers and not upon
the non-Indian purchasers. 446 F. Supp., at 1355, n. 15. The State did
not appeal from this holding, appellants'' brief at '55, n. 40, and all parties
agree that in consequence the tobacco products tax may not be imposed
on sale::; by tribal dealers. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,
411 U. S. 164 (1973). See also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373
1(1'976).
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'ing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to
their reservations. 8 In the Colville case, the Tribes also challenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked
the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to indianowned vehicles. The Yakima case did not present these latter
issues, but it did make a broad attack on the application of
the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation transactions. Both complaints alleged that the challenged state·
practices were contrary to the Indian Commerce Clause (U.S.
Const., Art. I, §' 8, ci. 3), and various federal treaties and
enactments.
From the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely parallel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining·
order against t1ie State's enforcement of the taxing statutes·
was issued in each. Appendix (App.), at 13, 147. Thereafter,
because the complaints sought injunctive relief against the'
enforcement of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was·
convened pursuant to tlie tlien ·applicable requirement of 28'
U. S. C. § 2281' (1970). 4 On &lptember 6, 1974, the threejudge court issued· preliminary injunctions restraining the'
State from enforcing· the cliallenged taxes against the 'l"ribes.
App. 15, 156. There followed extensive discovery,~ after·
which the parties to each case reached agreement on pretrial
orders setting forth facts and clarifying the issues.
s The Tribes also sought damages for interference with their cigarette·
businesses. The damage issues in both cru;;es were remanded by the threejudge Court to a single district· judge. 446 F. Supp., at 1367, 1373.
4 Although § 2281 was subsequently repealed, Act of Augu!lt 12, 1976;
Pub. L . No. 94-381; § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, it was expressly left in place for
cases which, like those before us, were pending on the date of repeaL
Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. We consider issues concerning the
applicability of the former § 2281 to these cru;;es in Part III, infra.
5
Proceedings in both cases were stayed for several months, however;
pending this Court's. decision in Moe v. COnfederated SalU!h and· Kootenai ·
T.fibes,.425 -u . S. 463::(1976) , and Bryan v. l{asca County, supra.
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Trial was held in both cases on March 28, 1977, and the
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on May 10,
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a
three-judge court to consider the, i8sues presented; (2) that
the state cigarette ta}f could ..;ot be ·applied to on-reserva-tion transactions because it was pre-empted by" the tribal taxing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales,· but could be
applied to sales of other goods to non:Indians; ( 4) that the
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements
in connection with various tax-exempt sales; (5) that the
State could n_ot impose its vehicle ·excise taxes upon vehicles
owned by the Tribes and their members, and ( 6) that the
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutional. 'The court
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new trial. "This appeal
!ollowed. We postponed consideration of certain ·jurisdicU. S. (1979). We
tional questions to the merits. now conclude that we have jurisdiction of the appeal and
· affirm the judgment of the District Court with one
modification.
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background,
which is not seriously in dispute. 6 Thereafter, we explore
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then
turn to the merits.
II
(a) The State Taxing Schemes
The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of
$1.60 per carton/ on the "sale, use, consumption, handling,
Our statement of the factual background is dra.wn in large measu11e
from the opinion of the District Court, 446 F. Supp., at 1345-1349, 1'3676

1370.
7 The

cigarette excise tax is imposed pul'llttant to R. C. W. 82.24.020.

I
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possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the State.
RCW 82.24.020. The tax is enforced with tax stamps; and
dealers are required to sell only cigarettes to which such stamps
have been affixed. R. C. W. 82.24.030. Indian tribes are
permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes for purposes of
resale to members of the tribe, but are required by regulation
to collect the tax with respect to sales to nonmembers.
R. C. W. 82.24.260, WAC 458-20-192. 8 The District Court
found, on the basis of its examination of state authorities,
that the legal incidence of the tax is on the purchaser in
transactions between an Indian seller and a non-Indian buyer. 9
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seizures whenever the cigarettes are destined to be sold to nonIndians without affixation of stamps or collection of the tax.
R. c. w. 82.24.040.
That provi~ion authorizes a levy of 6.5 mills per cigarette. The tax is
brought up to its full amount by R. C. W. 28A.47.440, and 73.32.130,
which add 0.5 mills ana 1 mill respectively.
8 Initially the State asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales,
regardless of whether the buyer was Indian or non-Indian. Its theory was
that Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, ch. 505 (1953), granted it general
~uthority to tax reservation Inaians. After this theory was rejected in
B1·yan v. lt(]Jjca County, supra, the State abandoned any claim of authority
to tax sales to tribal members. See 446 F. Supp., at 1346, n. 4.
0 446 F. Supp., at 1352-1355. Essentially the Court accepted the
State's contention that the tax falls upon the fir~t event which may constitutionally be subjected to it. In the case of sales by non~ Indians to nonIndians, this means the incidence of the tax is on the seller, or perhaps on
someone even further up the chain of distiibution, ·because that person ·is
• the one who first sells, uses, consumes, handles, pos::;esses or distributes the
' products. But where the wholesaler or retailer is an Indian on whom
the tax cannot be impo:sed under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, supra, the first taxable event· is the use, consumption or possession
by the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, the District Court concluded, the
tax falls on that purchaser. While the question is not free from doubt, we
I accept this conclusion.

•
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Washington also imposes a sales tax on sales of personal
property, including ciga.rettes. R. C. W. 82.08.020. This tax,
which was 5% during the relevant period, is. collected from
the purchaser by the retailer. R. C. W. 82.08.050. It does
not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation 'Indians.
WAC 458-20-192.
·'
The State Motor Vehi~le Excise Tax is imposed on "the
privilege of using in the state any motor v.ehicle." R.. C. W.
82.44.020. The tax is assessed annually, and during the .r~Ie.
vant period the amount was' two percent ,of the fair market
value of the vehicle in question. · Ibid. In additon, the State
' imposes an an~mal tax in the amount of one percent of fair
market value on the privilege of using campers and trailers
r in the State. R. C. W. 82.50/0

(b) The Tribes
Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized
by the United States as a sovereign Indian Tribe. · Each is
governed by a bus.iness or tribal council approved by the Secretary of Interior. 11 The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 members, of whom about 3,200 live on the Colville Indian Reservation.12 Enrolled members of the·'-Tribe constitute just
r. under half of the reservation's population. · '"The Lummi Tribe
has approximately 2,000 members. "Roughly 1,250 of them
The same chapter provided for an excise tax on mobile homes. Initially, the State sought to apply this tax to Indians as well; but after
Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, and Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tnbes, supra, it no longer attempts to do so. 446 F. Supp., at
10

1365.
11

The Makah Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of

1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. While the Lummi and Colville Tribes do
have federally approved constitutions, they voted in 1935 not to come
under that Act. 446 F. Supp., at 1345; n. 2.
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million acres in the north-

eastern section of Washington. It was· established by Executive Order on
1872 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affa~rs, Laws and Treaties 916 (1903).

July .~,
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live on the reserva.tion. 13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000
members. Some 900 live on the reservation. 14 . The Colville,
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated : and underdeveloped. Many members reside in ·mobile 'homes. Most own
at least one automobile which is·used both on and off the reservation. Unemployment is a serious·problem on the Colville
and Makah reservations.
The Confederated Bands and'Tribes of the Yakimaindian
Nation have more than '6,000 members, of whom about 5,000
live on the reservation. 15 Enrolled members, however, constitute less than one fifth of the reservation's population. . The
balance is made up of approximately ·1,500 Indians who are
not members of the Tribes and more than 20,000 non.:.Indians.

,..
,,

•

....

(c) ·The ··Tribal Cigarette Business
· The Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes have nearly identical cigarette sales and taxing schemes. Each · Tribe has
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has established one
or more on-reservation tobacco outlets. 16 ·These ordinances
have been approved· by the Secretary of· Interior; and the
· dealer at each tobacco outlet is a federally licensed · Indian
trader. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds ·l'r
13 The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319 acres, most of them on a
peninsula near Bellingham, Wash. It was established by ·the treaty of
Point Elliot in 1855. 12 Stat. 927.
14 The Makab Reservation encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip
of the Olympic Peninsula. It too was established by treaty in 1855. 12
Stat. 939. Roughly 63% of its inhabitants are enrolled members of the
'l'ribe.
15
'l'he Yakima Indian Reservation was set aside for the Tribe by treaty
ratified Match 8, 1859, 12 Stat. '951. It encompasses about 1.4 million
acres in south central Washington .
16 The tribal ordinances regulating the sale, distribution and taxing of
cigarettes are set forth at App. 104, 118, and 111.
1 7 The funds are maintained in individual accounts in · the Bureau of
Indian Affairs agency serving the reservation pur::mant to 25 CFR Part 104
'1 (1978). App. 32-34.

....

......
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to p~rchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers. 18 The Tribes
distribute the cigarettes to their tobacco outlets and collect
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale distribution price and a tax of' 40-to-50 cents per carton. The
cigarettes remain the property of the.'Tribe until sale. The
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to
the ultimate .consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through
1976, the Colville. Tribe realized approximately .$266,000 from
its cigaxette tax;; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and ·the
Makah Tribe realized $'13,000.
While the Colville, Lummi, and 'Makah ·Tribes function as
retailers, retaining possession of the ·cigarettes until their sf.l,le
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It purchases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them
to its licen~ed retailers: The Tribe receives a markup over i;he
wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of · 22.5
~ent per carton. ·. There is no requirement that this tax be
added to the selling price. · In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived
$278,000 from its cigarette business.
Indian tobacco dealers make a large majority of their sales
to non-Indians-residents of nearby communities who journey
to the reservation especially to take advantage of the triba,.l tax
e~emption. The purchaser saves inore than a dollar on each
carton, and that makes the trip worth while. All parties agree
that if the State were able to tax sales by Indian smoke shops
and eliminate that one-dollar saving the stream of non-Indian
bargain hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's
b11siness is to 11 substantial de~ree dependent upon his ta~..
exempt status, and if he loses that status his sales will fall off
sharply.

.

.,

.

III
We first address our jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal.
Two ~tttacks are made upon that jurisdiction, one grounded in
18 These Otlt-of-state whole§alers ar~ also f~erally licensed Indian
t r<:\:d~r"fJ .

.·
'.

..
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the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing threejudge district courts and the other having to do with the timing
of the State's appeal. Both are lacking in merit.
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit
"required by any Act o:f Congress to be heard and determined
by a district court of three judges." At the time the Yakima
aml Colville cases were filed, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 provided that:
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officers of such State
in the enforcement or execution of such statute . ..
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by
a district court of three judges. ..." 19
After the State filed its jurisdictional statement in this appeal,
the United States moved to dismiss the Yakima case on the
ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by
a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to
the Yakima case because that is the only one to which the
government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane
t o the Colville case as well.
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only in
the Supremacy Clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S.
111 , 128- 129 ( 1965). In addition, § 2281 is not brought into
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973). ·The United States argues
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into
one or the other category, and thus failed to trigger § 2281,2°
1 9 The repeal of this provision in 1976 does not affect its application to
these cases. See n. 4, supra.
2 1} A the governme11t recognizes, its position in this regard is somewhat

I'
'I

..
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Further, the government continues;· the ~ttacks on the State'.s
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine CommercJ
Clause issues, are not properly charaeterized as challenges to
the constitutionality of a state statute, Rather, the ·government asserts, they go to the constitutionality of~the result ob~ained by the us/3 of the statute.. We 'nnd neith~r contention
persuasiye.
·
The original complaints in these actions contended that
the state taxes were unconstitutionai under the "Indian Com~
merce Clause as well a8 the Supremacy Clause. 'Relying
primarily upon language in footnote i7 i~ Moe, Moe v. Con.:.
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, supra, at 481, n. l7, the
United States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce Clause claims
were iqsubstantiaP 1 Footnote 17 does suggest that chal~
lenges to taxing statutes iike the on~s before us are to be
Clause. But Moe was decided
' Ianalyzed under the Supremacy
.
•
in 1976-long after a three-judge court was convened to hear
cases-and it is 'thus
apparent that footnote ..17 alone
these
I
,
cannot be dispositive, whatever its precise thrust. There is
~anguage in that footnote, howe~.er, which suggests that th~
insubstantiality of Commerce
Clause claims such as those
• r
pefore us flows_ from l.fesqalero .4pache T,ribe v. Jones, 411
p. S. 145 (1973), an~ McClanaha~ v. Ar{z~na State X~
Cornm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)-both of which were decided
1

'

.,

rnomalous since it was the United States which initially requested a threeJudge court in the Yakim.a case. App. 145, At, tqat time the government
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
tate ;;tatute on grounds of its unconstitutionality within the meaning of
§ 2281.
21 The District Court seems to have found this contention persuasive,
446 F. Supp., at 1350, although it addressed it.onlx briefly. Presumably
it saw no need to explore the matter more fully sjnce it was. confiden~
1hat the three-judge requirement of § 2281 h11-d in,-l'lny event 1btten s11-ti~fi~.d
~Y the Tribes' ~hallenges to the State's enforcement measures. 446 F.
Stipp., at 1350-11351.
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before the present suits were filed. 22 We think the United
States. reads too much into this language. Goosby v. Osser,
o'Upra, made it clear that constitutional claims will not lightly
be found insubstantial for purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby
explicitly states that prior decisions are not sufficient to support a conclusion that certain claims are insubstantial unless
those prior decisions "inescapably render the claims frivolous.''
409 U. S., at 518. We cannot say here that the Goosby test
has been met. Neither Mescalero nor McClcmahan "inescapably render[s] the [Tribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivolous" because neither holds that that clause is wholly without
force in situations like the present. And even footnote 17
merely rej"ects the stark and rather unhelpful notion that the
Commerce Clause provides an u automatic exemption [] 'as a
matter of constitutional law [emphasis added]' " in such cases.
It does not take that clause entirely out of play in the field of
state regulation of Indian affairs.
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack
an the official seizure of cigarettes bound for the reserva22

Footnote 17 in its entirety reads as follows:

"It i8 thus clear that the basis for the invalidity of these taxing

meas~

nrrs, whicli we have found to be inconsistent with existing federal statutes,
iR the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Canst., Art. VI, cl. 2, and not any automatic
exl'mptions 'as a matter of constitutional law' either under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine as laid down
originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). If so, then the
basis for convening a three-judge court in this type of case has effectively
dit;appeared, for this Court has expressly held that attacks on state statutes
rabing only Supremacy Clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of
28 U. S. C . § 2281. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965). Here,
however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court, because
at the outset the Tribe's attack asserted unconstitutionality of these statutes
under the Commerce Clause, a not insubstantial claim since Mescalero
[Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973),] and McClanaha:n [v,
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973),] had not yet been
decided. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973)." 425 U.S., at 481,
n. 17.
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tions also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281.
The United States concedes that that attack raised Commerce Clause issues, but maintains that the · Tribes' target
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves,
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pursuant to tho~e statutes. ·we have no quarrel with the proposition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit to
, restrain their lawless behavior into a '§ 2281 case, Phillips v.
United States, 312 U. 8.' 246, 248~252 ('1941) . . But this is not
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires actions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes granting them broad executive discretion. Phillips, 312 U. S., at
252. Here the state officials involved were attempting to
enforce the state tax laws 'by using the tools authorized for
such enforcement by the state legislature. ·They manifested
an intention to continue to use those tools for that purpose.
And it is those tools, as applied to cigarettes in ·Indian commerce, which the Tribes challenged. 28 We hold that this
suffices to bring these cases within § 2281.
The other jurisdictional question postponed last February is
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness
under 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b) of the -state's appeal from the
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction ·issues. Basically, the problem is
this: the Notice of Appeal on these two issues was filed more
,:than 60 days after the District Court's decision, but within 60
days of the denial of a state motion for partial new trial-a
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and assumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District
See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 354, n. 10 (1970) . See als()
Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355 (1966);
Query v United States, 316 U.S. 486, 490 (1942) .
23
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Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely
renders nonfinal the disposition of those issues actually raised
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice
of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction
issues was timely. If the latter, that notice was filed out of
time and to that extent the appeal is jurisdictionally time
barred. 24
We think that the filing of a motion for partial new trial
in these circumstances must have rendered nonfinal the disposition of all issues between the parties. A contrary conclusion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make
little difference save to force future appellants to include in
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues.
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any
sound supporting rationale but capable of occasionally tripping
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redundant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of
The actual chronology was as follows: On May 10, 1978, the District
Court entered its final order. On May 22, the State filed a motion for
J)Hrtial new trial on the cigarette and sales tax issues. On July 12, while
thut motion was pending, the State filed a Notice of Appeal raising the
motor vehicle excise tax and assumption of jurisdiction issues. On July 17,
the motion for partial new trial was denied; and on August 14, the State
filed a Notice of Appeal on the sales and cigarette tax issues. On September 8, the State filed an Amended Notice of Appeal raising all relevant issues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal was filed more than 60 days
after the original District Court order. Accordingly, under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2101 (b), it was out of time. The Notice of August 14 and the Amended
Notice of September 8, however, were filed within 60 days of the District
Court's d<>nial of the motion for partial new trial. It seems clear that
the filing of that motion rendered nonfinal the disposition of aU covered
issues-if not, one seeking a partial new trial would have to jeopardize
his right to appeal. Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U. S. 441, 445446 (1974), Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 266 (1942).
Thus,. the only remaining question is whether the motion for partial new
trial also suspended the finality of the District Court's disposition of
issues not covered by that motion.
21

>,

'/8-630-0PINION
14

WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES

the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction
holding is properly before us.

IV
We turn now to the merits. ·The primary questions concern the validity of the Washington cigarette and sales taxes.
In our view, these questions are considerably more narrow
than some of the briefs suggest. We are not required to reconstruct the foundations of Indian sovereignty, locate the
precise source of Indian power to assess taxes on non-Indians 25
or finally define the relationship between state and Indian
revenue-raising authority. All that is before us is a challenge
to the application of a particular state taxing scheme to particular transactions that are also subject to particular tribal
taxing and regulatory ordinances. And all we decide is that
that stafe scheme may not be applied to those transactions.
We begin with a brief overview. It is no longer the law
that Indian reservations partake of the full territorial sovereignty of states or foreign countries, although they do retain
important attributes of such sovereignty. 26 As a result, the
25 See Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384 (1904); Iron Crow v. Oglala
Siou:e Tribe, 231 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1956), cf. 55 I. D. 14 (1934) .
26 The starkest territorial conception of Indian sovereignty was sketched
by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
557-561 (1832) . An Indian reservation, he stated, was "a distinct commum}y, occupying its own territory .. . in which the laws of Georgia
cau h.:we no force . . . ." See F . Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 122 (1942) . Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219 (1959), noted thlllt
thit~ view had been "modified .. . in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved.'" Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60,
71- 75 (l962}, noted a shift as well. And McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, supra, a.t 172, observed that "the trend has been away
from the iqea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction ." Ra.~.her, McClanahan concluded, sovereignty is better seen as !J.
'"backdrop pgainst which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must
Df:J rea<! ." Ibid. In a similar vein, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
~i35 U. S. 191, 208 (1978) , recognized that Indian tribes are "prohibited
!rqm exerci~ing both those powers of autonomol,\s states that are expressly
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boundary between state and tribal authority has become increasingly difficult to define. Still, there are some guideposts.
First, it seems clear that in the absence of tribal consent state
law generally does not reach on-reservation conduct involving
only Indians. Thus we have held that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving the
on-reservation conduct of tribal members, Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976); that States cannot apply their
income taxes to the receipts derived by reservation Indians
from reservation sources, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission, 411 U. S. 164 (1973); and that States may not
levy cigarette taxes on on-reservation sales to reservation
Indians or impose personal property taxes on property owned
by such Indians, Moe, supra, at 480-481.
Second, there is a significant territorial component to tribal
power. Thus state taxes on the off-reservation activities of
Indians are permissible, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U. S. 145 (1973), and tribal laws will often govern the onreservation conduct of non-Indians. Williams v. Lee, 358
U. S. 217 (1959). See also United States v. Mazurie, 419
u. s. 544, 558 (1975) ,27
terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status.'"
(Emphasis and citations omitted.) Still, United States v. Wheeler, 435
U. S. 313, 322-326 (1978), emphasized the sovereign nature of tribal authority over Indians. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.
145, 148 (1973); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 201-203 (1975).
27 This territorial component is also suggested by recent statutes like the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 685, 735, which provide that
"lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian tribes" may be redesignated for air qualit.y purposes "only by
the appropriate Indian governing body." A similar note is sounded in the
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977, 41 Stat. 445, 523. In addition, a geographical or territorial source for Indian authority may be
found in the Washington Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676, ch. 180, 4 (1889), by
which the State was required to disclaim "all right and title" to lands
" owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribe" and to agree that such
lands "shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
Congress. • . ."
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Third, where it is necessary to resolve a conflict between
state and tribal authority over on-reservation conduct involving Indians and non-Indians, a relatively particularistic look at
t he interests of state . and tribe and the federal policies that
gover(! relations with Indian trlbes is appropriate. ·we have
coneluded, for example, that a tribe lacks jurisdiction to try
a non-Indian for a crime, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435
U. S. 191, 208 (1978), but that a State may not resolve a dispute arising out of on-reservation transactions between an
Indian purchaser and a non-Indian seller, Williams v. Lee,
supra, or tax tbe gross receipts of a federally licensed retail
trading post that deals on the reservation with reservation
Indians, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U. S. 685 (1965) .
And fourtb , the preceding results flow from an intricate
web of sources including federal treaties and statutes, the
'broad policies and notions that underlie those federal enactments, and a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that
l1as roots deep in aboriginal independence. The prevalent
1node of analysis is one of pre-emption. It takes as its starting point the exclusive power of the Federal Government to
regulate I ndian Tribes and proceeds to bound state power
where necessary to give vitality to the federal concerns at
:stake. Bryan v. ltasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 376, n . 2 (1976).
Only rarely does the talismanic invocation of constitutional
language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal sovereignty
shed light on difficult problems. Moe, supra, at 481 , n. 17,
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, supra, at 172.
For present purposes, two federal concerns seem especially
important. One is the strong and oft-cited policy of encouraging tribal self-government. United States v. Wheeler,
435 U. S. 313, 322- 326 (1978); Fisher v. District Court, supra,
at 386-388; M cClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,.
-supra, at 179; Williams v. Lee, supra, at 219-220. And the
other is a complementary interest in stimulating Indian econ omic and commercial development. Both found expression

·.
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in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461
et seq./M Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 151-152/0
and are manifest in more recent statutes as well. 30 They are,
we believe, of central importance in analyzing any conflict of
state and tribal law.
28 Ad we have already noted, of the Tribes before us only one-the
Makah Tribe-is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act. The
others, although governed by fede.rally approved constitutions, have voted
not to come under that Act. This is not particularly relevant to the present cases because that Act is important here primarily as an indicia of
congres:sional policy regarding all Indians. Moreover, the concerns underlymg that Act have been reaffirmed in more recent legislation as well. See
n. 30, infra. A year after the Reorganization Act was enacted, Congress
provided that "All laws, general and special, and all treaty provisions
affecting any Indian reservation which has voted or may vote to exclude
it:self from [thi:s Act] . . . shall be deemed to have been continuously
effective as to such reservation, notwithstanding the passage of [this Act]."
25 U.S. C. 478b (1976), 49 Stat. 378 (1935) .
2 u We noted there that the "intent and purpose of the Reorganization
Act was ' to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, quoting H. R.
Rep. No. 1804, 73d Conf., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). The Act itself contains a
number of provisions that demonstrate Congress' concern with encouraging
Indian economic development. See 25 U. S. C. §§ 469, 470, and 477. See
also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 1'19--60 (1978) .
30 See the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25
U. S. C. § 450 et seq. and the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C.
§ 1451 et seq. The first section of the latter statute sta.tes as follows:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to provide capital ... to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and
human, t.o a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for
the utilizat.ion and management of their own resources and where they will
enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts comparable to
that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities."
Adherence to the policies underlying the Reorganization Act has not been
without some interruption. The Termination Acts of the 1950's, see, e. g.,
25 U. S. C. §§ 564, 721-728, 741-760, and 891-901, seem to have signalled
:t congressional urge to pursue an assimilationist policy somewhat akin t&
the approach that was dominant prior to the Reorganization Act. See
~Nlera1ly Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968) . But

,.
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The major factual difference between the present cases and
Moe is that here the Tribes have elected to tax and regulate
on-reservation cigarette sales 85 while in Moe they had not. 86
Phrased differently, the Tribes before us are acting in federally
sanctioned and encouraged ways--they are raising governmental revenues, establishing commercial enterprises and
struggling to escape from " 'a century of oppression and paternalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152,
quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).
That difference has a number of consequences. First, it
means that in this case the sharp drop in cigarette sales that
would result from imposition of the state taxes will reduce
revenues not only of individual Indian retailers, but of the
Tribes themselves as governmental units. Second, it means
that a decision permitting application of the state taxes would
place Indian goods at an actual competitive disadvantage as
ludian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U. S. C. § 450
et 8eq. and the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq.
See 446 F. Supp., at 1356-1360.
3 5 The United States argues that there exists a second important diffen'nco a::; well-the presence here of evidence that permitting imposition
of the state tax would sharply reduce sales by tribal tobacco outlets. In
Moe, the government asserts, there was no showing that the economic
impa ct would be this grave. Brief for the United States, at 14-15. We
think the United States reads Moe too parsimoniously. That decision
doe~ make clear that Indian tribes have no right to a certain volume of
::,n lc~. And the present one does not turn upon the mere drop in sales
which imposition of the tax would produce.
na The State suggests that tribal involvement in Moe was in many re~pects comparable to that in these cases, and thus that Moe is directly
cont rolling. But while the District Court opinion in that case does refer
to au administrative fee imposed by the Tribe on tobacco retailers, and to
;;orne rPgulat~ry involvement as well, 392 F. Supp., at 1313, neither court
in Moe seems to have focussed upon these facts. Indeed, the District
Court >'pecifically noted that the Tribes had not imposed any tax ott
cigaretteo;, ibid., and we observed that the case presented no conflict with
~rihal self-government, 425 U. S., at 483.
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compared to non-Indian ones becaul;)e the former would have
to bear t,wo tax burdens w~ile the latter bore but one. And
third, it Jeads to an actual conflict of jurisdiction and sovereignty because imposition of the Washington tax would inject
state law into an on-reservation transaction which the Indians
have chosen to subject to their own laws.
In our view, these three consequences bring the Washington
taxes into sharp conflict with important federal policies. Perhaps most striking is the fact that a rule permitting imposition
of the sta.te taxes would have the curious efl'ect of making the
federal concerns with tribal self-government and commercial
development inconsistent with one-another. In essence,
Tribes are put to an unsatisfactory choice. They are free to
tax sales to non-Indians, but doing so will place a burden upon
such sales which ma.y well make it profitable for non-Indian
buyers who are located on the reservation to journey to surrounding communities to purchase cigarettes. 37 Or they can
decide to remain competitive by not taxing such sales, and in
the process forego revenues urgently needed to fill governmental coffers. Commercial growth, in short, can be had only
at the expense of tax dollars. And having to make that choice
seriously intrudes on the Indians' right "to make their own
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This problem was entirely absent in Moe. Nothing in the result
there disfavored the purchase of Indian goods. Rather, imposition of th&
state tax on non-Indians simply created a situation in which persons were
encouraged to buy cigarettes on the basis of factors other than tax benefits and avoidance-factors like geographica.I location and convenience.
In the present situation, tJie balance actually tips against the Indians.
Accordingly, our Brother S·rEVENs' statement that the "economic interest
at :;take in thi:; litigation is precisely the same as that involved in Moe,"
dissent infra, at 2, overlooks a crucial distinction-that between the
preservation of a tax advantage, which was at stake in Moe, and the
elimination of a tax disadvantage, which is at the core of this case. This
distinction might not be present if the state tax allowed some form of
credit for the amount of any tribal tax. We are not now faced with a
state scheme that provides for such a credit, and we express no view as to.·
the validity of such a scheme ..

.
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laws and be ruled by them," Williams v. Lee, supra, at
2l9-220. 8 ~

The State urges that an affirmance in these cases would
eviscerate Moe by making it turn solely on the presence or
absence of even a token tribal tax. The result, the State
continues, would be to accord to Indian tribes the right to
"market" to non-Indians the tax-exempt status recognized in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Ta;x Commission, supra, and
rtjlated cases. In the State's view, that in turn would give
the Tribes carte blanche to establish vast tax-exempt shopping
c~nters dealing in every imaginable good.
We disagree. By permitting imposition of a state tax that
would doubtless hurt sales by Indian smoke shops, Moe made
It might be argued that the choice we describe is entirely common~
place-that in making its taxing decisions every governmental unit ·is
required to balance its revenue needs against the economic impact of the
taxes it considers. In one sense, this is quite true: If one State has a
very low sales tax, a neighboring State's ability to impose a higher one may
as a practical matter be impaired. In some circumstances, it can cope
with this situation by imposing a complementary tax on the in-state use of
goods purchased elsewhere. National Geographic Society v. California
Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, M5 (1977). And in others there will
exist no efficacious way of collecting such a tax. Whatever the case, however, the two States will face each other across their common border with
equal arsenals.
The present situation is quite different for the simple reason that Indian
reservations are not States. This has two sorts of consequences. First,
it means the equality noted in the preceding paragraph is absent. Moe
holds that sellers on an Indian reservation may be required to collect state
taxes on sales to non-Indians that occur entirely on the reservation. Yet
it is highly unlikely that the Tribes in these cases could require sellers in
Washington to collect tribal taxes. And second, Indian Tribes, while less
autonomous than States in important respects, are the special beneficiaries
of the federal concerns and policies we discuss in text. As a result, while
we are content to recognize certain tradeoffs and frictions in the state-statecontext as inevitable, similar problems in the state-reservation context
de.Qland special scrutiny. Tribes may lack the tools needed to protect
themselves, and protecting them is an important federal concern. Cf~
~or.ton v . .{!{ancari •til' U, S .. 535., 551-555_ (19H) ..
88

....
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clear that Indians do not have a right to market their ta.x.
exempt status. Nothing we do today is in any way to the
contrary. We have sfmply struck down one of many conceivable state taxing schemes. And our holding is not that
Indians have an absolute right to enter markets with the competitive boost that comes from tax-exempt status, 30 but merely
that the State is not free to eliminate that competitive·boost
in ways that force tribes to choose ·between federally sanctiolled goals, place triba] goods at an actual disadvantage and
compel tribal men1bers to collect a tax that subjects their
goods to a aouble burden. Accordingly, the ·spectre of enormous tribal tax ·havens recedes considerably.
The State concedes that the Washington cigarette and
sales 40 taxes may not ·be imposed on s~:i.les to Indians. ·we
39 Indeed, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, suggests that
the federal interest in tribal economic development addesses itself primarily
to the need to ensure that Indians can compete with non-Indians on an
equal footing .
40 As applied to cigarettes, ·it seems to us that the state sales and
cigarette taxes present essentially the same question. Each imposes an
economic burden on the distr"ibution of cigarettes. Each falls on the nonIndian purchaser, and the amount ·of each is directly proportional to the
amount of cigarettes purchased. Nomenclature aside, they are, in short,
indistinguishable from either an economic or a formal perspective. In
consequence, they are properly analyzed as ·dual components of a single
stat.e-imposed burden on tribal cigarette sales, a· burden that mu&1 to some
extent yield when the tribe chooses to impose its own analogous burden
on those sales.
The Di:>trict Court did note one distinction between the two taxes: the
·sales tax was smaller. Thus, while under that court's view the cigarette
tax was invalid for two ·reasons-it ( 1) ·would interfere with tribal self-.
governm!:'nt by dra::;tically reducing the volume of cigarette sales and the
tribal revenues produced by such sales and (2) had in any event been
pre-empted by the Tribes' exercise of their federally delegated powers, 446
F . Supp., at 1360-1366,-the sales tax was invalid only for the second
reason. It had be!:'n pre-empted by the Tribes' taxing schemes, but it was
simply not large enough to have an ·impact upon tribal self-government, id.,
at 1370-1371. Even if our own analysis dovetailed in other respects more
clo$.el:y w:itl.1. that of the Di,strict Cou.rt,. we would be unwilling to accept
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now hol<.l that the application of those taxes to on-reservation
cigarette sales by Indians to non-Indians is also impermissible.

v
Several questions remain before us, but none requires extensive discussion.
The first concerns the challenge in the Colville case to·
the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper and
travel trailer taxes. R. C. W. chs. 82.44 and 82.50. Although
not identical, these taxes are quite similar. Each is denominated an excise tax for "the privilege of using in the State"
the covered vehicle, each is assessed annually at a certain percentage of fair market value, and each is sought to be imposed
upon vehicles owned by the Tribe or its members and used
both on and off the reservation. 41
Once again, our departure point is Moe. ·There we held
that Montana's personal property tax could not validly be
applied to motor vehicles owned by tribal members who ·resided on the reservation. 425 U. S., at 480-481. ·The vehicles
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and
off the reservation,~ 2 and the tax was assessed annually at ·"a
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus,
the only difference between the taxes now before us and the one·
the proposition that the permissibility of a tax must turn upon a highly
:fact-specific inquiry into demand elasticities and actual impacts. Thus, in
t he present case we hold the presence of some competitive disadvantage to
be enough without attempting to quantify that disadvantage.
4 1 In the wake of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, supra,
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon
vehicles used wholly witni'n the reservation. Appellants' brief, at 111, and'
D.

77.
Moe did not focus upon vehicle use at all. The District Court opin-

42

ion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which
Montana sought to n.pply its tax were used both on and off the reservation. Confederated' Salish and' Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 392 F. Supp.
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. !975) (tnree-judge court) (Smith, J ., concurring:
:lml dissenting}.
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struck down 'in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State,
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax.
The State asserts that this difference mandates a different
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle on
January 1 of each year," 43 and that event took place on the
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission, supra, Montana was without authority
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continues,
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is
inapplicable and the tax should be upheld under M esoalero
;J..pache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily
circumvented. It is the substance of what was done, not its
form only, which Moe found invalid. Cf. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274,285-286 (1977). While
Washington may well be free to levy a tax on the use outside
the reservation of Indian-owned vehicles, it may not under
that rubric accomplish what Moe held was prohibited. Had
Washiqgton tailored its tax to the amount of actual off-reservation use, or otherwise varied something more than mere
nomen(llature, this might be a different case. But it has not
done so, and we decline to treat the case as if it had.
The second question still before us concerns the tax status
under !Moe and McClanahan of Indians who are present on
the reservation but do not belong to the governing Tribe.
This issue arose in the Yakima case in the wake of the District·
'Court's determination that the state retail sales tax could be
applied to the purchase ·by non-Indians of goods other than
cigarettes. 44 It was, of course, quite clear that under Moe
43

!d., at 1327, citing the Montana statute, R. C. M. 1947, § 84-406 (2)
(1974 Supp.))
44
See p. 4, supra. This d~Jtermi:p.ation was, of course, entirely unexcep-.
tional after Moe •.
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and McClanahan the sales tax could not be applied to similar
purchases by tribal members, but the State argued that this
exemption should not extend to Indians who reside on the
reservation but are not enrolled in the governing Tribe.
Helying in part on the lower court opinion in Moe, Confederated Salish and Kootenai 1'ribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297,
1312 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court), the District Court
rejected this contention, 446 F. Supp. 1371. Moe did not
reach this question because Montana failed to raise it on
appeal. We do reach it now, and we affirm. The State has
failed to suggest a persuasive reason for treating Indians resident on the reservation differently depending upon whether
they are formally enrolled in the governing tribe. 45
The third issue that requires attention is the State's mechanism for enforcement of its cigarette and sales taxes. Most
questions concerning enforcement are simply not before us
because the underlying taxes have in large measure been held
invalid. The District Court did, however, conclude that the
State could not require the Tribes to keep records of certain
cigarette and other sales to Indians-sales concededly exempt
even under Moe. 446 F. Supp. 1358-1359, 1373. These
recordkeeping requirements were apparently tailored to enforcement of taxes on nonexempt sales. Having concluded
that there are no nonexempt cigarette sales in this case, it
is difficult to see why a recordkeeping requirement geared to
collection of a tax on such sales presents a live controversy.
Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the District Court's
holding that the State could not require Indian retailers to
keep records of cigarette sales to Indians. As for the Court's
seemingly parallel holding that the State could not require the
45 This conclusion is consistent with that reached by a number of lower
courts. In addition to Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe,
392 F . Supp., at 1312, see, e. g., Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N. M. 261,
531 P . 2d 1234 (1975) , cert. denied, 424 U. S. (1976); Dillon v. State of
Montana, 451 F. Supp. 168 (Mont. 1978). Cf. the definition of "Indian,.
in tne Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 479.
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Tribes to keep records of exempt sales of goods other than
cigarettes-a requirement apparently intended to facilitate
the collection of valid taxes on the sales of such goods to nonIndians-there does seem to be an actual controversy. The
District Court based its 'holding entirely on its conclusion
that the record was inadequate to show ·any need for the requirement. Accepting that finding, we affirm that Court's
result. Nothing in Moe permits the -State to impose unnecessary burden upon tribal retailers, and we save an exploration
of what burdens are and are not truly necessary for a case in
which this issue is actually presented.
The final question that must be considered concerns the
challenge 'by the Colville, 'Lummi, and Makah 'Tribes to the
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over them.
The District ·court found that assumption unlawful as regards
the Makah and Lummi reservations and lawful as regards the
Colville reservation. 446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. 'The State
challenges the former findings.
All parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington
v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the YakirruJ,1ndian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979). There a pattern of jurisdiction
identical to those created on the Makah and Lummi reservations was upheld, arid the holding of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit on which the District Court in the present
case relied for its conclusion that such patterns are unconstitutional was reversed. Accordingly, the judgment 46 of the
We note probable jurisdiction in No. 78-60, Confedemted Tribes of
the Colville I·ndian Reservation; Lummi Indian Tribe; and Makah' Indian
Tribe v. Washington, et al., which is pending on appeal. There the Colville Tribe appeals from so much of the District Court's judgment as
reflects the holding that Washington's assumption of total jurisdiction
over that Tribe's reservation was lawful. See 446 F. Supp., at 1366.
The Colville Tribe challenges that holding on grounds ( 1) that Washington could not assume jurisdiction without amending its constitution and
(2) that the assumption of total jurisdiction over only selected reserva-46

... · ~
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District Court in this respect is reversed and in all other
respect is
Affirmed.

•

tions violates the Equal Protection Clause. · Washington v. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of the' Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979),
disposes of the first contention, id., at 493, aild makes clear that the
second must fail if the assumption of jurisdiction is rationally related to
some valid state purpose, id., at 500-502. We find the pattern of jurisdiction in the present case rational: The Colville Tribe consented in 1965
to the State's assumption of jurisdiction over it, and the State has assumed
total jurisdiction only over Tribes that have so consented. · The presence
or absence of tribal consent is It rational basis for distinguishing among
reservations, and there is thus no constitutional infirmity. Accordingly.
the judgment i.s in thi.s respect affirmed.

l
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CHAMBERS OF

January 2, 1980

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

2ll~Jl.~

78-630 - Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of The Colville
Indian Reservation

Dear Bill,
I shall likely be in partial

dissen~

in this case and before coming to rest, I
am awaiting other writings.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
erne

~ttpTttttt <!Jcurl cf flrt ~b ~hd:t.«
~a,g~ ~. OJ. 2llbill-~
CHAMI!5ERS OF"

..JUSTICE

w ...

..J. BRENNAN, ..JR.

RE:

January 16, 1980

No. 78-630 State of Washington v. Confederated
Tribes

Dear Bill:
Thanks so much for your response.

Since you are

altering your draft dissent I'll await its circulation before making my changes.
Sincerely,

/J0
Mr.Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

- --~

-

·'

,·

~-.

Dear Bill:
Thank you for your memorandum on this case. For
the reasons stated in my Nov. 27 letter, I still am inclined
to adhere to my view that the state sales tax is not preempted. I will await the end of this second round of
"votinq," however, before I decide whether to dissent on that
issue. ··.~
While I continue to aqree with most of what you
have written, I think that wqR's dissent makes a point when
it says that the Court has not fully identified the sour.ce of
the ore-emotion in this case. Since it is no mere stroke of
the tribal pen, but federal power that ousts the state tax,
perhaps it would be well to address the qao that Rill
identifies.

if

·,

<jj

'•

.•·

'·
..

·'

··,

Here, the Secretary of the lnterior--actinq under
lawful requlations--has approved tribal constitutions that
qive these tribes the power to tax non-Indians. See, e.q.,
Colville Constitution art. v, S l(e) (1938) fApp. 66). The
Secretary also has approved the taxing schemes at issue. Our
decisions show that such expressions of federal authority and
policy can confer additional authority upon the Tribes and
pre-empt inconsistent state laws. United States v. Mazurie,
419 u.s. 544 (1975), recognizes that the federal qovernment
can qive the Indians authority over non-Indians who come
within the reservation because the tribes traditionally have
had substantial independent authority over non-Indians within
their territory. And Fisher v. District Court, 424 u.s. 392
(1976), holds that federal approval of a tribal court could
pre-emot state court iurisdiction over matters otherwise
within the state's power.

.

.·
~·

',.

'•:'

·'

2.

.

,

" '

I do not, of course, insist upon chanqes alonq
these lines, but perhaps some reference to these factors
would emphasize the continuity in our Inoian law decisions.

..

'~

'1"

...

·"" 1·

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfP/SS
The Conference

';

',.
'·1
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'•
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',· .
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CHAMBERS OF

January 17, 1980

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

78-630 - State of Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of The Colville Reservation.

Dear Bill,
As you know, my vote in Conference was contrary to the view expressed in Part IV of your
circulating opinion in this case. I have not
changed my mind on the cigarette and sales tax
questions, and in all likelihood I shall join
John Stevens in this respect.
With respect to sales to Indians not members
of the tribe, I agree with Bill Rehnquist. Since
I believe the state taxes on cigarettes are valid,
I would also sustain the record-keeping requirements. Otherwise, I agree with your Part V.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
erne

'f o: The c;:lief Justice
Hr. Just it; :1 J:;:c'~nnan
M:c. Jut;'CJG2 ::· t:;1vart
Mr. JustJue lh.rshall
Mr. JuBtico BJ.ackmun
v1fr. Ju.sU.CG P;)well
Mr. J·ua t lee R.~hnquist
Mr. Justice Stevens
From: Mr.

Ju~tice

White

Circulated: ___2
___1_J_A_N_l_SS_O__

1st

DRAFT

Recirculated: _____________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~
No. 78-630
State of Washington et al.,
Appellants,

v.
Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United
Colville Indian ReserStates District Court for the
va tion et al.
Eastern District of Washmgton.
State of W ashiugton,

v,
UniLcd States et al.
[February -, 1980]
Mn. J UKTICE vVHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I view this case much as MH. Jus·ncE STEVENS does and
have joined his partial dissent. I add only that the majority
opinion proceeds on the assumption that federal law requires
state tax laws to give way to Indian taxes on transactions
between Indians and non-Indians on Indian reservations. I
find nothing in our prior cases to support this result. Of
course, the tribal tax involved here is a valid tax, but that
alone does not warrant pre-empting state taxing power absent
more definitivP guidance from Congress thall we have.
Moe held that the tltates could impose a sales tax on sales
by Ind1ans to non-Indians, evell though the tax, by removing
a competitive advantage that otherwise would have existed,
had serious economic impact on the Indians and their federally
licensed Indian smoke shops. The Court does not disturb
that holdillg here; and the result should be no dift'erent simply because the tribes have chosen, in eft'ect, to substitute for ·
their lost competitive advantage a tribal tax on sales to nonIttdiaus and hence;. abseu t a rollback of state taxes, to make·

/
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cigarettes purchased by non-Iudians at Indian smoke shops
more expensive than those purchased off the reservation. I
seC' nothing in the federal law that gives the Indians first
taxing preference with respect to sales to non-Indians. Any
competitive disadvantage, as the Court calls it, can easily be
removed by the tribes, rather than the State, rolling back
thC'ir taxes. Sales to Indians, of course, remain completely
free of state taxation.
At the very least, the Court's competitive disadvantage
rationale would not invalidate the entir·e state tax but require
only a rebate or credit up to the amount of thEl Indian tax.
But if it does not say so expressly, the Court strongly implies
that any tribal tax automatically pre-empts the taxable incidents of these sales for the benefit of the tribe and completely
~state taxing power. It also seems to me that despite the
Court's protestations to the contrary, its opinion striking
down these state taxes would be equally applicable to Indian
retailing enterprises dealing in other lines of goods: the tribes
could create their own competitive advantage by taxing at a
very modest rate all reservation sales to 110n-Indians, thereby
foreclosing state taxes on these sales. Until and unless Congress clearly construes and applies the Indian Commerce
Clause to bar state taxes on reservation sales to non-Indians,
I would sustain state revenue measures such as the cigarette·
and' sales taxes involved here ..

•·.

j,

GM:1-31-80

>.

~·

Mr. Justice,
I had
working on Confederated Tribe •

Brennan clerk who's been
You miqht be interested to know:

(1) Mr. Justice Brennan probably won't circulate
anything more until he has heard from the Chief:

(2) Mr. Justice Brennan probably will write that
reservation Indians who are not members of the qoverninq tribe are
not entitled to a tax immunity: he is swayed by the number of
votes for this view as expressed by the Rehnquist dissent: he is
also surprised that you have not joined Mr. Justice Rehnquist on
this point:

(3) The next draft from the Brennan chambers will
incorpor~te the suqqestion that your last letter made about the

pre-emption arqument.

Greq

t'•

•

CHAMBERS OF

Fe bruary 1, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKM UN

~ ~t..U-C~
~4;~~
klj/4~~
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

~-7-f/

Re: No. 78-630 - Was hington v. Conf ederat e d Tri be s
At our conference of October 12, I voted to affirm
in part and to reverse in part. I am still of that view.
Accordingly, on the assumption that the several opinions
that have been proposed remain as they are, and that no
different consensus develops, I propose to file one reading as follows:
"I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's
opinion. I am in agreement with Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's analysis of the Washington motor
vehicle excise tax issue, and I therefore join
Part IIC of his separate opinion.
"I ~lso join the respective opinions of Mr .
Justice White and Mr. Justice Stevens, except
to the extent that they are inconsistent with
Part IIC of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion."

~u.prmtt

Q}nttrl.of tqt~b ~brlts

~agqmgron, ~·

<!f.

20c?'~~

CHAMI!IERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 1, 1980

Re:

J

78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservat~on

Dear Bill:
In reviewing our "inventory" before taking off for
the Mid-Year ABA session, I find the above.
I will await word from you as to anything you want
me to do - other than join you!

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN , JR.

RE:

No. 78-630

February 4, 1980

Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Chief:
Assuming that your memorandum of last Friday constitutes a vote against my position in the above, I offer the
following score sheet: There is a court for my facts and
jurisdiction sections (parts I, II & III) and for the portions of part V setting forth my views of the motor vehicle
tax and the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the
reservations. My positions on the cigarette and sales
taxes (part IV) and the proper treatment of Indians not enrolled in the subject Tribes (part V) have not carried the
day. And my position on the single enforcement issue before us -- whether the state may require tribal retailers
to keep records of exempt sales of goods other than cigarettes to facilitate collection of sales taxes on nonexem~t
sales of such goods -- has yet to be the focus of attent1on
in several chambers (although my impression is that it is
entirely uncontroversial since the District Court found
that the requirement served no purpose) .

I

In light of this, it seems that you should reassign the
opinion, presumably to someone whose views are in line with
those of at least four others on all issues. Whoever winds
up with it is of course free to take whatever he pleases
from my draft.
·-.

Sincerely,

f /

The Chief Justice

)

<

~~

cc: The Conference

1.. .

I
I~

I
~
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~~
~

No. 78-630: Washinqton v. Confederaten Tribes

z/7/ro

Mr. Justice,

You asked me whether vou could help out Mr. Justice
Brennan by sayinq that you could ioin all of his opinion
except for the sliqht part str.ikinq ctown the qeneral sales
tax.

That, of course, is the position that you have taken

ever since Conference.

From talkinq to the responsible

Brennan clerk, I think that Mr. Justice Brennan has been
counting vou as with him on substantially all of the opinion.
Other votes are a little difficult to follow, but I
count only 4 votes aqainst the principal holdinq on the
cigarette tax.
'

They are from PS, BRW, WHR, and JPS.

I count

only 3 votes aqainst the holdinq that the tax exemption
extends to all reservation Indians.
JPS.

Thev are BRW, WHR, and

Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Brennan seems to have

concluded that he does not have a Court for most of his
opinion.

The reason, his clerk tells me, is that he counts

the CJ's memo of 1 Feb. as a neqative note--shiftinq the
maiority on the principal ciqarette tax holdinq to the other
side.

Thus, it seems that the ball is in the CJ's court and

that nothinq you could add at this point would make much
difference.

/

2.

If you want to lend moral support, however, you
could send Mr. Justice Brennan a short note sayinq explicitly
that you are prepared to ioin everythinq he has written
except for the sentences and the footnote that invalidate the
qeneral sales tax.

I would advise aqainst that--althouqh not

stronqly--for two reasons.

First, you miqht well find

yourself in substantial aqreement with a new maioritv opinion
on such issues as the tax exemption for all reservation
Indians.

Second, you later rniqht think that Mr. Justice

Brennan's opinion is inadequate as a dissent from a new
maiority opinion for substantially the reasons that vou
identified in your 17 Jan. letter to him.

Grea

.:§ttpumr C!J ourt of t~t 'J.llnitt b,$>hdts
~aslrmgtan. gl. C!J . 2!lc?Jt2
C H AM BE R S O F

T HE CHI E F ..JU S TI CE

February 25, 1980

RE:

No. 78-630 - Washington v. Con f ederated Tribes

Dear Bill:
As I indicated to you earlier, I cannot join
your opinion in this case. I could join Par ts I,
II, and III, and although I agree with the results
you reach in Part V on the motor vehicle tax and
the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the
reservations, I find that I do not agree with you
regarding the cigarette and sales taxes, or on the
issue of the proper treatment of Indians who are
not enrolled members of the relevant tribes.
Accordingly, I have decided to act
suggestion that the case be reassigned,
ask Byron to try his hand at an opinion
accommodates the positions of those who
views similar to his own.

on your
and will
that
have expressed

This is a hard case to unravel and there will
have to be some accommodation.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.§14tttuu• ~ourt of tlyt ~btitt!l, .§tatt.s

'Jl]las!fingtcn. gl. <!f.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 25, 1980

RE:

No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Byron:
Will you try your hand at an opinion for the
Court in this Case?

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

~upt"tUtt

<!fltUrlltf tift ~b ~hdt.l1

J)'zur~ ~.
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

....

___

April 17, 1980

Re:

78-630 - State of Washington v. Confederated
Tribes, etc.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

Respectfully,

/
Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JusTtcE

w.. . .J .

Apri 1 17, 1980

BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes, etc.

Dear Byron:

--

1•11 be attempting a dissent on the basic issue.

--------""----hope to get it around shortly.

I

----..

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference
,.
:t'•

... I

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

v.Confederated

No. 78-630 -

Dear Byron:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

T .M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

The Conference

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

17 April 1980

From: Gregory May

No. 79-630: Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Mr. Justice White has written a very good opinion that
can be summarized as follows:

I. History of this Litigation (pp. 2-4)

II. Factual Background (pp. 4-8)
A.

Description

of

Washington

cigarette,

sales,

and

vehicle excise statutes (pp. 4-6)
B. Description of the Tribes (pp. 6-7)
C. Description of tribal cigarette regulation and tax
schemes (pp. 7-8):
1. Colville tribes act as retailers; tax must be
passed on to consumers
2.

Yakima

Tribe

retailer need not be passed on

acts

as

wholesaler;

tax

on

2.

III. Jurisdiction (pp. 8-13)
A.
convened

28

because

U.S.C.

§

tribal

2281:

three-judge

Commerce

Clause

court

claims

properly
were

not

frivolous (pp. 8-12)
B. 28 U.S.C.

§

2101(b): Colville appeal timely because

motion for partial new trial tolls time for appeal on all issues
in the judgment (pp. 12-13)

IV. Cigarette and Sales Taxes (pp. 13-25)
A. Moe and the principles derived from it (pp. 13-15)
1. Principles established by Moe:
a.
nondiscriminatory

tax

State
on

sometimes

non-Indian

may

customers

impose

doing

a

business

with Indian retailers on the reservation
b.

Tax

may

be

valid

even

if

it

seriously

disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's business with
non-Indians
c. State may impose at least minimal burdens
on the Indian retailer to aid

in enforcing and collecting the

tax
2. Moe left open:
a. Effect of tribal taxes and regulations on
the State's ability to tax
b.
keeping,

as opposed

Indian retailers

to

State's power to impose detailed recordsimple

precollection requirement,

upon

3.

c.

State's

power

to

tax

on

reservation

purchases by Indians not members of the governing tribe
d.

State's power to enforce its tax laws by

seizures
B. Basis and limitation of tribal tax powers (pp.

15-

22)
Tribes have inherent power to tax non-Indians

1.

within the reservation (pp. 15-17)
2.
cigarette

or

Tribal

sales

cigarette

taxes

on

taxes

cigarette

do

not

oust

transactions

state
between

Indian retailers and non-Indian consumers (pp. 17-22)
a.
marketing

a

tax

Tribes

exemption--a

upon the reservation (p. 18)
b.

No

to

preempt

no

legitimate

interest

in

value not arising from activity
~ ~ ~h-L-4 ..... -/-..t-trV

~-~~~ ~

fed~

Congress meant to occupy the
reservation;

have

~~~-~-~1'·#44A.~
statute cfr treaty shows that

field of taxation on non-Indians~AJ
~{,./.A

*****although tribes themselves might be

through

exercise

of

properly

delegated

authority, no such delegation in this case***** (p. 18-19)
c.

State

taxes here

do not

interfere

with

tribal self-government; tribal interest in raising governmental
revenues

is weakest when the values

taxed do not

arise within

the reservation (pp. 19-20)
d.

State taxes here do not burden commerce

in violation of the Indian Commerce Clause; Moe said as much (p.
20)

.

~

4.

e.

State

need

not

credit

the

tribal

tax

against the state tax because Tribes have not shown that such a
credit would significantly reduce the impact on their cigarette
business (pp. 20-21)
f.

State taxes do not conflict with tribal

taxes or tribal regulation of cigarette trade; so, no preemption
on this ground (pp. 21-22)
C. State collection practices (pp. 22-23)
1.

Simple

collection burden

is valid

under Moe

(p. 22)

2. Tribes have not borne their burden of proving
that

the

state-imposed

record-keeping

requirements

are

not

reasonably necessary for enforcement of the valid state tax (pp.
22-23)
D.

State tax on reservation Indians not belonging to

the Tribes (pp. 23-24)
1. No federal statute preempts state power to tax
persons not belonging to the governing Tribes (p. 24)
2. Nor can such state taxes interfere with tribal
self-government,

because

the

objects of

the

tax

stand

on

the

same footing as non-Indian residents (p. 24)
E. State enforcement practices (pp. 24-25)
1. State can seize cigarettes off the reservation
in order to enforce Indians'
the reservation (p. 25)

obligation to collect the tax on

5.

2.

Question

whether

State

can

enter

upon

the

reservation to make seizures is not before the Court (p. 25)

V. Vehicle Excise Tax (pp. 25-27)
Although
legally

called

an

indistinguishable

excise

from

the

tax,

Washington's

personal

property

tax

is

tax

on

vehicles invalidated in Moe

VI. State Jurisdiction Over Reservation (p. 27)
Resolved last Term in favor of the State, Washington
v.

Yakima Indian Nation,

439 U.S.

463

(1979); companion appeal

~

on this issue disposed of in footnote 32.

*

- ----draf~ departs

Only Part

---.--..--...

Brennan's

earlier

draft.

Mr.

Justice

from Mr. Justice

Brennan

probably

could

'\

accept

Mr.

Justice

IV-A, supra.
in

his

own

discussion

White's

characterization of Moe.

See Part

And although it goes beyond anything that he said
opinion,

of

the

WJB

also

Tribe's

would

inherent

accept

tax

the

powers.

new
See

draft's
Part

IV-

conclusion that

the

B( 1), supra.
But WJB

will

dissent

from BRW' s

state taxes are notr- preempted and do not
self-government.

See

dissent

holding

from

the

Part

IV-B(2),

that

the

interfere with tribal

supra.
State

may

WJB

also

impose

will

record-

I

6.

keeping

requirements

upon

Indian

retailers.

See

Part

IV-C.

Unless he has changed his mind (as his clerk once indicated that
he had), WJB will dissent from the determination that the State
can tax reservation Indians who do not belong to the governing
tribe.

See Part IV-D.

Finally, WJB now may find it necessary

to take a position on the off-reservation seizures sustained in
Part IV-E of BRW's draft.

*

*

*

In the outline above,

*

*

I have set off with asterisks

the part of BRW's holding that most directly conflicts with your

IY«AJ!J

viz.,~

view of this case:

conclusion that these tribal taxes
.)'

were not exercises of lawfully delegated federal authority.
Part IV-B(2)(b).

See

WJB goes a bit further and suggests that the

state taxes are invalid because they interfere with the interest
in tribal self-government manifested through each tribe's tax.
Perhaps because he takes that perspective, WJB also thinks that
a

tribal

cigarette

tax

preempts all

state taxes on cigarette

transactions.
After

th~ tha(J{he

reading BRW' s

I

s_!: ill

am

incl.iJ;led

to~

tribal taxes preempt the state cigarette tax, but

not the state sales tax.
have not borne

opinion,

I am inclined to agree that the Tribes

their burden of proving

the

invalidity of the

record-keeping requirements associated with the sales tax law.

7.

Finally,

I

think that BRW makes a very good argument for

extending blanket

t~x_i~nity

to

-

belong to the governing tribe.

re ~ ion

not

Indians who do not

I am concerned, however, about

situations where a tribal Indian marries an Indian from another
tribe and brings the outsider to live upon the reservation;

I assume that at

seems a bit odd to tax one but not the other.
least

some

tribes

do

not

treat

a member 1 s

it

spouse as

being a

member of the tribe.
I
When

it

recommend

arrives,

that you continue to await the dissent.

you

will

have

to

consider

whether

you

( 1)

continue to differ with WJB over the scope of preemption--i.e.,
the sales tax issue,

( 2) continue to agree with WJB 1 s comments

about tribal self-government, (3) differ with WJB on whatever he
says about the record-keeping questions, and (4) differ with WJB
on whatever he now says about reservation Indians not belonging
to the governing tribe.

r
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Dear Byron:
will await the dissent
Sincerely,

Mr.
lfp/ss
cc:
...

·'
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Qfllltrl af tift 'Jtrittb ~btttg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 23, 1980

Re:

No. 78-630 -Washington v. Confederated Tribes

Dear Byron:
I anticipate circulating an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part as soon as I can.

Sincerely,/

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

.§npumi Qfllllrl cf lftt ~b ~htltiY
~Mfttttgictt, ~. ~ 2tTglJ1~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 30, 1980

Re:

No. 78-630, Washington v. Confederated
Tribes

Dear Byron,
In due course I shall circulate a short
separate opinion, concurring in part ' and
dissenting in part.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

/
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of tlp• ~TnHd1 .§taftg

'J)i'rctilqittg-hm.ltl. ~· ZObfJ~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARR Y A . BLACKMUN

May

22, 19/

Re: No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes
Dear Byron:
Bil l Brennan and you have done basic and helpful wor k on
the many issues of this complicated case .
I think there is
some meri t in having as much unanimity as possible .
I still have some mild concern as to certain minor issues ,
but they are not overwhelming , and I am willing to accommodate . You therefore may join me .
Sincerely,

'·

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference
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79-630 Washington v. Confederate Tribes
Dear Byron:
In view of the difficulties - unusual even for a
complex Indian case - that we have had puttinq a Court
toqether on a majority of the issues in this case, I write to
say that I am willinq to join your opinion if my vote will
qive you a Court.

·~
:·

!

I may join you even if you end up only with a
plurality of four, althouqh in that situation I reserve the
riqht to take a second look.
The principal difference between your conclusions
and the views I have heretofore held is that you sustain the
state's ciqarette tax. I had rather thouqht the Indians had
the better of it on the preemption arqument. I hav~ not
thought, however, that the principle of trihal self
government was strona enough in itself to prevent the state
from taxin~ cigarette sales to non-Indians. I note that Bill
Brennan now rests his view primarily on this qround.

.
'

·~

In any event, I think you have written a persuasive
opinion. It is important to put a Court together, and settle
these questions of power to tax. I therefore am willinq to
join you as above indicated.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice
cc:

The Conference

...

.....
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...

Chief ,Tustice
Justice Brennan
.Tust.Lce Stewart
Justi.cG Mars'Jall
Jnst .i ce Blaekmun
L..-ri'. JuGtice Powell
Hr . Just.i.ca R,hnqui st
Mr . Ju::;tl.ce Stevens

To: The
Mr .
Mr .
Mr .
Mr .

STYLISTIC CW.NSES TH~OUGHOUT.

From: Mr . Justi ce White
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m
No. 78-630

State of Washington et al.,
Appellants,

v.
Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United
States District Court for the
Colville Indian Iteser..
Eastern District of Wash ..
vation et al.
ington.
State of Washington,

v.
United States et al.
[June -, 1980]

MR. ,JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In recent Terms we have more than once addressed the
intricate problem of state taxation of matters involving
Indina tribes and their members. White Mountain Apache
Tnbe v. Bracker, U. S (1980); Central Machinery
Co . v. Arizona, U. S. - (1980); Moe v. Salish&: Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona
State 1'ax Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache
Tribe . Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973) . We return to that
vexing area in the present cases. Although a variety of questions are presented, perhaps the most significant is whether an
Indian tribe ousts a State from any power to tax on-reservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by imposing its
own tax on the transaction or by otherwise earning revenues
from the tribal business. A three-judge District Court held
for the Tribes. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

/
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I
These cases are here on the State of Washington's appeal
from declaratory judgments and permanent injunctions entered by the District Court at the close of consolidated proceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978). The first case, Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. State of Wash·i ngton, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Colville),
Makah , and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States of
Americ•:t and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909,
was commenced on July 18, 1973, by the United States on
behalf of the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation (Yakima Tribe). 1 In each action, the complainants contended that the State's cigarette and tobacco
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by onreservation tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judgments to that effect, as well as injunctions barring the State·
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from seizing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to
their reservations. 8 In the Colville case, the Tribes also challenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction·
1 On April 24, 1974, the Yakima Tribe intervened as a plaintiff in the
United StatE'~ ' C'm;e. Its complaint appears at App. 149.
2 The state tobaceo products tax, which is imposed on cigars and pipe
tobacco pursuant to Wash . Rev. Code § 82.26 (1976), is not before us.
The District Court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers
and not upon the non-Indian purchasers. 446 F . Supp. 1339, 1355 , n. 15
(ED Wash. 1978) . The State did not appeal from this holding, Brief for
Appellants 55, n 40, and all parties agree that in consequence the tobacco
products tax may not be imposed on sales by tribal dealers.
8 The Tribes also sought damages for interference with their cigarettebusinesses. The damage issues in both cases were remanded by the threejudge court to a single district judge. 446 F. Supp., at 1367, 1373.
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twer their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked
the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to Indianowned vehicles. The Yakima case did not present these
latter is1mes, but it did make a broad attack on the application of the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation
transactions.
From the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely parallel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining
order against the State's enforcement of the taxing statutes
was issued in each. App. 13, 147. Thereafter, because the
complaints sought injunctive relief against the enforcement
of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was convened
pursuant to the then-applicable requirement of 28 U. S. C.
§ 2281 (1970). 1 On ~eptember 6, 1974, the three-judge court
issued preliminary injunctions restraining the State from
enforcing the challenged taxes against the Tribes. App. 15,
156. There followed extensive discovery, 5 after which the
parties to each case reached agreement on pretrial orders setting forth facts and clarifying the issues.
Trial was held in both cases on Mar. 28, 1977, and the
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on Feb. 22,
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a
three-judge court to consider the issues presented; (2) that
the state cigarette tax could not be applied to on-reservation transactions because it was pre-empted by the tribal taxing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales, but could be
4 Although § 2281 was subsequently repealed, Act of Aug. 12, 1976, § 1,
90 Stat. 1119, it was expressly left in place for cases which , like those
before us, were pending on the date of repeal. § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. We
consider issues concerning the applicability of the former § 2281 to thesecases in Part III, ·infra.
11 Proceedings in both cases were stayed for several months, however,
pending this Court.'s decisions in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 42&
V. S. 463 (1976) , and Br!fan v. I.t.ascq, Co?!J.nty, 426 U . S. 373 (1976).
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applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians; ( 4) that the
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements
in connection with various tax-exempt sales; (5) that the
State could not impose its vehicle excise taxes upon vehicles
owned by the Tribes and their members, and (6) that the
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutional. The court
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new trial. This appeal
followed. We postponed consideration of certain jurisdictional questions to the merits. - U. S . - (1979).
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background,
which is not seriously in dispute. 6 Thereafter, we explore
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then
turn to the merits.
II
The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of
81.60 per carton/ on the "sale, use, consumption, handling,
possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the State.
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.24.020 (1976). The tax is enforced
with tax stamps; and dealers are required to sell only cigarettes to which such stamps have been affixed. § 82.24.030.
Indian tribes are permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes
for purposes of resale to members of the tribe, but are required
by regulation to collect the tax with respect to sales to nonmembers. § 82.24.260; Wash. Admin. Code § 458-20-192
8 Our statement of the factual background is drawn in large measure
from the opinion of the District Court, 446 F . Supp., at 134&--1349, 13681370.
7 The cigarette excise tax is imposed pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code
182.24.020 (1976) . That provision authorizes a levy of 6.5 mills per
cigarette. The tax is brought up to its full amount by Wash. Rev. CodeI28A.47.440, and § 73 32.130 (1976) , which add 0.5 mills and 1 mill
respectively.
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( 1977) .M The District Court found, on the basis of its examination of state authorities, that the legal incidence of the tax
is on the purchaser in transactions between an Indian seller
and a non-Indian buyer. 9
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seizures whenever the cigarettes are destined to be sold to nonIndians without affixation of stamps or collection of the tax.
Washington also imposes a sales tax on sales of personal
property, including cigarettes. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.08.020
(1976). This tax, which was 5% during the relevant period,
is collectf'd from the purchaser by the retailer. ~ 82.08.050.
It does not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation Indians. ·wash. Admin. Code§ 458-20-192 (1977).
The state motor vehicle excise tax is imposed on "the
privilege of using in the state any motor vehicle." Wash.
Rev. Code § 82.44.020 (1976). The tax is assessed annually,
8 Initially the State asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales,
regardless of whether the buyer was Indian or non-Indian. Its theory was
that Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), granted it. general authority to tax
reservation Indians. After this theory was rejected in Bryan v. Itasca
County, supra, the State abandoned any claim of authority to tax sales
to tribal members. See 446 F . Supp., at 1346, n. 4.
9 446 F. Supp., at 1352-1355.
E~s(•ntially, the Court accepted the
State's contention that the tax falls upon the first event which may constitutionally be subjected to it. In the case of sales by non-Indians to nonIndians, this means the incidence of the tax is on the seller, or perhaps on
someone even further up the chain of distribution, because that person is
the one who first sells, uses, consumes, handles, possesses or distributes the
products. But where the wholesaler or retailer is an Indian on whom
the tax cannot be imposed under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax·
Comm'n, +11 U. S. 164 (19i:n, the fir,.:! taxable event i;; the mif:', consumption or possession by the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, the District
Court concluded, the tax falls on that purchaser. We accept this,
.cQnclusipn •.
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and during the relevant period the amount was two percent of
the fair market value of the vehicle in question. In addition,
the State imposes an annual tax in the amount of one percent
of fair market value on the privilege of using campers and
trailers in the State. § 82.50.400. 10
Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized
by the UHited States as a sovereign Indian tribe. Each is
governed by a business or tribal council approved by the Secretary of Interior.11 The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 members, of whom about 3,200 live on the Colville Indian Reservation.12 Enrolled members of the Tribe constitute just
under half of the reservation's population. The Lummi Tribe
has approximately 2,000 members. Roughly 1,250 of them
live on the reservation .13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000
members. Some 900 live on the reservation. 14 The Colville,
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated and underdeveloped. Many members reside in mobile homes. Most own
at least one automobile which is used both on and off the
reservation.
10 The same chapter provided for an excise tax on mobile homes.
Initially, the State sought to apply this tax to Indians as well; but after
Bryan v . ltasca County, supra, and Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra,
it no longer attPmpt,.; to do ~o . 446 F. Supp., at 1365.
11 The Makah Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. While the Lummi and
Colville Tribe,; do have federally-approved con:stitution~, they voted in
1935 not to come under that Act. 446 F . Supp., at 1345, n. 2.
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million acres in the northeastern section of Washington. It was established by Executive Order on
July 2, 1872. 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 916 (2nd
ed. 1904).
13 The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319 acres, most of them on a
peninsul a near Bellingham, Wash. It was established by the Treaty of
Point Elliott in 1855. 12 Stat. 927.
a The Makah Reservation encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip
of the Olympic Peninsula. It too was established by treaty in 1855.
Treaty with the Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939. Roughly 63% of its inhabitants are enrolled members of the Tribe.
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The Yakima Tribe has more than 6,000 members, of whom
about 5,000 live on the reservation. ~ Enrolled members,
however, constitute less than one fifth of the reservation's
population. The balance is made up of approximately 1,500
Indians who are not members of the Tribes and more than
20,000 non-Indians.
The Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes have nearly identical cigarette sales and taxing schemes. Each Tribe has
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has authorized one
or more on-reservation tobacco outlets.16 These ordinances
have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior; and the
dealer at each tobacco outlet is a federally licensed Indian
trader. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds 17
to purchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers. 18 The Tribes
distribute the cigarettes to the tobacco outlets and collect
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale distribution price and a tax of 40-to-50 cents per carton. The
cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sale. The
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to
the ultimate consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through
1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from
its cigarette tax; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and the
Makah Tribe realized $13,000.
While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as
retailers, retaining possession of the cigarettes until their sale
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It pur1

13 The Yakima Indian Reservation was set aside for the Tribe by treaty
ratified March 8, 1859. Treaty with the Ya.kimas, 12 Stat. 951. It
encompas&'s about 1.4 million acres in south-central Washington.
16 The tribal ordinances regulating the sale, distribution and taxing of
cigarettes are set forth at App. 104, 118, and 111.
17 The funds are maintained in individual accounts in the Bureau or
Indian Affairs agency serving the reservation pursuant to 25 CFR Part 104.
(1978) . App. 32-34.
18 Thes6 out-of-state whole@.let;s are aleo federally licensed Indian
traders •.
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chases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them
to its licensed retailers. The Tribe receives a markup over the
wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of 22.5
cents per carton. There is no requiremellt that this tax be
added to the selling price. In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived
$278,000 from its cigarette business.
Indian tobacco dealers make a large majority of their sales
to non-Indians-residents of nearby commun'ities who journey
to the reservation especia.lly to take advantage of the claimed
tribal exemption from the state cigarette and sales taxes. The
purchaser saves more than a dollar on each carton, and that
makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree that if the State
were able to tax sales by Indian sinokeshops and eliminate
that one-dollar saving the stream of non-Indian bargain
hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's business is to a substantial degree dependent upon his tax-exempt
status, and if he losses that status his sales will fall off sharply.

III
We first address our jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal.
Two attacks are made upon that jurisdiction, one grounded in
the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing threejudge district courts and the other having to do with the timing
of the State's appeal.
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit
"required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined
by a district court of three judges." At the time the Yakima
and Colville cases were filed, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 provided that:
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State
in the enforcement or execution of such statute ...
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute·

·"
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unless the application therefor is heard and determined by
a district court of three judges . ..." 19
After the State filed its jurisdictional statement in this appeal,
the United States moved to dismiss the. Yakima case on the
ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by
a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to
the Yakima case because that is the only one to which the
government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane
to the Colville case as well.
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only in
the Supremacy Clause. Swift ,& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S.
111, 128-129 (1965). In addition, § 2281 is not brought into
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973) . The United States argues
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into
one or the other category, and thus failed to trigger § 2281,2°
Further, the Government continues, the attacks on the State's
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine Commerce
Clause issues, are not properly characterized as challenges to
the constitutionality of a sta.te statute. Rather, the Government asserts, they go to the constitutionality of the result obtained by the use of the statute. We find neither contention
persuasive.
The original complaints in these actions contended that
.the state taxes were unconstitutional under the Indian Commerce Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause. Relying
The repeal of this provision in 1976 does not affect its application to
these cases. See n. 4, supra.
20 As t he Government recognizes, its position in this regard is somewhat
anomalous since it was the United States which initially requested a threejudge court in the Yakima case. App . 145. At that time the government
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
s~ate statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality within the meaning of
§2281,
19

·.

..
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primarily upon language in footnote 17 in Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481, n. 17 (1976), the United
States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce Clause claims ·were
insubstantial. 21 But Moe was decided in 1976-long after ·a
three-judge court was convened to hear these cases-and it
is thus apparent that footnote 17 alone cannot be dispositive,
whatever its precise thrust. There is language in that footnote, however, which suggests that the insubstantiality of
Commerce Clause claims such as those before us flows from
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), and
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164
(1973)-both of which were decided before the present suits
were filed. 22 We think the United States reads too much into
this language. Goosby v. Osser, supra, made it clear that
constitutional claims will not lightly be found insubstantial for
purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby explicitly states tha.t
The District Court seems to have found this contention persuasive,
446 F . Supp., at 1350, although it addressed it only briefly. Presumably
it saw no need to explore the matter more fully since it was confident
that the three-judge requirement had in any event been satisfied by the
Tnbes' challenges to the State's enforcement measures. /d., at 1350-1351.
22 Footnote 17 in its entirety reads as follows :
"It is thus clear that the basis for the invalidity of these taxing measures, whicfi we have found to be inconsistent with existing federal st.'ltutes,
is the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and not any automatic
exemptions 'as a matter of constitutional law' either under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-i~munity doctrine as laid down
originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). If so, then the
basis for convening a three-judge court in this type of case has effectively
disappeared, for th1s Court has expressly held that attacks on state statutes
raising only Supremacy Clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of
28 U. S. C § 2281. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965) . Here,
however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court, because
at the outset the Tnbe's attack asserted unconstitutionality of these statutes·
under the Commerce Clause, a not insubstantial claim since M escalerl"
and McClanahan had not yet been decided See Goosby v. Osser, 409'
U.S. 512 (1973)." 425 U. , at 481, n. 17.
21
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prior decisions are not sufficient to support a conclusion that
certain claims are insubstantial unless those prior decisions
t'inescapably render the claims frivolous." Id., at 518. We
cannot say here that the Goosby test has been met. Neither
Mescalero nor McC"lanahan "inescapably render[s] the
[Tribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivolous" because neither
holds that that clause is wholly without force in situations
like the present. And even footnote 17 merely rejects the
stark and rather unhelpful notion that the Commerce Clause
provides an "automatic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitutional law'" in such cases. (Emphasis added.) It does not
take that clause entirely out of play in the field of state regulation of Indian affairs. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker,- U.S.-,- (1980).
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack
on the official seizure of cigarettes bound for the reservations also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281.
The United States concedes that that attack raised Commerce Clause issues, but maintains that the Tribes' target
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves,
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pursuant to those statutes. We have no quarrel with the proposition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit to
restrain their lawless behavior into a § 2281 case, Phillips v.
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 248-253 (1941). But this is not
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires actions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes granting them broad executive discretion. Here the state officials
involved were attempting to enforce the state tax laws by
using the tools authorized for such enforcement by the state
legislature. They manifested an intention to continue to use
those tools for that purpose. And it is those tools, as applied
to cigarettes h1 Indian commerce, which the Tribes chal-

'.
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lenged.23 We hold that this suffices to bring these cases within
§ 2281.

The other jurisdictional question postponed last February is
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness
under 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b) of the State's appeal from the
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and as~
sumption of jurisdiction issues. Basically, the problem is
this : the Notice of Appeal on these two issues ·was filed more
than 60 days after the District Court's decision, but within 60
days of the denial of a state motion for partial new trial-a
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and assumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District
Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely
renders nor{final the disposition of those issues actually raised
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice
, of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction
issues was timely. · If the latter, that Notice was filed out of
time and to that extent the appeal is jurisdictionally timebarred.24

.......

.

~·

23 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 354, n. 10 (1970).
See also
· Department of Employment v. United States,- 385 U. S. 355 (1966);
Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486, 490 (1942) .

The actual chronology was as follows: On May 10, 1978, the District
Court entered its final order. On May 22, the State filed a motion for
partial new trial on the cigarette and sales tax issues. On July 12, while
that motion was pending, the State filed a Notice of Appeal raising the
motor vehicle excise tax and assumption of jurisdicticn issues. On July 17,
the motion for partial new trial was denied; and on August 14, the State
filed a Notice of Appeal on the sales and cigarette tax issues. On September 8, the State filed an Amended Notice of Appeal raising all relevant issues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal was filed more than 60 days
after the criginal District Court order. Accordingly, under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2101 (b), it was out of time . The Notice of August 14 and the Amended
Notice of September 8, however, were filed within 60 days of the District
Court's denial of the motion for partial new trial. It seems clear that
· the filing of that motion rendered nonfinal the disposition of all covered.
24

,-

.-
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We think that the filing of a motion for partial new trial
in these circumstances must have rendered nonfinal the disposition of all issues between the parties. A contrary conclusion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make
little difference save to force future appellants to include in
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues.
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any
sound supporting rationale but capable of occasionally tripping
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redundant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of
the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction
holding is properly before us, and we turn to the merits.

IV
A

In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976),
we considered a state taxing scheme remarkably similar to the
cigarette and sales ~ taxes at issue in the present cases. Montana there sought to impose a cigarette tax on sales by smokeshops operated by tribal members and located on leased trust
lands 'vithin the reservation, and sought to require the smokeshop operators to collect the tax. We upheld the tax, insofar
2

issues-if not, one seeking a partial new trial would have to jeopardize
his right to appeal. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U. S.
441, 4-!5-446 (Hl74); Department of Bauking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 266
(1942) . Thus, the only remaining question is whether the motion for
partial new trial also suspended the finality of the District Court's disposition of issues not covered by that motion .
2 ~ We are here generally concerned only with the application of Washington's retail sales tax to cigarette sales. The District Court upheld
the sales tax as applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians, and the
Tribe~ do not contest that holding . We do, howewr, ron::;ider the que::;tion of noncigarette sales when we d1scuss (1) whether Washington can
tax purchases by Indians not members of the governing Tribe, and
(~) whetber Washington's recordkeeping requirelOOnts are valid.
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as sales to non-Indians were concerned/ 6 because its legal ihci.
dence fell on the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, "the competitive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on
tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, within and
without the reservation, is dependent on the extent to which
the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout' his legal obligation
to pay the tax." I d., at 482 (emphasis in original). We
upheld the collection requirement, as applied to purchases by
non-Indians, on the ground that it was a "minimal burden"
designed to aid the State in collecting an otherwise valid tax.
!d., at 483.
Moe establishes several principles relevant to the present
cases. The State may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory
tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers doing business
on the reservation . Such a tax may be valid even if it seriously disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's business with non-Indians. 27 And the State may impose at least
"minimal" burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing
and collecting the tax. There is no automatic bar, therefore,
to Washington's extending its tax and collection and recordkeeping requirements onto the reservation in the present cases.
Although it narrows the issues in the present cases, Moe
does not definitively resolve several important questions.
First, unlike in Moe, each of the Tribes imposes its own tax
on cigarette sales, and obtains further revenues by participating in the cigarette enterprise at the wholesale or retail level.
Second. Washington requires the Indian retailer to keep
detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in addition to
simply precollecting the tax. Moe expressed no opinion
We struck down the tax as applied to sales to Indians. Moe v. Salish
& Koot enai Tribes , 425 U. S. 463, 475-481 (1976).
27 The United States reads Moe too parsimoniously in asserting its inapplicability to cases, such as the present ones, in which the economic
impact on tribal retailers is particularly severe. Moe makes clear that
t he Tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of sales to non-Indians,.
or indeed to any such sales at all.
26
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f'egarding the "complicated problems" of enforcement that
distinctions between exempt and nonexempt purchasers might
entail. I d. , at 468, n. 6. Third, Moe left unresolved the
question of whether a State can tax purchases by on-reservation Indians not members of the governing tribe, as Washington seeks to do in the present cases. Id., at 480-481, n. 16.
Finally, unlike in Moe, Washington has seized, and threatens
to continue seizing, shipments of unstamped cigarettes en
route to the reservations from wholesalers outside the State.
We address each of these questions.

B
(1)

At the outset, the State argues that the Colville, Makah,
and Lummi Tribes have no power to impose their cigarette
taxes on nontribal purchasers. 28 We disagree. The power
to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute
of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by
federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status.
Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 (1978).
The widely held understanding within the Federal Government has always been that federal law to date has not worked
a divestiture of Indian taxing power. Executive Branch officials have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess
a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of nonIndians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have
a significant interest, 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op.
2 8 The incidence of the Colville, Lummi, and Makah taxes falls on the
cigarette purchaser, since the tribal ordinances specify that the tax is to be
passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Yakima ordinance, in contrast,
does not require that the tax be added to the selling price, and the incidence of the Yakima tax therefore does not full on the purchaser. Th&
State's chullenge is directed only at the Colville, Lummi, and Makah.
taxes.
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Atty. Gen. 174 (1855), including jurisdiction to tax, 23 Op.
Atty. Gen. 214 (1900); Powers of Indian 'Pribes, 55 I. D. 14,
46 ( 1934) . According to the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior:
"Chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized as
pertaining to an Indian tribe is the power of taxation.
Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this power
may be exercised over members of the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be
attached as conditions." 'Ibid. (emphasis added).
Federal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax
· non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic
activity. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CAS 1905),
appeal dismissed, 203 U. S. 599 (1906); Iron Crow v. Oglala
Sioux Tribe, 231 F. 2d S9 (CAS 1956); cf. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 3S4, 393 ( 1904). No federal statute cited to
us shows any congressional departure from this view. · To
the contrary, authority to tax the activities or property of
non-Inrlians taking place or situated on Indian lands, in cases
where the tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter,
was very probably one of the tribal powers under "existing
law" confirmed by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 4S Stat. 9S7, 25 U. S. C. § 476. In these respects the
present cases differ sharply from Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (197S) , in which we stressed the
shared assumptions of the Executive, Judicial and Legislative
Departmeu ts that Indian tribes could not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the
Tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would
be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National
Government, as when the Tribes seek to engage in foreign
relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal
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consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do
not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights. See id.,
fl,t 208-210; United States v. Wheeler, supra, at 326. In the
present case, we can see no overriding federal interest that
would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation. And even
if the State's interests were implicated by the tribal taxes, a
question we need not decide, it must be remembered that
tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only
the Federal Government, not the States.
(2)
The Tribes contend that their involvement in the operation
and taxation of cigarette marketing on the reservation ousts
the State from any power to exact its sales and cigarette taxes
from nonmembers purchasing cigarettes at tribal smokeshops.
The primary argument is economic. It is asserted that
smokeshop cigarette sales generate substantial revenues for
the Tribes which they expend for essential governmental services, including programs to combat severe poverty and underdevelopment at the reservations. Most cigarette purchasers
are outsiders attracted on to the reservations by the bargain
prices the smokeshops charge by virtue of their claimed
exemption from state taxation. If the State is permitted to
impose its taxes, the Tribes will no longer enjoy any competitive advantage vis-a-vis businesses in surrounding areas.
Indeed, because the Tribes themselves impose a tax on the
transaction, if the state tax is also collected the price charged
will necessarily be higher and the Tribes will be placed at a
competitive disadvantage as compared to businesses elsewhere.
Tribal :::mokeshops will lose a large percentage of their cigarette sales and the Tribes will forfeit substantial revenues.
Because of this economic impact, it is argued, the state taxes
are ( 1) pre-empted by federal statutes regulating Indian
affairs; (2) inconsistent with the principle of tribal selfgovernment; and (3) invalid under "negative implications"
()f the Indian Commerce Clause.
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It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the
13mokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated
on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a
13ignificant interest. Cf. White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, U. S. (1980); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribe.~, supra, at 475-481; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973). What the smokeshops offer
these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely
an exemption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the
power to create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes
or otherwise earning revenues by participating in the reservation enterprises. If this assertion were accepted, the Tribes
could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores
at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep
discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas. We
do not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or
otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do
their business elsewhere.
The federal statutes cited to us, even when given the
broadest reading to which they are fairly susceptible, cannot
be said to pre-empt Washington's sales and cigarette taxes.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25
U. S. C. § 461 et seq., the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88
Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat.
2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq., evidence to varying degrees a
congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government
and economic development, but none goes so far as to grant
tribal enterprises selling goods to nonmembers an artificial
competitive advantage over all other businesses in a State.
The Indian traders statutes, 25 U. S. C. § 261 et seq., incorporate a congressional desire comprehensively to regulate
businesses selling goods to reservation Indians for cash or·
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exchange, see Centra.l Machinery Co. v. Arizona,- U.S.(1980); Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685
(1965), but no similar intent is evident with respect to sales
by Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe. The Washington
Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676, reflects an intent that the State
not tax reservation lands or income derived therefrom, but
the present taxes are assessed against nonmembers of the
Tribes and concern transactions in personalty with no substantial connection to reservation lands. The relevant treaties,
Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (Lummi Tribe); Treaty
with the Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas,
12 Stat. 951, can be read to recognize inherent tribal power to
exclude non-Indians or impose conditions on those permitted
to enter ; but purchasers entering the reservation are not the
State's agents and any agreements which they might make
cannot bind it. Finally, although the Tribes themselves could
perhaps pre-empt state taxation through the exercise of
properly delegated federal power to do so, cf. Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (per curiam); United States
v. Mazur-ie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975), we do not infer from the
mere fact of federal approval of the Indian taxing ordinances,
or from the fact that the Tribes exercise congressionally
sanctioned powers of self-government, that Congress has delegated the far-reaching authority to pre-empt valid state sales
and cigarette taxes otherwise collectible from nonmembers of
the Tribe.
Washington does not infringe the right of reservation
Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled by them,"
Willia.rns v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), merely because
the result of imposing its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes
of revenues which they currently are receiving. The principle
of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federaf
{(;oNermnent, on the· on~t hand~ and· thQse of the State, on the·
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other. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 179 ( 1973). While the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for essential governmental programs, that interest
is strongest when the revenues are derived from value gen~rated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes
~nd when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services: ' The
State also has a legitimate governmental interest in raising
revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax
is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is
the recipient of state services. As we have already noted,
Washington's taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the
Tribes from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers
who do not receive significant tribal services and who would
otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservations.
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own force, automatically bars a.Il state
taxation of matters significantly touching the political and
economic interests of the Tribes. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Ttibes, supra, at 481 , n. 17. ·That clause may have a
more limited role to play in preventing undue discrimination
against, or burdens on, Indian commerce. But Washington's
taxes are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to a.ll transactions within the State. And although the result of these
taxes will be to lessen or eliminate tribal commerce with nonmembers, that market existed in the first place only because of
a claimed exemption from these very taxes. The taxes under
consideration do not burden commerce that would exist on the
reservations without respect to the tax exemption.
We cannot fault the State for not giving credit on the·
amount of tribal taxes paid. It is argued that if a credit is
not given , the tribal retailers will actually be placed at a competitive disadvantage, as compared to retailers elsewhere, due
to the overlapping impact of tribal and state taxation. While
this argument is not without force, we find that the Tribes·
have failed to demonstrate that business at the smokeshops:
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would be significantly reduced by a state tax without a credit
as compared to a state tax with a credit. With a credit, prices
at the smokeshops would presumably be roughly the same as
those off the reservation, assuming that the Indian enterprises are operated at an efficiency similar to that of businesses
elsewhere; without a credit, prices at smokeshops would exceed
those off the reservation by the amount of the tribal taxes,
about 40-to-50 cents per carton for the Lummi, Makah, and
Colville Tribes, and 22.5 cents per carton for the Yakima
Tribe. It is evident that even if credit were given, the bulk
of the smokeshops' present business would still be eliminated,
since nonresidents of the reservation could purchase cigarettes at the same price and with greater convenience nearer
their homes and would have no incentive to travel to the
smokeshops for bargain purchases as they do now. Members
of the Tribes, of course, would be indifferent to whether a
credit were given because under Moe they are immune from
any state tax, whether credited or not. Some nonmembers
of the Tribes living on the reservations would possibly travel
elsewhere to purchase cigarettes if a state credit were not
given, and smokeshop business would to this extent be
decreased as compared to the situation under a credited tax.
But the Tribes have not shown whether or to what extent
this would be the case. and we cannot infer on the present
record that by failing to give a credit Washington imper- ·
missibly taxes reservation value by deterring sales tha.t, if
credit were given, would occur on the reservation because of
its location and because of the efforts of the Tribes in importing and marketing the cigarettes.
A second asserted ground for the invalidity of the state
taxes is that they somehow conflict with the Tribes' cigarette
ordinances and thereby are subject to pre-emption or contravene the principle of tribal self-government. This argument
need not detain us. There is no direct conflict between the
13tate and. trib~tl schemes, since each government is free to

7c.;; 630- 0PINION
22

iVASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES

impose its taxes without ousting the other. Although taxes
can be used for distributive or regulatory purposes, as well as
for ra.ising revenue, we see no nonrevenue purposes to the
tribal taxes at issue in these cases, and, as already noted, we
perceive no intent on the part of Congress to authorize the
Tribes to pre-empt otherwise valid state taxes. Other provisions of the tribal ordinances do comprehensively regulate the
marketing of cigarettes by the tribal enterprises; but the State
does not interfere with the Tribes' power to regulate tribal
enterpri~. es wheu it simply imposes its tax on sales to noumembcrs. Hence, we perceive no conflict between state and
tribal law warranting invalidation of the State's taxes.

c
We recognized in Moe that if a State's tax is valid, the State
may impose at least minimal burdens on Indian businesses to
aid in collecting and enforcing that tax. ·The simple collection burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax on tribal
smokeshops is legally indistinguishable from the collection
burden upheld in Moe, and we therefore hold that the State
may validly require the tribal smokeshops to affix tax stamps
purchased from the State to individual packages of cigarettes
prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the Tribe.
The state sales tax scheme requires smokeshop opera.tors to
keep detailed records of both taxable and nontaxable transactions. The operator must record the number and dollar
volume of taxable sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. With
respect to nontaxable sales, the operator must record and
retain for state inspection the names of all Indian purchasers.
their tribal affiliations, the Indian reservations within which
sales are made, and the dollar amount and dates of sales.
In addition. unless the Indian purchaser is personally known
to the operator he must present a tribal identification card.
The District Court struck down all recordkeeping requirements with respect to cigarette sales, because it found that no
cigarette sales were taxable. With respect to sales of items·
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other than cigarettes, the District Court found no record evidence "as to whether the record keeping requirements, as
promulgated, are or are not reasonably necessary to ensure
payment of lawful taxes." 446 F . Supp., at 1373. The District Court upheld the requirements insofar as they pertained
to taxable sales, but struck them down with respect to nontaxable sales on the ground that the State had not met its
burden of showing that the regulation was reasonably necessary to ensure payment of taxes which it had power to impose.
Contrary to the District Court, we find the State's recordkeeping requirements valid in toto. The Tribes, and not the
State as the District Court supposed, bear the burden of showing that the recordkeeping requirements which they are challenging are invalid. The District Court made the factual
finding, which we accept, that there was no evidence of record
on this question. Applying the correct burden of proof to the
District Court's finding, we hold that the Tribes have failed
to demonstrate that the State's recordkeeping requirements
for exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as a means of
preventing fraudulent transactions.

D
The State asserts the power to apply its sales and cigarette
taxes to Indians resident on the reservation but not enrolled
in the governing Tribe. The issue arose in the Yakima case
in the wake of the District Court's determination that the
state retail sales tax could be applied to the purchase by nonIndians of goods other than cigarettes. It was, of course,
quite clear after Moe and McClanahan that the sales tax could
not be applied to similar purchases by tribal members, but the
State argued that this exemption should not extend to nonmembers of the Tribe. Relying in part on the lower court
opinion in Moe, Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v.
Moe, 392 F . Supp. 1297. 1312 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge
court) , the District Court rejected the contention. 446 F.
Supp,, at 1371- 1372. 'rhis Court dicl not reach the question in

..
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Moe because Montana failed to raise it on appeal. We d<)
reach it now, and we reverse.
Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which
they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt
Washington's power to impose its taxes on Indians not mem..
bers of the Tribe. We do not so read the Major Crimes Act,
62 Stat. 758. as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1153, which at most
provides for federal-court jurisJiction over crimes committed
by Iudians on another Tribe's reservation. Cf. United States
v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641, 646-647, n. 7 (1977). Similarly,
the mere fact that nonmembers resident on the reservation
come within the definition of "Indian" for purposes of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 988, 25 U. S. C.
§ 479, does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt
such Indians from state taxation.
Nor would the imposition of Washington's tax on these purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, fol'
the simple reason that nonmembers are not constituents of
the governing Tribe. For most practical purposes those
Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on
the reservation. There is no evidence that nonmembers have
a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disburse ..
ments. We find, therefore, that the State's interest in taxing
these purchasers outweighs any tribal interest that may exist
in preventing the State from imposing its taxes.

E
Finally, the State contends that it has the power to seize
unstamped cigarettes as contraband if the Tribes do not cooperate in collecting the State's taxes. The State in fact seized
shipments travelling to the reservations from out-of-State
wholesalers before being enjoined from doing so by the Dis~
trict Court, and it has declared its intention to continue such
seizures if successful in this litigation. The Tribes contest
this power, noting that because sales by wholesalers to the
tribal businesses are concededly exempt from state taxation~
no state tax ls due while the cigarettes are ln transit.
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We find that Washington's interest in enforcing its valid
taxes is sufficient to justify these seizures. Although the
cigarettes in transit are as yet exempt from state taxation, they
are not immune from seizure when the Tribes, as here, have
refused to fulfill collection and remittance obligations which
the State has validly imposed. It is significant that these
seizures take place outside the reservation, in locations where
state power over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive
than it is within reservation boundaries. Cf. Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973). By seizing
cigarettes rn route to the reservation, the State polices against
wholesale evasion of its own valid taxes without unnecessarily
intruding on core tribal interests.
Washington further contends that it may enter onto the
t•eservatiolls. seize stocks of cigarettes which are intended for
sale to nonmembers, and sell these stocks in order to obtain
payment of the taxes due. However, this question, which
obviously is considerably different from the preceding one, is
not properly before us. The record does not disclose that the
State has ever entered the reservations to seize cigarettes
because of the Tribes' failure to collect the taxes due on
sales to nonmembers, or ever threatened to do so except in
papers filed in this litigation. Indeed, the State itself concedes that "it may very well be that this Court will find it
unnecessary to rule on this aspect of the appeal." Brief for
Appellant 110. We therefore express no opinion on the
matte.

v

The next issue concerns the challenge in the Colville case
to the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper
and travel trailer taxes. Although not identical, these taxes
are quite similar. Each is denominated an excise tax for the
"privilege" of using the covered vehicle in the State, each is
assessed annually at a certain percentage of fair market value,
and each is sought to be imposed upon vehicles owned by
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the Tribe or its members and used both on and off the
reserva.tion. 20
Once again, our departure point is Moe. There we held
that Montana's personal property tax could not validly be
applied to motor vehicles owned by tribal members who resided on the reservation. 425 U. S., at 480-481. The vehicles
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and
off the reservation,ao and the tax was assessed annually at a
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus,
the only difference between the taxes now before us and the one
struck down in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State,
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax.
The State asserts that this difference mandates a different
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle as of
January 1 of each year," at and that event took place on the
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, supra, Montana was without authority
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continues,
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is
inapplicable and the ta.x should be upheld under Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
2o In the wake of McClanahan
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra,
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon
vehicles u. ed wholly within the re2ervation. Brief for Appellant 111, and
n. 77.
30 Moe did not focu s upon vehicle use at all.
The District Court opinion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which
Montana sought to apply its tax were used both on and off the resen·ation . Confedemted Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Montana , 392 F. Supp.
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court) (Smith, J., concurring
and dissenting) .
31 /d ., at 1327, citing the l\Iontana statute , Mont. Rev. Codes Ann ..
§ 84-406 (2) (1974 Supp.).
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We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily
circumvented. While Washington may well be free to levy
a tax on the use outside the reservation of Indian-owned
vehicles, it may not under that rubric accomplish what Moe
held was prohibited. Had Washington tailored its tax to the
amount of actual off-reservation use, or otherwise varied something more than mere nomencla.ture, this might be a different
case. But it has not done so, and we decline to treat the
case as if it had.

VI
Finally, we come to the chailenge by the Colville, Lummi,
and Makah Tribes to the State's assumption of civil and
criminal jurisdiction over them. The District Court found
that assumption unlawful as regards the Makah and Lummi
reservations and lawful as regards the Colville reservation.
446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. The State challenges the former
findings.
AU parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington
v. Yak·ima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). There a pattern of jurisdiction identical to those created on the Makah
and Lummi reservations was upheld, and the holdin~~: of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on which the District
Court in the present case relied for its conclusion that such
patterns are unconstitutional was reversed. We therefore
uphold the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the Makah
and Lummi reservations.32 Accordingly, the judgment of the
District Court is
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
82

We note probable jurisdiction in No. 78-60, Confederated Tribes of
the Colville lndian Reservation et al. v. Washington et al., which is pending on a.ppeal. There the Colville Tribe appeals from so much of the District Court's judgment as reflects the holding that Washington's assump-·
tion of total jurisdiction over that. Tribe's reservation was lawful. See 446
F. Supp., ~t 1366-1367. The Colville Tribe challenges that holding on.
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grounds (1) tiHlt Washington could not assume jurisdiction without amend.
ing its constitution and (2) that the assumption of tota.l jurisdiction over
only selected reservat.ions violates the Equa.l Protection Clause. W asking ton v. Yakima. Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), disposes of the
first contention, id., at 493, and makes clear that the second must fail
if the assumption of jurisdiction is rationally related to some valid state
purpose, id., at 500-502 . Wr find the pattern of juri:sdiction in the
present case rational: The Colville Tribe consented in 1965 to the State's
a:s:sumpt.ion of jurisdiction over it, and the State has assumed total juris.
diction only over Tribes that have so consented. The presence or
absence of tribal consent. is a rational ba.sis for distinguishing among
reservations, and there is thus no constitutional infirmity. Accordingly,
th<' judgment is in this respect affirmed.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.

In recent Terms we have more than once addressed the
intricate problem of state taxation of matters involving
Indian tribes and their members. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973) . We return to that
vexing area in the present cases. Although a variety of questions arc presented, perhaps the most significant is whether an
Indian tribe ousts a State from any power to tax on-reservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by imposing its
own tax on the transaction or by otherwise earning revenues
from the tribal business. A three-judge District Court held
for the Tribes. We affirm J:n part and reverse in part.
l[

These cases are here on the State of Washington's appeal

.

•
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from declaratory judgments and permanent injunctions entered by the District Court at the close of consolidated proceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978) . The first case, Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Colville),
Makah, and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States of
Americ•z and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909,
was commenced on July 18, 1973, by the United States on
behalf of the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation (Yakima Tribe). 1 In each action, the complainants contended that the State's cigarette and tobacco
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by onreservation tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judgments to that effect, as well as injunctions barring the State
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from seizing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to
their reservations. 8 In the Colville case, the Tribes also challenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked
On April 24, 1974, the Yakima Tribe intt>rvened as a plaintiff in the
United States' ca:se. Its complaint appears at App. 149
2 The state tobacco product~:! tax, which is unposed on cigars and pipe
tobacco pursuant to Wash. Rev . Code § 82.26 (1976), is not before us.
The District Court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers
and not upon the non-Indian purchasers. 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1355, n. 15
(ED Wash. 1978) . The State did not appeal from this holding, Brief for
Appellants 55, n. 40, and all parties agree that in consequence the tobacc(}
products tax may not be imposed on sales by tribal dealers.
3 The Tribes also sought damages for interference with their cigarette
businesses. The damage issues in both cases were remanded by the threejudge court to a single district judge. 446 F . Supp., at 1367, 1373.
1
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the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to Indianowned vehicles. The Yakima case did not present these
latter issues, but it did make a broad attack on the application of the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation
transactions.
From the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely parallel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining
order against the Sta.te's enforcement of the taxing statutes
was issued in each. App. 13, 147. Thereafter, because the
complaints sought injunctive relief against the enforcement
of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was convened
pursuant to the then-applicable requirement of 28 U. S. C.
§ 2281 (1970). 4 On September 6, 1974, the three-judge court
issued preliminary injunctions restraining the State from
enforcing the challenged taxes against the Tribes. App. 15,
156. There followed extensive discovery, 5 after which the
parties to each case reached agreement on pretrial orders setting forth facts and clarifying the issues.
Trial was held in both cases on Mar. 28, 1977, and the
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on Feb. 22,
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a
three-judge court to consider the issues presented; (2) that
the state cigarette tax could not be applied to on-reservation transactions because it was pre-empted by the tribal taxing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales, but could be
4 Although § 2281 was subsequently repealed, Act of Aug. 12, 1976, § 1,
90 Stat. 1119, it was expressly left in place for cases which , like those
before us, were pending on the date of repeal. § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. We
consider issues concerning the applicability of the former § 2281 to these
cases in Part III, infra.
11 Proceedings in both cases were stayed for several months, however,
pending this Court's decisions in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 42$
U. .S. 463 .(1976), aud Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 (1976).
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applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians; (4) that the
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements
in connection with various tax-exempt sales; (5) that the
State could not impose its vehicle excise taxes upon vehicles
owned by the Tribes and their members, and (6) that the
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutionaL The court
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new triaL This appeal
followed, We postponed consideration of certain jurisdictional questions to the merits. U. S. (1979).
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background,
which is not seriously in dispute. 6 Thereafter, we explore
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then
turn to the merits.

II
The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of
$1.60 per carton/ on the "sale, use, consumption, handling,
possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the State.
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.24.020 (1976), The tax is enforced
with tax stamps; and dealers are required to sell only cigarettes to which such stamps have been affixed. § 82.24.030.
Indian tribes are permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes
for purposes of resale to members of the tribe, but are required
by regulation to collect the tax with respect to sales to nonmembers. § 82.24.260; Wash. Admin. Code § 458-20-192
8 Our statement of the factual background is drawn in large measure
from lihe opinion of the District Court, 446 F . Supp., at 1345-1349, 13681370.
7 The cigarette excise tax is imposed pursuanli to Wash . Rev. Code
§ 82.24.020 (1976) . That provision authorizes a levy of 6.5 mills per
cigarette. The tax is brought up to its full amount by Wash . Rev. Code
§28A.47.440, and §73.32.130 (1976) , which add 0,5 mills and 1 mill
respectively.

..
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(1977) .~ The District Court found, on the basis of its exami~
nation of state authorities, that the legal incidence of the tax
is on the purchaser in transactions between an Indian seller
and a non-Indian buyer.9
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seiz=
ures whenever the cigarettes are destined to be sold to non~
Indians without affixation of stamps or collection of the tax,
Washington also imposes .a sales tax on sales of personal
property, including cigarettes. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.08.020
(1976) . This tax, which was 5% during the relevant period,
is collected from the purchaser by the retailer. § 82.08.050.
It does not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation Indians. Wash. Admin. Code§ 458--20- 192 (1977) .
The state motor vehicle excise tax is imposed on "the
privilege of using in the state any motor vehicle." Wash.
Rev. Code § 82.44.020 (1976) . The tax is assessed annuallyy
8 Initially the Sta.t e asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales,
- regafdless of whether the buyer was Indian or non-Indian. Its theory was
that Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 {1953), granted it general authority to tax
reservation Indians. After this theory was reJected in Bryan v. Itasca
Co·unty, supra, the State abandoned any claim of authority to tax sales
to tribal members. See 446 F . Supp., at 1346, n. 4.
9 446 F . Supp., at Ja52-1;355.
Es~entially, the Court a.ccepted the
State's contention that the tax falls upon the first event which may con~
stitutionally be subjected to it. In the case of sales by non-Indians to nonIndians, this means the incidence of the tax is on the seller, or perhaps on
someone even further up the chain of distribution, because that person is
the one who first sells, uses, consumes, handles, possesses or distributes the
products. But where the wholesaler or retailer is an Indian on whom
the tax cannot be imposed under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164 (197:3) , the first taxable event is the use, consumption or possession by the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, the District
Court concluded, t he tax falls on that purchaser., We accept this
eon elusion,

,'•'
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and during the relevant period the amount was two percent of
the fair market value of the vehicle in question. In addition,
the State imposes an annual tax in the amount of one percent
of fair market value on the privilege of using campers and
trailers in the State. § 82.50.400. 10
Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized
by the United States as a sovereign Indiau tribe Each is
governed by a business or tribal council approved by the Secretary of Interior. 11 The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 members, of whom about 3,200 live on the Colville Indian Reservation.u Enrolled members of the Tribe constitute just
under half of the reservation's population. The Lummi Tribe
has approximately 2,000 members. Roughly 1,250 of them
live on the reservation. 13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000
members. Some 900 live on the reservation. 14 'T he Colville,
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated and underdeveloped. Many members reside in mobile bomes. Most own
at least one automobile which is used ·both on and off the
reservatiOn.
10 The same chapter provided for an excise tax on mobile homes. Initially, the State sought to apply this tax to Indians as well; 'but after
Bryan v Itasca County, wpm, and Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra,
it no longer attempts to do so. 446 F . Supp., at 1365.
11 The Makah Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 lJ. S. C. § 461 et seq. While the Lummi and
Colville Tribe:> do havE' federally-approved con~titutions, they voted in
1935 not to come under that Act. 446 F. Supp., at 1345, n. 2.
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million acres in the northeastern section of Washington. It was established by Executive Order on
July 2, 1872. 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 916 (2nd
ed. 1904).
18 The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319 acres, most of them on a
peninsula near Bellingham, Wash. It was established by the Treaty of
Point Elliott in 1855. 12 Stat. 927.
14 The Makah Reservation encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip
of the Olympic Peninsula. It too was established by treaty in 1855.
Treaty with the Maka.h Tnbe, 12 Stat. 939 Roughly 63 % of its inhabitants are enrolled members of the Tribe.

..
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The Yakima Tribe has more than 6,000 members, of whom
about 5,000 live on the reservation. 1 & Enrolled members,
however, constitute less than one fifth of the reservation's
population. The balance is made up of approximately 1,500
Indians who are not members of the Tribes and more than
20,000 non-lndians.
The Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes have nearly identical cigarette sales and taxing schemes. Each Tribe has
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has authorized one
or more on-reservation tobacco outlets. 16 These ordinances
have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior; and the
dealer at each tobacco outlet is a federally licensed Indian
trader. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds 17
to purchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers. 18 The Tribes
distribute the cigarettes to the tobacco outlets and collect
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale distribution price and a tax of 40-to-50 cents per carton. The
cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sale. The
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to
the ultimate consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through
1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from
its cigarette tax; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and the
Makah Tribe realized $13,000.
While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as
retailers, retaining possession of the cigarettes until their sale
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It pur~
1 ~ The Yakima Indian Reservation was set aside for the Tribe by treaty
ratified March 8, 1859. Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951. It
encompasst>s about 1.4 million acres in south-central Washington .
16 The tribal ordinances regulating the sale, distribution and taxing of
cigarettes are set forth at App. 104, 118, and 111.
17 The funds are maintained in individual accounts in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs agency serving the reservation pursuant to 25 CFR Part 104
(1978) . App. 32-34.
18 These out-of-state wholesalers are also federally licensed Indian
traders.
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chases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them
to its licensed retailers. The Tribe receives a markup over the
'wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of 22.5
cents per carton. There is no requirement that this tax be
added to the selling price. In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived
$278,000 from its cigarette business.
Indian tobacco dealers ma"ke a large majority of their sales
to non-Indians-residents of nearby communities who journey
to the reservation especially to take advantage of the claimed
tribal exemption from the state cigarette and sales taxes. The
purchaser saves more than a dollar on each carton, and that
makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree that if the State
were able to tax sales by Indian smokeshops and eliminate
that one-dollar saving the stream of non-Indian bargain
hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's business is to a substantial degree dependent upon his tax-exempt
status, and if he losses that status his sales will fall off sharply.

,,l,

•'

·'

III
We first address our jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal.
'Two attacks are made upon that jurisdiction, one grounded in
· the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing three~
judge district courts and the other having to do with the timing ·
of the State's appeal.
Under 28 U. S: C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit
11
required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined ·
by a district court· of three judges." At the time the Yakima
and Colville cases were filed, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 provided that :
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State stat~
ute by restraining the action of any officer of such State·
in the enforcement or execution of such statute ...
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
ttpQn the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute

..

..•'''

...,.,'
•·

'I

18-630-0PINION
WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES

9

unless the application therefor is heard and determined by
a district court of three judges . .. ." 19
After the State filed its jurisdictional statement in this appeal,
the United States moved to dismiss the Yakima case on the
ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by
a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to
the Yakima case because that is the only one to which the
government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane
to the Colville case as well.
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only in
the Supremacy Clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S.
111, 128-129 (1965) . In addition, § 2281 is not brought into
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512; 518 (1973). The United States argues
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into·
one or the other category, and thus failed to trigger § 228J.2°
Further, the Government continues, the attacks on the State's
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine Commerce
Clause issues, are not properly characterized as challenges to
the constitutionality of a state statute. Rather, the Government asserts, they go to the constitutionality of the result obtained by the use of the statute. We find neither contention
persuasive.
The original complaints in these actions contended that
the state taxes were unconstitutional under the Indian Commerce Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause. Relying
19

The repeal of this provision in 1976 does not affect its application to
these cases. See n. 4, supra.
20
As the Government recognizes, its position in this regard is somewhat
anomalous since it was the United States which initially requested a threejudge court in the Yakima case. App. 145. At that time the government
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
state statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality within the meaning oi

§ 2281.
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primarily upon language in footnote 17 in Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 481, n. 17 (1976), the United
States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce. Cla4se claims were
insubstantial. 21 But Moe was decided. in 1976-long after a
three-judge court was convened to hear these cases-and it
is thus apparent that footnote 17 alone cannot be dispositive,
whatever its precise thrust. ·There is language in that footnote, however, which ·suggests that the insubstantiality of
Commerce Clause claims such as those before us flows from
M'esoalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), and
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164
(1973)-both of which were decided before the present suits
were filed.22 We think the United States reads too much into
this language. Goosby v. Osser, supra, made it clear that
constitutional claims will not 1ightly be found insubstantial for
purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby explicitly states that

•'

_.

,•

21

The District Court seems to have found this contention persuasive,
446 F. Supp., at 1350, although it addressed it only briefly. Presumably
it saw no need to explore the matter more fully since it was confident
that the three-judge requirement, had in any event been satisfied by the
Tribes' challenges to the State's enforcement measures. /d., at 1350-135L
22 Footnote 17 in its entirety reads as 'follows :
" It is thus clear that the basis Tor the invalidity of these taxing measures, whicn we have found to oe inconsistent with existing federal statutes,
is the Supremacy Clause, U . S. Canst., Art. VI, cl. 2, and not any automatic
exemptions 'as a matter of constitutional la:w' either under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity· doctrine as laid down
originally in M'Culloch v.'Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) . · If so, then the
basis for convening a three-jtidge court in this type of case has effectively
disappeared, for this Court has expressly held 'that attacks on state statutes
raising only Supremacy ·clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of
28 U . S. C.§ 2281. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) . · Here,
however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court, because
at the outset the Tribe's attack asserted unconstitutionality of these statutes
under the Commerce Clause, a not insubstantial claim since Mescaleroand McClanahan had not yet been decided. See Goosby v. Osser., 40~
,U,S. 5~ (1973)." 425 U . S ., at 481, n . I?.
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prior decisions are not sufficient to support a conclusion that
certain claims are insubstantial unless those prior decisions
"inescapably render the claims frivolous." ld., at 518. We
cannot say here that the Goosby test has been met. Neither
Mescalero nor McClanahan "inescapably render [ s] the
[Tribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivolous" because neither
holds that that clause is wholly without force in situations
like the present. And even footnote 17 merely rejects the
stark and rather unhelpful notion that the Commerce Clause
provides an "automat,ic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitutional law'" in such cases. (Emphasis added.) It does not
take that clause entirely out of play in the field of state regulation of Indian affairs.
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack
on the official seizure of cigarettes bound for the reservations also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281.
The United States concedes that that attack raised Commerce Clause issues, but maintains that the Tribes' target
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves,
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pursuant to those statutes. We have no quarrel with the proposition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit .to
restrain their lawless behavior into a § 2281 case, Phillips v.
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 248-253 (1941) . But this is not
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires actions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes granting them broad executive discretion. Here the state officials
involved were attempting to enforce the state tax laws by
using the tools authorized for such enforcement by the state
legislature. They manifested an intention to continue to use
those tools for that purpose. And it is those tools, as applied
to cigttrettes in Indian commerce, which the Tribes ~hal-

7
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lenged.23 We hold that this suffices to bring these cases within
§ 2281.
The other jurisdictional question postponed last February is
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness
under 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b) of the State's appeal from the
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and as~
sumption of jurisdiction issues. Basica1ly, the problem is
this: the Notice of Appeal on these two issues was filed more
'than 60 days after the District Court's decision, but within 60
days of the denial of a state motion for partial new trial-a
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and assumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District
Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely
renders nonfinal the disposition of tho~e issues actually raised
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice
of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction
issues was timely. If the latter, that Notice was filed out of
time and to that extent the appeal is jurisdictionally timebarred.2'
See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 354, n. 10 (1970) . See also
Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355 (1966) ;
Queru v. United States, 316 U.S. 486, 490 (1942) .
24 The actual chronology was as follows: On May 10, 1978, the District
23

Court entered its final order. On May 22, the State filed a motion for
partial new trial on the cigarette and sales tax issues. On July 12, while
that motion was pending, the State filed a Notice of Appeal raising the
motor vehicle excise tax and assumption of jurisdiction issues. On July 17,
the motion for partial new trial was denied; and on August 14, the State
filed a Notice of Appeal on the sales and cigarette tax issues. On Sep·
tember 8, the State0led an Amended Notice of Appeal raising all relevant issues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal was filed more than 60 days
after the original District Court order. Accordingly, under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2101 (b), it was out of time. The ohce of August 14 and the Amended
Notice of September 8, however, were filed within 60 days of the District
Court's denial of the motion for partial new trial. It seems clear that
the filing of that motion rendered nonfinal the disposition of all covered
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We think tha.t the filing of a motion for partial new trial
in these circumstances must have rendered nonfinal the disposition of all issues between the parties. A contrary conclusion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make
little difference save to force future appellants to include in
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues.
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any
sound supporting rationale but capable of occasionally tripping
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redundant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of
the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction
holding is properly before us, and we turn to the merits.

IV
A

In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976),
we considered a state taxing scheme remarkably similar to the
cigarette and sales 25 taxes at issue in the present cases. Montana there sought to impose a cigarette tax on sales by smoke·
shops operated by tribal members and located on leased trust
lands \vithin the reservation, and sought to require the smoke·
shop operators to collect the tax. We upheld the tax, insofar
issues-if not, one seeking a partial new trial would have to jeopardize
his right to appe.'ll. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U. S.
441, 445-446 (1974); Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 266
(1942) . Thus, the only remaining question is whether the motion for
partial new trial also suspended the finality of the District Court's disposition of issues not covered by that motion.
25 We are here generally concerned only with the application of Washington's retail sales tax to cigarette sales. The District Court upheld
the sales tax as applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians, and the
Tribe~ do not contest that holding. We do, however, con~:>ider the question of noncigaret.te sales when we discuss (1) whether Washington can
tax purchases by Indians not members of the governing Tribe, and
(2) whether Washington's recordkeeping requirements are valid.

,,
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as sales to non-Indians were concerned/ 6 because its le'gal ingi~
dence fell on the non-Indian purchaser. .Hence, "the competitive advantage which ''the Indian seller doing business on
tribal land enjoys over ail other cigarette retailers, within .and
without the reservation, is ~ependent on the extent to which
the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation
to pay the tax." !d., 11t 482 ' (emphasis in" original) .- We
upheld the collection requirement, as applied to purchases by
non-Indians, on the ground that it was a "minirnal burden"
designed to aid the State in collecting an otherwise wralid tax.
!d. , at 483.
Moe establishes several principles relevant to the present.
cases. The State may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory
tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers doing business
on the reservation. Such a tax ma.y be valid even if it s~ri
ously disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's business with non-Indians. 27 And the State may impose at least
"minimal" burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing
and collecting the tax. There .is no automatic bar, therefore,
to Washington's extending its tax and collection and recordkeeping requirements onto the reservation in'the present cases.
Although it narrows the issues in the present cases, Moe
does not definitively resolve several important questions.
First, unlike in Moe, each of the· Tribes imposes its own tax
on cigarette sales, arid obtains further revenues by participating in the cigarette enterprise at the wholesale or reta:il level.
Second, Washington requires the Indian retailer to keep
detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in addition to
simply precollecting the tax. Moe expressed no opinion
We struck down the tax as applied to sales to Indians. Moe v. Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463,475-481 (1976) .
2 7 The United States reads Moe too parsimoniously in asserting its inapplicability to cases, such as the present ones, in which the economic
impact on tribal retailers is particularly severe. Moe makes clear that
the Tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of sales to non-1nilians,.
·or inde(ld to any such sales ~t .all,
26

·'
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regarding the "complicated problems" of enforcement that
distinctions between exempt and nonexempt purchasers might
entail. I d., at 468, n. 6. Third, Moe left unresolved the
question of whether a State can tax purchases by on-reservation Indians not members of the governing tribe, as Washing.
ton seeks to do in the present cases. !d., at 480-481, n. 16.
Finally, unlike in Moe, Washington has seized, and threatens
to continue seizing, shipments of unstamped cigarettes en
route to the reservations from wholesalers outside the State,
We address each of these questions.

B
(1)

At the outset, the State argues that the Colville, Makah,
and Lummi Tribes have no power to impose their cigarette
taxes on nontribal purchasers. 28 We disagree. The power
to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute
of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by
federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status,
Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 (1978) .
The widely held understanding within the Federal Govern~
ment has always been that federal law to date has not worked
a divestiture of Indian taxing power. Executive Branch offi~
cials have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess
a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of nonIndians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have
a significant interest, 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op.
28 The incidence of the Colville, Lummi, and Makah taxes falls on the
cigarette purchaser, since the tribal ordinances specify that the tax is to be
passed on to the ultimate consumer. ·The Yakima ordinance, in contrast,
does not require that the tax be added to the selling price, and the incidence of the Yakima tax therefore does not fall on the purchaser. The
State's challenge is directed only at the Colville, Lummi, and Makah

taxes.
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Atty. Gen. 174 (1855), including jurisdiction to tax, 23 Op,
Atty. Gen. 214 ( 1900); Powers of India:n Tribes, 55 I. D. 14,
46 (1934). According to the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior:
"Chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized as
pertaining to an Indian tribe is · the power of taxation.
Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this power
may be exercised over members of the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be
attached as conditions." 'Ibid. (emphasis added).
Federal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax
non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic
activity. Buster v. ·Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8 1905),
appeal dismissed,· 203 U. S. ·599 (1906); Iron Crow v. Oglala
Sioux Tribe, 231 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1956); cf. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, 393 (1904). No federal statute cited to
us shows any congressional departure from this view. To
the contrary, authority to tax the activities or property of
non-Indians taking place or situated on Indian lands, in cases
. where the tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter,
was very probably one of the tribal powers under "existing
law" confirmed by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U. S. C. § 476. In these respects the
present cases differ sharply from Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), in which we stressed the
shared assumptions of the Executive, Judicial and Legislative
Departments that Indian tribes could not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the
· Tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would
be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National
Government, as when the Tribes seek to engage in foreign
· r~latiQn~, t:t.Iienat~ their tands to non-Inqians without ft.)deral
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consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do
not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights. See id.,
at 208- 210; United States v. Wheeler, supra, at 326. In the
present case, we can see no overriding federal interest that
would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation. And even
if the State's interests were implicated by the tribal taxes, a
question we need not decide, it must be remembered that
tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only
the Federal Government, not the States.
(2)
The Tribes contend that their involvement in the operation
and taxation of cigarette marketing on the reservation ousts
the State from any power to exact its sales and cigarette taxes
from nonmembers purchasing cigarettes at tribal smokeshops.
The primary argument is economic. It is asserted that
smokeshop cigarette sales generate substantial revenues for
the Tribes which they expend for essential governmental services, including programs to combat severe poverty and underdevelopment at the reservations. Most cigarette purchasers
are outsiders attracted on to the reservations by the bargain
prices the smokeshops charge by virtue of their claimed
exemption from state taxation. If the Sta.te is permitted to
impose its taxes, the 'Tribes will no longer enjoy any competitive advantage vis-a-vis businesses in surrounding areas.
Indeed, because the Tribes themselves impose a tax on the
transaction, if the state tax is also collected the price charged
will necessarily be higher and the Tribes will be placed at a
competitive disadvantage as compared to businesses elsewhere.
Tribal ~mokeshops will lose a large percentage of their cigarette sales and the Tribes will forfeit substantial revenues.
Because of this economic impact, it is a.rgued, the state taxes
are (1) pre-empted by federal statutes regulating Indian
affairs; (2) inconsistent with the principle of tribal selfgovernment; and (3) invalid under "negative implications•'
of the IndUl.n Commerce Clause.

'.
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It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the
srnokeshops to persons corning from outside is not generated
on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a
significant interest. Cf. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
supra, at 475-481; McClanahan v. Arizona State Ta:r
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973) . What the srnokeshops offer
these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely
an exemption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the
power to create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes
or otherwise earning revenues by participa.ting in the reserva~
tion enterprises. If this assertion were accepted, the Tribes
could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores
at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep
discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas. We
do not believe that princip1es of federal Indian law, whether
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or
otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemp~
tion from state taxation to persons who would norma:lly do
their business elsewhere.
The federal statutes cited to us, even when given the
broadest reading to which they are fairly susceptible, cannot
be said to pre-empt Washington:'s sales and cigarette taxes.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25
U. S. C. § 461 et seq., the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88
Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat.
2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq., evidence to varying degr~es a
congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government
and economic development, but none goes so far as to grant
triba.I enterprises selling goods to nonmembers an artificial
competitive advantage over all other businesses in a State.
The Indian traders statutes, 25 U. S. C. § 261 et seq., incorporate a congressional desire comprehensively to regulate
businesses selling goods to reservation Indians for cash or
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exchauge, see Warren Trading Post v. 'Pax Cormn'n, 380 U. S.
685 (1965) , but no similar intent is evident with respect to
sale by Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe. The Washington Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676, reflects an intent that the
State not tax reservation lands or income derived therefrom ,
but the present taxes are assessed against nonmembers of the
Tribes and concern transactions in personalty with no substantial connection to reservation lands. The relevant treaties,
Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (Lummi Tribe); Treaty
with the Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Y akimas,
12 Stat. 951, can be read to recognize inherent tribal power to
exclude non-Indians or impose conditions on those permitted
to enter ; but purchasers entering the reservation are not the
State's agents and any agreements which they might make
cannot bind it. Finally, although the Tribes themselves could
perhaps pre-empt state taxation through the exercise of
properly delegated federal power to do so, cf. Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U. S. 382, 390 (1976) (per curiam); United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975), we do not infer from the
mere fact of federal approval of the Indian taxing ordinances,
or from the fact that the Tribes exercise congressionally
sanctioned powers of self-government, that Congress has delegated the far-reaching authority to pre-empt valid state sales
and cigarette taxes otherwise collectible from nonmembers of
the Tribe.
Washington does not infringe the right of reservation
Indians tci "make their own laws and be ruled by them,"
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), merely because
the result of imposing its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes
of revenues which they currently are receiving. The principle
of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal
Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the
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other. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S,
164, 179 ( 1973) . While the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for essential governmental programs, that interest
is strongest when , the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation ,by ·activities involving the Tribes
and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services: - The
State also has a legitimate governmental' interest in raising
revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax
is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is
the recipient of state services. As we have already noted,
Washington's taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the
Tribes from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers
who do not receive significant tribal services and who would
otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservations.
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Com..
merce Clause, of -its own force, automatically bars all state
taxation of matters significantly touching the political and
economic interests of the ·Tribes. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai T·ribes, supra, at 481, n. 17. That clause may have a
more limited role to play in preventing undue discrimination
against, or burdens on, Indian commerce. But Washington's
taxes are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to· aU transactions within the Sta.te. And although the result of these
taxes will be to lessen or eliminate tribal commerce with nonmembers, that market existed in tlie firsl place only because of
a claimed exemption from these very ta.xes: The taxes under
consideration do not 'burden commerce that would exist on the
reservations without respect to the tax exemption.
We cannot fault the State for not giving credit on the
amount of tribal taxes paid. It is argued that if a credit is
not given, the tribal retailers·will actually be placed at a competitive disadvantage, as compared to retailers elsewhere, due
to the overlapping impact of tribal and state taxation. While
this argument is not without force, we find that the ·Tribes
· h~v~ f~iled tQ demonstratE;) that b1,1sines~ at the smokeshopa
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would be significantly reduced by a state tax without a credit
as compared to a state tax with a credit. With a credit, prices
at the smokeshops would presumably be roughly the same as
those off the reservation, assuming that the Indian enterprises are operated at an efficiency similar to that of businesses
'elsewhere; without a credit, prices at smokeshops would exceed
those off the reservation by the amount of the tribal taxes,
'a bout 40-to-50 cents per carton for the Lummi, Makah, and
Colville Tribes, and 22.5 cents per carton for the Yakima
Tribe. It is evident that even if credit were given, the bulk
of the smokeshops' present business would still be eliminated,
-eince nonresidents of the reservation could purchase cigarettes at the same price and with greater convenience nearer
their homes and would have no incentive to travel to the
smokeshops for bargain purchases as they do now. Members
of the Tribes, of course, would be indifferent to whether a
credit were given because under Moe they are immune from
any state tax, whether credited or not. Some nonmembers
of the Tribes living on the reservations would possibly travel
elsewhere to purchase cigarettes if a state credit were not
given, and smokeshop business would to this extent be
decreased as compared to the situation under a credited tax.
But the Tribes have not shown whether or to what extent
this would be the case, and we cannot infer on the present
record that by failing to give a credit Washington impermissibly taxes reservation value by deterring sales that, if
credit were given, would occur on the reservation because of
its location and because of the efforts of the Tribes in importing and marketing the cigarettes.
A second asserted ground for the invalidity of the state
taxes is that they somehow conflict with the Tribes' cigarette
t>rdinances and thereby are subject to pre-emption or contravene the principle of tribal self-government. This argument
need not detain us. There is no d1rect conflict between the
1tate and tribal schemes, since each government is free to

'·
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impose its taxes without ousting the other. Although taxes
can be used for distributive or regulatory purposes, as well as
for raising revenue, we see no nonrevenue purposes to the
tribal taxes at issue in these cases, .and, as already noted, we
perceive no intent on the part of Congress to authorize the
Tribes to pre-empt otherwise valid state taxes. Other provisions of the tribal ordinances do comprehensively regulate the
ma.rketing of cigarettes by the tribal enterprises; but the State
does not interfere with the Tribes' power to regulate tribal
enterprises when it simply imposes its tax on sales to nonmembers. Hence, we perceive no conflict between state and
tribal law warranting invalidation of the State's taxes.

',

c
We recognized in Moe that if a State's tax is valid, the State
tnay impose at least minimal burdens on Indian businesses to
aid in <'Ollecting and enforcing that tax. The simple ·Collection burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax on tribal
smokeshops is legally indistinguishable from the collection
burden upheld in Moe, and we therefore hold tha.t the State
ma.y validly require the tribal smokeshops to affix tax stamps
purchased from the State to individual packages of cigarettes
prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the Tribe.
The state sales tax scheme requires smokeshop operators to
keep detailed records of both taxable and nontaxable transactions. The operator must record the number and dollar
volume of taxable sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. With
respect to nontaxable sales, the operator must record and
retain for state inspection the names of all Indian purchasers,
their tribal affiliations, the Indian reservations within which
sales are made, and the dollar amount and dates of sales.
In addition, unless the Indian purchaser is personally known
to the operator he must present a tribal identification card.
The District Court struck down all recordkeeping require-·
ments with respect to cigarette sales, because it found that no
cig~:rette sales were taxable, With respt:lct to sales of item~
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tlther than cigarettes, the District Court found no record evidence "as to whether the record keeping requirements, as
promulgated, are or are not reasonably necessary to ensure
payment of lawful taxes." 446 F. Supp., at 1373. The District Court upheld the requirements insofar as they pertained
to taxable sales, but struck them down with respect to nontaxable sales on the ground that the State had not met its
burden of showing that the regulation was reasonably necess~ry to ensure payment of taxes which it had power to impose.
Contrary to the District Court, we find the State's recordkeeping requirements valid in toto. The Tribes, and not the
State as the District Court supposed, bear the burden of showing that the recordkeeping requirements which they are challenging are invalid. The District Court made the factual
finding, which we accept, that there was no evidence of record
on this question. Applying the correct burden of proof to the
District Court's finding, we hold that the Tribes have failed
to demonstrate tha.t the State's recordkeeping requirements
for exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as a means of
preventing fraudulent transactions.

D
The St.ate asserts the power to apply its sales and cigarette
taxes to Indians resident on the reserva.tion but not enrolled
in the governing Tribe. The issue arose in the Yakima case
in the wake of the District Court's determination that the
state reta.il sales tax could be applied to the purchase by nonIndians of goods other than cigarettes. It was, of course,
quite clear after Moe and McClanahan tha.t the sales tax could
not be applied to similar purchases by tribal members, but the
State argued that this exemption should not extend to nonmembers of the Tribe. Relying in part on the lower court
opinion in Moe, Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v.
Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (Mont. 1975·) (three-judge
court), the District Court rejected the contention. 446 F .
Supp., at 1371~1372. This Court did not reach the question in
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Moe because Montana failed to raise it on appeal. We do
reach it now, and we reverse.
Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which
they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt
Washington's power to impose its taxes on Indians not members of the Tribe. We do not so· read the Major Crimes Act,
62 Stat. 758, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1153, which at most
provides for federal-court jurisdiction over crimes committed
Ly Indians on another Tribe's reservation. Cf. United States
v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641 , 646- 647, n. 7 (1977) . Similarly,
t he mere fact that nonmembers resident on the reservation
come within the definition of "Indian" for purposes of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 988, 25 U. S. C.
§ 479, does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt
such Indians from state taxation.
Nor would the imposition of Washington's tax on these purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for
the simple reason that nonmembers are not constituents of
the governing Tribe. For most practical purposes those
Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on
the reservation. There is no evidence that nonmembers have
a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disbursements. We find, therefore, that the State's interest in taxing
these purchasers outweighs any tribal interest that may exist
in preventing the State from imposing its taxes.
E
Finally, the State contends that it has the power to seize
unstamped cigarettes as contraband if the Tribes do not coop·
erate in collecting the State's taxes. The State in fact seized
shipments travelling to the reservations from out-of-State
wholesalers before being enjoined from doing so by the District Court, and it has declared its intention to continue such
seizures if successful in this litigation. The Tribes contest
this power, noting that because sales by wholesalers to the
tribal businesses are concededly exempt from state taxation,
no state tax is due while the cigarettes are in transit.
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We find that Washington's interest in enforcing its valid
taxes is sufficient to justify these seizures. Although the
cigarettes in transit are as yet exempt from state taxation, they
l,U"e not immune from seizure when the Tribes, as here, have
refused to fulfill collection and remittance obligations which
the State has validly imposed. It is significant that these
seizures take place outside the reservation, in locations where
state power over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive
than it is within reservation boundaries. Cf. M esoalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973). By seizing
cigarettes en route to the reservation, the Sta.te polices against
wholesale evasion of its own valid taxes without unnecessarily
intruding on core tribal interests.
Washington further contends that it may enter onto the
reservations, seize stocks of ciga.r ettes which are intended for
sale to nonmembers, and sell' these stocks in order to obtain
payment of the taxes due. However, this question, which
obviously is considerably different from the preceding one, is
not properly before us. The record does not disclose that the
State has ever entered the reservations to seize cigarettes
because of the Tribes' failure to collect the taxes due on
sales to nonmembers, or ever threatened to do so except in
papers filed in this litigation. Indeed, the State itself concedes that "it may very well be that this Court will find it
unnecessary to rule on this aspect of the appeal." Brief for
Appellant 110. We therefore express no opinion on the
matter.

·~
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The next issue concerns the challenge in the Colville case
to the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper
and travel trailer taxes. Although not identical, these taxes
are quite similar. Each is denominated an excise tax for the
"privilege" of using the covered vehicle in the Sta.te, each is
assessed annually at a certain percentage of fair market value,
tmd e~ch is sought to be imposed upon vehicles owned by
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the Tribe or its members and used both on and off the
reservation.29
Once again, our departure point is Moe. 'There we held
that Montana's pei_'sonal property tax could not ·validly be
applied to motor vehicles, owned by tribal members who resided on the reservation. 425 U.S., at 480-481. The vehicles
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and
off the reservation, 30 and the tax was assessed annually at a
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus,
the only differenqe between the taxes now before us and the one
struck down in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State,
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax.
The State asserts that this difference ·mandates a different
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle as of
January 1 of each year," 31 and that event took place on the
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, supra, Montana was without authority
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continues,
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is
inapplicable and the tax should be upheld under Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U . S. 145 (1973).
29 In the wake of McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra,
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon
vehicles used wholly within the reservation. Brief for Appellant 111 , and
n. 77.
30 Moe did not focus upon vehicle use at all. The District Court opinion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which
Montana sought to apply its tax were used both on and off the reservation. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 392 F . Supp.
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court) (Smith, J., concurring
and dissenting) .
31 ld., at 1327, citing the Montana statute, Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 84-406 (2) (1974 Supp.).
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and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon
vehicles used wholly within the reservation. Brief for Appellant 111 , and
n. 77.
80 Moe did not focus upon vehicle use at all.
The District Court opinion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which
Montana sought to apply its tax were used both on and off the reservation. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 392 F. Supp.
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31 ld., at 1327, citing the Montana statute, Mont. Rev. Codes Ann •
.§ 84-406 (2) (1974 Supp.).

'·

78-63G-OPINION
WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES

27

We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily
circumvented. While Washington may well be free to levy
a tax on the use outside the reservation of Indian-owned
vehicles, it may not under that rubric accomplish what Moe
held was prohibited. Had Washington tailored its tax to the
amount of actual off-reservation use, or otherwise varied something more than mere nomenclature, this might be a different
case. But it has not done so, and we decline to treat the
case as if it had.

VI
Finally, we come to the challenge by the Colville, Lummi,
and Makah Tribes to the State's assumption of civil and
criminal jurisdiction over them. The District Court found
that assumption unlawful as regards the Makah and Lummi
reservations and lawful as regards the Colville reservation .
446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. The State challenges the former
findings.
All parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington
v. Yak·ima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). There a pattern of jurisdiction identical to those created on the Makah
and Lummi reservations was upheld, and the holdinp; of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on which the District
Court in the present case relied for its conclusion that such
patterns are unconstitutional was reversed. We therefore
uphold the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the Makah
and Lummi reservations. 82 Accordingly, the judgment of the
District Court is
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

1n

We :aste pmbable jttfiscliction
No. 78-60, Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation et al. v. Washington et al., which is pending on appeal ~ the Colville Tribe appeals from so much of the Dis2
trict Court's JUdgment as reflects the holding that Washington's assumption of total jurisdictjou over that Tribe'::; reservation was lawful. See 446
F. Supp., at 1366- 1367. The Colville Tribe challenges that holding on
82

,.

'7
28

6~m-OPINJON

WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES

grounds (1) that Washington could not assume jurisdiction without amend~
ing itl:! constitution and (2) that the assumption of total jurisdiction over
only selected reservations viola.tes the Equal Protection Clause. Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), disposes of the
first contention, id., at 493, and makes clear that the second must fail
if the assumption of jurisdiction is rationally related to some valid state
purpo~e, id., at 500-502. We find the pattern of jurisdiction in the
present case rational : The Colville Tribe consented in 1965 to the State's
·assumption of jurisdiction over it, and the !Sta.te has assumed total jurisdiction only over Tribes that have so consented. The presence or
absence of tribal consent is a rational basis for distinguishing among
reservations, and there is thus no constitutional infirmity. Accordin~y~
the judgment is in this respect affirmed.
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